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ABSTRACT
When King Philip's War erupted in the summer of 1675,
the New England colonies entered a quarter-century of almost
constant trial and tension. Colonial leaders consistently
interpreted each successive crisis and the lingering
legacies as warnings from God against backsliding and sin.
Interpreting the causes of the colonies' troubles was just
the beginning of the struggle, however; understanding,
solving, and learning from the trials of the period
represented the ongoing challenge for the future of the New
England mission.
The most obvious victims of King Philip's War were the
natives of the colony. Even the Praying Indians who lived
under English jurisdiction became targets of the colonists'
anxiety and prejudice.
The persistence of any bands in the
region, friendly or hostile, provided a source of continuing
tension for the colonists.
Economically, demographically, even politically, the
effects of King Philip's War lingered throughout the ensuing
decades.
The colony's effort to recoup the costs of the war
led to a persistent struggle as citizens and towns attempted
to avoid the increased tax rates. The need to secure the
frontier communities either threatened or actually abandoned
during the conflict represented an ongoing campaign in the
region.
In the area of politics, the war made the colonists
more sensitive and more assertive, and this new spirit
appeared in town politics as well as in the constitutional
upheaval in Boston.
The uneasiness resulting from the accumulated tensions
led to a period of self-examination among New Englanders.
Puritan clergy exhorted their followers to reform in order
to ward off the forces of evil which threatened the mission.
The jeremiads of the period bemoaned the spiritual decline
in the region, but in the end, their message remained
optimistic.
The errand would continue, but with a new sense
of secular interest incorporated into the New England
mentality. Although King Philip's War was not the sole,
direct cause of ail of the problems that plagued
Massachusetts during the troubled decades of the late
seventeenth century, it was the first in a series of crises
and the event which set the tone for the whole period.

viii
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INTRODUCTION

Samuel Eliot Morison hailed Dougals Leach's Flintlock
and Tomahawk (1958) as "the first comprehensive history of
King Philip's War to appear since the seventeenth century."
Morison characterized the book as "not only a military but a
political and social history" of "an intensely dramatic
struggle, decisive for the survival of the English race in
New England, and the eventual disappearance of the Algonkian
Indians."

Leach himself called King Philip's War "the first

major test for the budding civilization which had been
planted in New England."

He claimed that the conflict

represented "a crisis of staggering proportions" which
threatened "to undo much of the careful work that had been
accomplished.

No society," he surmised, "can pass through

such a crisis without experiencing deep and abiding
changes."1
For all of the recognition of the long-range importance
of King Philip's War to the New England mission and of the
"deep and abiding changes" that the conflict brought,
Leach's much-acclaimed work focused overwhelmingly on the
fifteen-month-long period of open hostilities rather than on
the continuing significance of the struggle.

This narrow

approach toward the war has been the norm in histories of
2
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3
the topic from the time that contemporaries such as William
Hubbard and Cotton Mather penned their accounts all the way
to the twentieth century.

Actually, some of these early

chroniclers, in an attempt to exhort their readers to
reform, came closer to fitting the war into a larger context
than have many modern historians.

Still, the common

portrayal of the victory over the Indians has remained an
image of ultimate challenge and heroic accomplishment.
Thus, King Philip's War has generally been viewed as a
solution to the problem of how the native and English
cultures would coexist in New England.

Leach and Morison,

in fact, saw English domination as inevitable and therefore
viewed the war as the conclusive means to that end.
Far from being a climax, however, King Philip's War
represented an important transition, and in many ways, the
beginning of a new phase in New England history.

This study

therefore portrays the conflict as the focal point in the
ensuing quarter century of tension and crisis rather than as
the conclusion of a half-century of development.

The

colonists defeated the natives in 1676, but the fears,
tensions, and doubts of the war years did not end with
Metacom's death.

The lasting significance of King Philip's

War rested not merely in the colonists' ability to meet the
military challenge but more importantly in their responses
to the legacies which continued to affect them.
King Philip's War erupted in a period of relative
tranquility in New England.

Not since the late 1630s had
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4
the natives of the region caused serious alarm;

religious

uniformity was still required in the colony, in spite of the
initially controversial Half-Way Covenant;

the missionary

effort had finally begun to bring significant numbers of
natives under colonial jurisdiction;

Massachusetts'

political autonomy went virtually unquestioned;
settlement was thriving and expanding.

and English

New Englanders may

not have been completely confident of success— the clergy
regularly delivered jeremiads against degeneracy— but they
certainly were not prepared for a crisis of the magnitude of
King Philip's War.

Therefore, the war could not end as an

isolated incident.

Rather, it left lingering problems and

generated nagging questions for years to come.
from the conflict was not quick;

Recovery

responding to the

unprecedented challenges represented an ongoing struggle.
On both the local and provincial level, King Philip's
War left deep marks in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

Leach

was correct in his assertion that the conflict posed "a
major test" for the English provinces, but the long-term
significance of the trial was not a matter of "the survival
of the English race in New England" versus "the eventual
disappearance of the Algonkian Indians," as Morison
suggested.

In the long run, the real challenges revolved

around the ways in which the colonists solved the various
problems caused by the conflict and reacted to the new
tensions generated during the postwar period.

This study

attempts to analyze the legacies of King Philip's War in a
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number of areas and thereby to determine how the conflict
affected the future of the English errand into the
wilderness.
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. Douglas Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk (New York:
MacMillan Publishers, 1958), viii-x.
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CHAPTER 1
PUNISHMENT AND REPENTANCE

In June 1675, King Philip's War erupted in Plymouth
colony, and though the colonists could not have known it at
the time, the conflict initiated a long period of persistent
and far-reaching adversity in the region.

Although the war

was not the only cause of the changes that occurred during
this crucial period, the fifteen-month-long struggle with
the natives under Metacom's leadership came to represent a
focal point for viewing the troubles of the ensuing decades.
Few New Englanders were prepared for the economic, social,
political, and intellectual upheaval that followed.

In the

beginning, very few colonists were prepared for the trauma
of aggressive Indian warfare.

Misunderstanding the causes

and nature of the conflict, the white residents could not
immediately cope with the stunning initial setbacks or with
their apparent inability to bring the natives to bay.
Throughout the war, Puritan leaders ignored the physical
realities, concentrating instead on spiritual causes, cures,
and lessons.

Thus, the war could not be an isolated episode

which ended with Metacom's death, but rather represented a
lingering shadow which loomed over New England during the
troubled decades of the late seventeenth century.
7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

On January 29, 1675, John Sassamon, a member of
Metacom's Wampanoag tribe, was murdered shortly after
warning English authorities of a native conspiracy against
the colonies.

Five months later, in early June, three

Wampanoags were brought up on dubious charges, summarily
tried, and executed for the crime.1 Within three weeks, on
June 24, a Wampanoag war party attacked the town of Swansea,
killing nine people;

King Philip's War had begun.

Obviously, though the events surrounding the murder of
John Sassamon and the ensuing trial provided the spark which
ignited the conflict, they were not the sole sources of
tension which led the natives to initiate hostilities
against the colonists.

In general, Metacom and his people

were troubled by the growth of the English population in New
England, the expansion of colonial settlement, and
increasing efforts to bring the natives under provincial
authority.

During the half century since his father

Massasoit concluded a mutual peace treaty with the Plymouth
Pilgrims, Metacom watched New England grow from a small
settlement on the coast to a thriving complex composed of
four separate colonies which contained English settlement
not only around Massachusetts Bay and Cape Cod, but along
Narragansett Bay and the Connecticut River as well.
The Wampanoags did not idly watch this expansion
progress, and during the two decades before the war,
colonial officials maintained a wary vigil against any hint
of native opposition.

The troubles basically arose because

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Englishmen— and Europeans in general— displayed an inability
to understand native values and needs.

2

The Puritans of

New England, as did their brethren in other colonies,
believed that they dealt fairly with the Indians in matters
such as land purchases and legal proceedings.

But in all

cases, colonial leaders measured the exchanges strictly
according to their own standards, not those of the Indians.
This dichotomy of attitudes compounded the outrage felt
by resistant tribes such as the Wampanoags over the physical
incursions on their domains.
undoubtedly went much deeper;

But their feelings of loss
as members of a close, proud

group imbued with traditional values and beliefs, Metacom's
people could trust in their moral superiority and resent the
insults cast upon them by a contending, yet seemingly
inferior culture.3 Feeling their position unfairly
threatened, lashing out at the aggressor represented a
perfectly rational response in the Wampanoags' frame of
mind.

So in addition to the struggle for land and political

sovereignty, the conflict known as King Philip's War also
contained an ideological core, not only on the part of the
well-publicized English mission but also for the natives
4
involved.
The colonists, of course, considered none of the
psychological bruises suffered by their native adversaries,
instead taking every opportunity to tighten the pressure on
the recalcitrant Wampanoags.

From the time Metacom

succeeded his brother Alexander (Wamsutta) to the sachemship
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10
in 1664, Plymouth officials demanded assurances from him
that he would not sell or in any way alienate any Wampanoag
lands without their consent.

But by the end of the decade,

Plymouth authorized the town of Swansea to purchase and
annex land from the natives for the expansion of the
community.

Feeling their sovereignty threatened, Metacom's

Wampanoags became restless, and the Plymouth General Court
responded by calling the sachem to account for a rumored
conspiracy against the colony.

On April 10, 1671, colonial

officials ordered Metacom to turn in all of his people's
weapons, fined him for his actions, and forced him to affirm
that he and his people had always been subjects of the
Plymouth colony.

This strong-armed tactic most directly

affected the natives, though at least one historian
maintains that the Taunton Treaty, as this agreement was
called, was intended as much as a tool in the land squabbles
between Plymouth and Massachusetts as a device to control
5
the Wampanoags.
Not to be outdone, the Bay Colony called Metacom to
Boston and made him agree to a similar treaty, acknowledging
himself "Subject to his Majesty the King of England, and the
Government of New-Plimouth, and to their Laws."

At the same

time, the authorities of both colonies forced the sachem to
take full responsibility for any tensions felt between the
two cultures.

"I having of late through my Indiscretion,

and the Naughtiness of my Heart," grovelled Metacom,
"violated and broken this my Covenant with my Friends, by
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taking up Arms, with evil intent against them, and that
groundlessly . . .

The key idea expressed was that the

natives acted maliciously with "nothing of any Provocation
from the English."6 Thus, colonial officials could claim
innocence in the event of hostilities and could voice horror
at any "unprovoked" attacks.
Prevalent English opinion, according to the Reverend
William Hubbard, a contemporary historian, contradicted any
notion that the troubles sprang from "some Irregularities
and Miscarriages in our Transactions and Dealings with the
Indians themselves."

To the contrary, the United Colonies

"endeavoured by the sharpest and severest Laws imaginable to
prevent any Miscarriages of such a Nature."

In reality, it

was the natives who felt the sharpness and severity of
colonial laws.

Further, Hubbard asserted, if Metacom and

his people had any reason for complaint, the offenses came
"only from such Places and Persons as border upon us round
about," but certainly not from the New England colonies.7
Although not all New Englanders were caught so blindly
unaware when the war broke out, the majority of colonists
held the view that the natives had no just reason to harbor
animosity against the English.
To the contrary, the Indians of Metacom's Wampanoag
band complained about many key points in their relations
with the English colonists.

In a parley with the native

chief just before the actual initiation of hostilities, a
group of Rhode Island magistrates heard a list of grievances
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from the powerful chieftain himself.

In the most general

terms, he claimed that the Indians "had dun no rong,
the English ronged them."

[but]

The troubles dated back to the

early days of the colony, Metacom said, when his father,
Massasoit, "was a great man and the English as a litell
Child";

the Wampanoags at the time "Constraened other

indians from ronging the English and gave them Coren and
shewed them how to plant."
turned.

Since then, the tables had

Most of the chief's complaints centered on the

colonists' land dealings.
was originally agreed upon.

They often claimed more land than
The "English made [petty

chiefs] drunk and then cheted them in bargens."

When chiefs

resisted colonial land grabs, the English found or created
"a nother king that wold give or seell them there land."
With colonial settlement spreading so rapidly, the natives
found "thay Could not kepe ther coren from being spoyled" by
English livestock, "thay never being iused to fence."
Whatever the issue, Metacom felt that the Indians could not
get a fair hearing from colonial courts or authorities, "all
English [being] agred against them, and so by arbetration
they had had much rong."8 The natives' grievances and the
underlying warnings contained therein went unanswered by
Massachusetts and Plymouth officials, and hostilities began.
Since the colonists viewed the initial attacks on the
southwestern towns of Plymouth colony as unprovoked and
unjustifiable, the other New England colonies, particularly
Massachusetts, leaped into the fray.

Massachusetts
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officials acted on the belief that "He that will not help to
quench the Fire in his Neighbours House, may justly fear to
lose his own."9 Residents of other colonies, however, were
dubious about the Bay Colony's intentions.

John Easton, a

Rhode Islander, left an account of the early stages of the
conflict which reflected as much a fear of Massachusetts'
encroachments as of Indian depredations.

These fears came

true when, in 1675, Massachusetts troops came first to
negotiate with the powerful Narragansett tribe "without
[Rhode Island's] Consent" and then attacked the natives
"without proclemation."

From the Rhode Island point of

view, the desire of the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies
for the Indians' lands "was the greatest Case of the war
against them."10 Massachusetts authorities, of course,
disagreed.
The myopic view that the English were innocent of any
affront against the natives allowed Puritan leaders to
attribute the war to God's punishment of the colonists' own
sins.

Warnings from the clergy about backsliding preceded

the war, but the violent eruption by the unconverted
Indians, the targets of the New England mission, brought a
virtual flood of literature condemning the colonists'
wrongdoings.

The belief that God's displeasure might be

unleashed in an Indian war was well established in Puritan
thought.

The "sins of men provoke the justice of Almighty

God both to visit and chastise" His people, wrote an
anonymous author in 1642;

it was certainly conceivable that
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the visitations could take the form of Indian attacks.11
This tradition mirrored the covenant agreement which
comprised the Puritan relationship with the Creator;

He

would never punish them arbitrarily or maliciously, but in
response to inconstancy, Puritan backsliders could expect
just retribution.
Expressions of this sentiment, both written and oral,
abounded throughout the conflict.

Mary Pray, appropriately

named, wrote from Providence in January 1676 that "sin is
the cause of our sorrow."

Searching for a positive motive

for the affliction, she expressed hope that "the lord in
much mercy [would] make us as sencabl of the caus as we are
of the punishment."

12

Colonial officials also hoped to

make the people sensible of their sins and omissions.
During the fall of 1675, the governor's Council of
Massachusetts publicized a catalogue of offenses prevalent
among the supposedly godly population.

The Council began by

pointing out that "God, for severall yeares past, hath not
only warned us by his word, but chastized us with his rods,"
all to no avail.

Among New England's sins, the Council

cited "a neglect of discipline in the churches";
of pride in apparrell" and hairstyles;
Quakers and their "damnable haeresies,
idolatrys";

an "evill

toleration of
[and] abominable

"much disorder & rudenes in [the] youth";

prophanity "by common swearing and cursing in ordinary
communication";

"contempt for authority";

and "idlenes."

Possibly most "shamefull and scandelous" of all, the Council
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15
condemned the "loose & sinfull custome of going or riding
from towne to towne,

. . . oft times men & weomen together,

upon pretence of going to lecture," when the true purpose
was "meerely to drincke & revell in ordinarys &
tavernes."

13

These various offenses seemed to reflect a

growing sense of worldliness.

According to both civil and

religious authorities, Massachusetts congregations reeked
with corruption.
Colonial officials also warned that simple recognition
was insufficient;

true repentence had to follow.

The

Council noted that the people needed "to be effectually
humbled for our sinns, to repent of them, reforme, and amend
our wayes."

In doing so, New England Puritans would "turne

againe unto the Lord our God, from whom wee have departed
with a great backsliding."14 All of these calls for
repentence— and they came from individuals as well as from
legislative bodies— suggest that the Puritans saw both the
causes and the progress of the conflict in spiritual terms.
The path to victory involved not only military campaigns
against Metacom;

in fact, military success was only

secondary, a result of the more important spiritual
reformation.

The true struggle was between good and evil,

personified by the English and native forces, but New
Englanders were constantly reminded that each of them also
had to fight the same battle within themselves.
By 1675 the Puritans had devised a plan for dealing
with such a struggle in times of trouble.

To purge their
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souls and congregations of sin, secular and religious
leaders alike advised recurrent days of humiliation and
fast, as well as regular individual self-examination.15 In
the early stages of the war especially, Massachusetts
officials seemed at least as concerned with preparing for
days of public humiliation as with planning expeditions
against the natives.

In fact, one of the Council's major

worries was a fear that many people were "so selfe wise &
improvident" that they would not take repentence seriously
until it was too late.16 Such a scenario would surely
prove damaging to New England's cause.
Of special concern to the Council was the behavior of
the Massachusetts militiamen.

Since they embodied the

outward signs of the battle against the forces of evil,
colonial soldiers had to display representative attributes
of the good.

Therefore, the Council ordered commanders to

set for their soldiers "a good example in piety & vertue"
and to make their camps places of "holynes to the Lord."17
All of Puritan society had to repent in order to regain
God's favor, but the requirement that the militia maintain a
high moral standard was essential to victory over the
natives.
Early in the war, however, no segment of New England
society reformed itself adequately, at least in the eyes of
the Massachusetts leadership.

The colonies would not taste

relief or victory, according to the orthodox view, until
individual and communal repentance righted their wrongs.
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Both civil and ecclesiastical leaders publicized this point.
In the winter of 1675-76, when the colonies feared the
return of spring and Indian attacks, Increase Mather warned
that "people are not [yet] Humbled and Reformed."

The

powerful cleric exhibited some partisan bias in accusing the
magistrates and especially Governor John Leverett of having
"no Heart to doe what they might in order to
Reformation.1,18 Later, in contemporary histories of the
war, both Mather and Hubbard agreed that in 1675, "although
[the] Wound was not incurable, yet much more Blood must be
taken away before it could be healed."

"All humane

endeavours shall arrive at no other Success," added Hubbard,
"than the Counsel of God hath preordained."19
That the clergy expressed such exhortations should
surprise no one;

perhaps more revealing are examples of

almost identical sentiments from a layman, albeit a highly
placed one, like Maj . John Pynchon.

On September 8, 1675,

the major wrote to Governor Leverett, "The Lord effectually
humble us;

the little success of our forces speaks we are

not yet truly humbled . . . ."

20

Such examples reflect the

degree to which devout New Englanders from various walks of
life saw the hand of God in every aspect of their existence.
The recurring defeats indicated to Puritans the need for
continued repentance in order to regain favor in the divine
plan.
Not only did God deny the colonies military success;
He also seemed to aid their enemies.

"He is not going forth
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with our Armies as in former times,11 lamented Increase
Mather, "but giving up many of our Brethen to the mouth of
the devouring Sword . . . .»21 Mary Rowlandson, a
minister's wife captured from Lancaster along with her three
children on February 10, 1676, expanded on the cleric's
amazement at "the strange providence of God in preserving
the heathen."

Correcting herself from questioning the

Creator's "strange providence," she later noted "admiration"
at how "the Lord preserve[d]

[the natives] for his Holy

ends," which for the time involved "further affliction to
our poor country."

22

New Englanders saw no contradiction

in their insistence that Indians constantly portrayed as
heathens and devil-worshippers were enjoying direct aid from
God.

The Book of Job gave adequate precedent for such

punishment.

Since the Puritan belief system attributed

every event to divine providence, the colonists' setbacks
could not be viewed as merely military defeats;

the natives

could nor possibly gain such success without direction from
above.

Consistent with their failure to recognize their

enemies' motivations in the conflict, New Englanders never
considered that Metacom's followers were guided by their own
strategy and expertise.
Despite the conviction that the war represented an
expression of God's anger, the same leaders who pointed to
the colonists' shortcomings also predicted an ultimate good
resulting from the troubled times.

The Lord would not

punish His chosen people without a purpose, and when they
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had been sufficiently humbled and reformed, the mission
would continue as intended.

Carrying the inconsistency one

step further, Daniel Gookin predicted one ironic benefit of
the war.

The heathen Indians, who were temporarily serving

the Almighty in the punishment of New England, would
eventually face destruction due to their evil role in the
conflict.23
In addition to the removal of the recalcitrant tribes,
other Massachusetts residents foresaw regeneration within.
Twenty years earlier, Pynchon wrote to John Winthrop,
Jr. that when the Lord lays His people low, "he knows how to
raise [them] up again in his due time."

He carried that

trust with him through New England's ultimate trial.

"These

are trying times," he confided to his son Joseph in 1675,
"and it is good knowing in whom we have believed and
treasured in heaven is abiding when the greatest earthly
enjoyment may soon fail us and come to nothing."24
Proclaiming the wisdom of the divine plan, one chronicler
exhorted the devout "to wait upon Gods Will, and attend his
Work in this thing."

Then, in the end, the Puritans would

recognize the saving grace of the Lord and have cause to
sing "How great is his Goodness!

and how great is his

Beauty!"25 Before any such joyous salvation could be
celebrated, however, New Englanders had to come to terms
with the natives who constantly reminded them of their sins.
The largest problem for most New Englanders was that
they simply could not view the Indians as rational beings
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driven by human needs and desires.

At best, during tranquil

times, the natives might be regarded as ignorant pagans
worthy of conversion and possible salvation.

But in periods

of conflict such as King Philip's War, English writers
characterized their enemies as irredeemable members of the
animal kingdom.

In 1676 Nathaniel Saltonstall likened

native warriors to "Wolves and other Beasts of Prey, that
commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by
Stealth."26 Such accusations reflected the colonists'
frustrations in being unable to comprehend or counteract
Indian warfare.
Englishmen could not understand native warfare because
it was totally alien to their idea of civilized,
institutionalized military action.

They denigrated native

strategy because it seemed to lack organization and purpose.
Since New Englanders viewed the war solely as God's
punishment for their own backsliding, they could not
recognize that the natives had a secular motive for their
actions.

Throughout history, war has served as an outlet

for suppressed tensions within or between contending
nations.

The Wampanoags and other tribes in the region

certainly felt enough agitation due to the encroaching
colonies to warrant a hostile response, according to their
cultural perception of the situation.
Further, by assuming that the Wampanoags had no real
tactics or strategy, Englishmen denied that native societies
took any care to train, prepare, or plan for their military
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operations.

Quite to the contrary, virtually every attack

made by Metacom or his allies corresponded to
well-established patterns common among American Indian
groups and actually among tribal peoples throughout the
world.

Mobility and surprise attacks, especially at dawn,

were basic elements of aboriginal warfare.

American natives

combined quick offensive action and overwhelming initial
fire power to make debilitating shock work to their
advantage.

Such tactics were ordinarily employed by the

Indians during King Philip's War.

Attacks did not acquire

or display these characteristics randomly;

the fact that

the same successful practices recurred with such regularity
indicated that the natives gave conscious thought to their
methods.

In claiming that this brand of warfare, including

the frequent use of ambushes, represented barbarism,
Englishmen judged native actions by European standards that
did not necessarily apply in North America.27 To the
Indians, their actions were not formless, purposeless, or
barbaric— they were proven effective tactics.
New Englanders seemed to take offense even at the
suggestion that the natives could proceed in a rational
manner on their own initiative.

According to the prevalent

opinion, "when sent by God in way of Judgment,

[the Indians]

act as if they were under Military Conduct," but in no way
could such an appearance result from their own training or
expertise.28 "Military Conduct" was not a virtue which
Englishmen generally attributed to native Americans, instead
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crediting their martial successes more to "perfidious
Subtlety and Falsehood, or to the Advantage of Season,
Place, and Number than any Valour or Courage."29 Civilized
Europeans refused to admit that their supposedly savage
counterparts could best them without divine aid, guile, or
luck.
Massachusetts chroniclers noted that New England
natives preferred and benefitted from action in rough
terrain.

The swamps of Plymouth and Rhode Island presented

special advantages to the Indians while compounding the
confusion and frustration of colonial troops.

The swamps,

which Hubbard characterized as "Habitations of Darkness,"
were "so full of Bushes and Trees, that a Parcel of Indians
may be within the Length of a Pike of a Man," said Nathaniel
Saltonstall, "and he cannot discover them."

In addition,

the natives, "being so light of Foot," travelled easily
through bogs where the English "could by no Means pursue
them."30 Admittedly, New Englanders displayed definite
shortcomings in wilderness combat, and they were no match
for the natives in tracking through heavy cover, but the
troopers and most of their leaders seemed to develop a
debilitating sense of pessimism about fighting the Indians.
Perhaps they believed that the ability to maneuver in swamps
was less than civilized, but the colonists decided, at least
while the war was going badly, that they simply could not
follow the natives through the bogs.
Massachusetts authorities were disappointed that their
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forces failed to defeat Metacom during the summer of 1675,
before the war got out of hand.

According to John Pynchon,

the English were "somewhat awk[ward] and fearful in scouting
and spy m g . "

31

In one case, related by Capt. Benjamin

Church, English soldiers hesitated to enter an area
reportedly infested with rattlesnakes, "which the little
company seem'd more to be afraid of than the black Serpents
they were in quest of ."

In other cases, troopers lacked a

healthy degree of caution.

Maj.

Daniel Gookin recalled a

soldier who wore "a new pair of shoes that made a creaking
noise as [he] travelled" on a campaign.

The company's

Mohegan guide refused to continue "until he had persuaded
the fellow with the creaking shoes to take his moccasins and
wear them, and the Indian carried the Englishman's shoes at
his back, and went himself barefoot."

Another soldier wore

"a pair of leather breeches, which being dry made a rustling
noise";

again, the Mohegan halted "until he had persuaded

the man to take off his breeches, or else to wet them in
water to prevent their rustling."32
These instances represent somewhat humorous examples of
English incompetence in combating hostile natives in a
wilderness environment.

English ineptitude, however,

sometimes proved fatal.

Mather related an incident in which

English soldiers were so disconcerted by the thick cover
that they fired at each other rather than at their enemies.
Certainly, Mather's account was full of symbolism— the
English blinded by evil forces and becoming their own
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enemy— but unfortunately for the colonists, this event and
others like it actually occurred.
had colonial militiamen spooked.

Indian warfare definitely
Early in the war they

continually overestimated native strength and shrank away
from opportunities to attack.

In November 1675, Capt. David

Henchman's company came upon a wigwam full of Indians, but
because of the "cowardice of most of his men,

[the

opportunity] followed not to [the natives1] capture."33
During an attack near Springfield the following March, a
small band of Indians scared off the militia detachment
assigned to escort a group of civilians to church.

The

Massachusetts Council denounced the incident "as a matter of
great shame, humbling to us."

Even more humiliating, a

contemporary poet mocked the soldiers with the lines, "Seven
Indians, and one without a Gun,/ Caused Capt. Nixon, and 40
34
The inability to defeat the natives early

men to run."

in the war definitely caused a great deal of consternation
among colonial authorities;

it also caused a great deal of

debate over the best tactics to employ.
These references seem to contradict Hubbard's
suggestion that many English defeats "proceeded from our too
much Confidence in our own Weapons, Courage and Martial
Discipline."35 The natives certainly had enough firearms
by 1675, a fact Hubbard admitted, and examples abound which
indicate that the English had no edge in courage.

Only in

the area of "Martial Discipline" could the colonial forces
claim superiority, and it must be a matter of debate whether
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that attribute represented an advantage in wilderness
combat.

A widely held opinion after the defeats, however,

was that the militia should not attempt "to deal with the
Indians in their own Way."

Hubbard blamed the loss of

nearly all of Capt. Thomas Lathrop's Essex Company near
Deerfield in September 1675 on "a wrong Notion" that the
colonists could defeat the natives "by skulking behind
Trees, and taking their Aim at single Persons."

The

companies would have been more successful, he maintained,
"if they had kept together in a Body, and fought marching."
Pynchon went even further;

he advocated the garrisoning of

vulnerable towns in preparation for attacks, pointing out
the uselessness of sending roving bands of militia to track
the Indians down on their own terrain.36 Pynchon and other
military officials came to realize that the struggle against
the native warriors required a serious commitment and a
cohesive strategy.
Benjamin Church was one of the few New Englander
writers who consistently advised and presented a secular
approach to the war.

If colonial authorities really

"intended to make an end of the War," he warned, "they must
make a business of the War, as the Enemy did."37
Practically the only colonial leader who openly admitted to
appreciating native martial skills, Church felt that New
Englanders had to lay aside all other concerns and fully
commit themselves to a realistic struggle against an
imposing opponent.

Obstacles appeared, however, not only in
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convincing the Puritan leadership to adopt a practical view
of the conflict or in formulating an effective strategy;
Massachusetts experienced difficulty merely getting men into
the ranks.

When "the Country calls for their service," the

Council lamented in late 1675, "sundry persons are found
absent."

Some engaged in the "hainous" practice of running

away from service, even after being "Impressed or Commanded
by Lawfull Authority."

In an attempt to prevent such

irresponsibility, Massachusetts passed an act making it
unlawful for any "Listed Soldier . . .

to Conceale or hide

himselfe or Armes from the Country service at any time."38
While the colonies had trouble actually fighting the
war, they had no trouble justifying their involvement in it.
Aside from the immediate assurance that the conflict
resulted from God's punishment of their backsliding, Puritan
leaders could draw on numerous precedents in both scripture
and Judeo-Christian thought as sanctions for their battle
against the forces of evil in New England.

The Old

Testament, of course, is replete with examples of the
Hebrews engaging in religious wars, ordained and aided by
God, against the pagans.

At a later date, Martin

Luther— echoing the thoughts of Thomas Acquinus— laid out
his ideas on just wars as a means of doing God's work.
Arguing against the misguided opinion that soldiers "engaged
in a very unchristian work and one entirely contrary to
Christian love," Luther maintained that they performed a
"precious and godly" service in protecting their families,
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communities, homes, and property.

"Self-protection is

certainly a sound reason for war . . . and he who kills
another in self-defense," according to the author, "is
innocent in everyone's eyes."

Further, Luther assured his

readers that "the losers were almost always those who
started the war."

He concluded with the phrase "The Lord

scatters those who desire war"(Psalm 68:l).39 New England
Puritans could not have found a better justification for
their struggle to destroy the hostile natives.

They

believed that they acted in self-defense against unprovoked
attacks by an evil force.

They definitely accepted none of

the blame for causing or starting the conflict, so they
could trust that in the final outcome the Lord would scatter
the culpable Indians.
In the end, of course, the New England colonies finally
defeated Metacom and his allied bands during the summer of
1676.

Virtually all New England writers, consistent with

their earlier view of the war itself, attributed the victory
to the will of God, who allowed them to "find some Way to
cut off the bloody and deceitful Enemies of his People."40
Just as they had preached throughout the conflict, the
Puritan leadership viewed the outcome as a sign that the New
England congregations had reformed their ways sufficiently.
After the colonies suffered setback upon setback due to
their lack of repentance, signs of God's returning favor
finally appeared in 1676.

"God himself hath sent from

Heaven and saved us," wrote an anonymous New Englander, "by
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wasting [the Indians] with Sickness, Starving them through
want of Provisions, Leaving them to their own Divisions,
Taking away their Spirits, putting the Dread of us upon
them,

[and] cutting off their Principal men, Sachems and

others."

41

Indeed, after the poor performance of the

colonial militia in 1675, there was something almost
miraculous about the quick demise of the natives.

As the

chronicler suggested, the ultimate victory resulted at least
as much from disease, starvation, and attrition as from
English military exploits, and probably more so.

Even the

secular-minded Church attested that his troopers "had
[their] Lives for the most part, wonderfully preserved, by
the over-ruling Hand of the Almighty, from first to
last."

42

Coming from a person like Church, such a

statement may seem surprising.

Perhaps he realized that for

his work to be acceptable and popular in New England he
needed to give credit to God, but more likely his
acknowledgment exemplifies how deeply the Puritan message
reached, even among the reputedly less devout.
"It appears thus by the Sequel of things . . ," wrote
Hubbard after Metacom's death on August 12, 1676, "that
[God] is beginning to call his Enemies to an Account, and
punish them for the Pride of their Hearts and for all their
Treachery and Cruelty against his Servants."

43

Puritans saw no inconsistency in this notion.

The
Just as

they

had explained that God employed a supposedly heathen and
satanic people to punish their backsliding, the New England
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faithful had no trouble believing that their loving God
would turn on the natives who carried out His plan.

In this

view, the Almighty used the Indians as pawns to accomplish
His ends and then cast them aside when they were of no more
use to Him.

This God sounds little like the one who called

for the natives' conversion and salvation, but throughout
the seventeenth century the Puritans saw themselves as the
center of the Lord's attention.

They believed with

confidence that He would employ any means available to teach
His people a lesson and ensure their repentance.
The immediate lesson to be learned was that New
Englanders had to reform their ways, but more important
perhaps, the lesson they drew from the whole experience was
that God intended the mission— the errand into the
wilderness— to continue.

Increase Mather found deliverance

from the Indians "a token for [the] good."

No matter much

they suffered "through Oppression, Affliction, and Sorrow,"
he pointed out, "yet our God will have compassion on us, and
this his People shall not utterly perish."44 What reason
would God have to spare "his People" if not as a mandate to
carry forward their holy mission?

This perception did not

suddenly appear in 1676 out of the ashes of the
Massachusetts frontier;

it had precedents in both Puritan

experience and Christian tradition.

"This is not the first

Time," wrote Hubbard, "that Christian People have been
exposed to many Outrages, and barbarous Calamities from
their Pagan Neighbors," and yet Christianity survived and
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flourished.

In the recent New England past, in reference to

an illness, John Pynchon reflected the Puritan view of
providential punishment, in praying that "The Lord help me
to make a right profitable use of this and all other his
visitations that they may indeed turn to my spiritual
advantage . . . ."

Pynchon expressed a desire "to lie at

his foot and to submit to his good pleasure that I may not
be found to despise his chastening nor yet to be weary of
his correction."

45

New England Puritans viewed their

errand as an ongoing commission.

God's servants, throughout

history, suffered setbacks and, because of their human
nature, needed correction at times;

but as long as they

experienced the return of God's favor in the form of victory
over their enemies, the faithful could believe in a
continuing sanction for the City upon a Hill.
One danger of such assurance among New Englanders was
overconfidence in their position as God's chosen people.
Hubbard proclaimed, for instance, "though the Righteous fall
seven Times, let not their Enemies rejoice;

for the

Righteous shall rise again, but their wicked Enemies shall
fall into Mischief, and rise no more."

He exhibited no

doubt that the Lord would, in due time, "bring down their
Enemies to lick the Dust before them."46 Hubbard seemed to
forget, in this statement at least, that it was the Puritans
who needed to learn humility from the conflict.

If God had

made anyone "lick the Dust," He should have forced all of
New England to prostrate itself before Him.

In the view
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expressed by Hubbard, the chosen few could not lose because
the Almighty would always rescue them and humiliate their
enemies.

Such self-righteous gloating represented a

complete antithesis to the repentance and reformation which
the Puritan clergy tried to inspire.
thing;

Trust in God was one

the expectation that New England inherently deserved

His succor was quite another.
Perhaps if New Englanders had been able to recognize
the real issues which drove Metacom's Wampanoags to
hostilities, the trauma of the Indian war might have
affected them less seriously.

They could have made "a

Business of the War," defeated the natives, healed their own
wounds, and put the whole affair behind them.

The beliefs

of Puritanism were so ingrained in the region, however, that
colonial authorities saw the hand of God controlling all
events which affected His people.

Far more than merely an

attempt by the natives to repel the incursions of English
culture, New Englanders perceived the conflict as the Lord's
punishment for backsliders, as a call for repentance, and
finally as a message for the continuation of the assigned
errand.

Therefore, although King Philip's War officially

ended in 1676, its legacies lingered on as the colonists
struggled to rebuild their estates, their communities, their
institutions, and their mission during the troubled decades
which followed.
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CHAPTER 2
THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED

If King Philip's War represented the focal point of a
transitional phase for the white residents of New England,
it did so in an even more poignant way for the native
inhabitants of the region.

Before the war, two basic types

of Indians existed in the colonies, at least in English
eyes— those who submitted to Puritan missionaries and civil
authorities, and those who remained unconverted and
recalcitrant.
English norms;
restrictions.

The one patterned their lives according to
the other attempted to resist imposed
The distinction hardly made life any easier

for the conformists, however.

Praying Indians, so called,

were caught between two cultures, alienated from aboriginal
society but never fully accepted by white New Englanders.
When King Philip's War erupted in 1675, the hatred focused
particularly on the hostile Wampanoags and their allies;
but the underlying malice toward and distrust of the
converted natives also became manifest in ugly expressions
of racial animosity.

In many instances, New Englanders

seemed to abandon their cherished standards of civility in
combating the Indian threat, and in the process virtually
destroyed the refractory tribes.
38

Thus, the conflict

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
directly affected all of the natives in the region in
varying degrees.

King Philip's War also transformed most

New Englanders' attitudes toward the Indians and allowed
them to complete the domination aimed at since 1620.
William Hubbard probably reflected the hard feelings
held against Indians in general better than did any other
contemporary writer.

They could not be trusted, he

maintained, for "though their Words were smoother than Oil,
yet were they drawn Swords."

Of course, the natives could

have said the same about English trustworthiness on many
occasions, but no matter.

The Wampanoags and their allies

clearly did not adhere to the civilized standards by which
writers such as Hubbard attempted to judge them.

Describing

an attack on an Indian camp near Sudbury in March 1676, he
stated, "it was so dark that an Indian could hardly be
discerned from a better Man."1 In the eyes of most New
Englanders, their own moral superiority over the natives was
unquestionable and, for all practical purposes, permanent.
Tribes that initiated hostilities against the colonists
deserved relentless retribution;

those allied with the

colonies merited little more than thinly veiled suspicion
and prejudice.
One powerful group of Indians apparently straddled the
fence, at least early in the conflict, and colonial
authorities originally sought to ensure the cooperation of
the Narragansett tribe.

Soon after the initial attacks by

Philip's warriors, Massachusetts commanders entered Rhode
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Island, without that colony's consent, and, by treaty, made
the Narragansetts pledge complete allegiance to the English.
Although elements of the tribe almost certainly sympathized
with the Wampanoag warriors at the time, the colonists as
yet had no reason to doubt Narragansett neutrality.

In

formulating the treaty, and very likely at least hinting to
the natives of the repercussions should they reject it,
authorities entirely ignored the sovereignty of the tribe.
Political scientists have argued that in such situations
belligerent forces often attempt to influence neutrals with
threats of invasion and by pointing out the "loftiness" of
their own aims and the "sordidness" of the actions of their
enemies.2 Certainly these stratagems must have played a
part in the negotiations of July 1675.

Very few New

Englanders probably believed that the treaty would hold up,
but even when it collapsed and Narragansett warriors under
Canonchet joined Metacom's bands, the pact worked to the
colonists' advantage.

When it became apparent that the

reluctant allies were abetting New England's enemies,
colonial officials could lay aside "all Scruples as to the
Justness and Necessity of the War";

the only question

remaining was "whether it were Feasible and Expedient [to
attack] in the Winter?"

3

While the treaty did not succeed

in drawing the Narragansett tribe into the English fold, its
failure allowed colonial forces to eliminate one more
recalcitrant band.

Either way, colonial ends were served.

Although later events justified the colonists'
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uneasiness about the Narragansett's intentions, the English
had no cause for their wholesale distrust of the Praying
Indians, the converted natives who lived under colonial
authority in organized towns.

Both to reflect and to

enhance their missionary success, evangelists such as John
Eliot encouraged the organization of these Praying Towns
within the English sphere of control.

Daniel Gookin, a

long-time friend of the cooperative converts, said that the
main reason for the move was "to secure places of habitation
for them" in which "they [could] cohabit together compactly
for good of religion & civility."

Thus, Praying Towns

contributed not only to the proselytization of the natives
but also to the extension of English hegemony over them.

In

addition, Gookin noted that the arrangement would "prevent
differences and contention among the English and
Indians . . . about the propriety of land."4 Despite all
good intentions— and there were many— New Englanders could
not have missed the point that placing Indians in towns with
circumscribed boundaries would free thousands of acres for
their own expansion.
If the Praying Towns were designed to provide the
Indians secure places of habitation and to prevent
contention about the propriety of land, cases arose early in
their history which contradicted these intentions.

For

instance, the most famous Indian town in Massachusetts,
Natick, experienced a series of land disputes with the
neighboring English settlement of Dedham.

The Dedham
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residents resented the presence of the natives from the
inception of Natick in the early 1650s.

In 1653 Dedham

requested of the Council and received a "drake" cannon,
ostensibly for protection against dangerous Indians.
Between 1655 and 1663 the two towns engaged in a judicial
contest over several thousand acres of land claimed by both.
In the end, the natives kept the disputed territory, but the
Dedhamites received a grant of 8,000 acres on the
Connecticut River as compensation.5
Similar disagreements occurred between natives and
whites in other towns, such as Sudbury and Marlborough.

In

each case, while the grants may have provided the Indians
with places to live, they clearly failed to relieve tensions
over land.

More important, the resentment of the native

residents could not have fostered an optimal environment for
their civil or religious tutelage.

As Eliot attested,

though the converted Indians generally "esteem[ed]" the
English, "the business about land giveth them no small
matter of stumbling."6
Although Gookin claimed that by 1674 approximately
1,100 Indians in Massachusetts alone lived "subject to the
gospel," the success of the missionary effort was always
exaggerated.

The population of Praying Indians probably

exceeded 2,000 in all of southern New England at the time;
of that number at least 168 received full church membership
and 350 were baptized.

The Bay Colony boasted seven

established Praying Towns on the eve of King Philip's War:
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Natick (29 families), Punkapaog (12), Hassanamesitt (12),
Okammakamesit (10), Wamesit (15), Nashobah (10), and
Maqunkaquog (11).

Of these, only Natick and Hassanamesitt

had organized churches.

All of the natives in these towns

came from the tribes around the bay, but the colony was in
the process of forming seven new towns, totalling as many as
one hundred and thirty families among the Nipmuck Indians of
the interior.

Unfortunately, the conflict put an end to the

plan because most of the Nipmucks, "being but raw and lately
initiated into the Christian profession, fell off from the
English and joined the enemy."7 Still, despite the
shortcomings, criticisms, and difficulties associated with
the effort, the missionaries were proud of their charges.
Writing specifically of the natives at Okammakamesit, near
Marlborough, but probably referring to all of the converts,
Eliot stated in 1670, "our godly Indians do obtain a good
report of the godly English, which is an argument that
bringeth light and evidence to my heart, that our Indians
are really godly."8 Unfortunately, the bulk of the
colonial population did not share "the Apostle's"
conviction.
Had the colonists shown less bias and suspicion toward
their converted neighbors, the natives' martial expertise
might have been employed to the colonies' advantage against
Metacom.

Gookin, superintendent of the Praying Indians

since 1656, suggested that the Massachusetts government
should have fortified the established Praying Towns "as a
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wall of defence" and as bases for combined Indian-white
scouting parties.

They "were greatly ambitious to give

demonstration to the English of their fidelity and good
affection," he stated, and a cooperative effort possibly
could have helped secure the colonial frontier.
not to be;

But it was

"the most holy God for the chastisement of the

English and Indians disposed otherwise.1,9 Somehow, New
Englanders attributed their distrust of the friendly natives
to God's program of correction.
Examples of the converts turning on their English
neighbors were greatly exaggerated, if not entirely
fabricated.

Most of the reports reflect more a bias against

Indians in general— and against the vulnerable Praying
Indians in particular— than any firm evidence of treachery.
"They that wear the Name of Praying Indians," claimed
Nathaniel Saltonstall, "have made Preys of much English
Blood."

Likewise, Mary Pray charged that "those Indians

that are caled praying Indians never [shoot] at the other
Indians, but up into the tops of the trees or into the
ground" in an attempt to warn New England's enemies.

Later,

Mary Rowlandson reported that during her captivity she heard
of supposed English allies cooperating with King Philip
"without any scruple, but that they should prosper, and gain
the victory."10 These citations have at least one common
characteristic;

all three are based on hearsay or

suspicion, without presenting any clear evidence.
Certainly, some Praying Indians turned against the English
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in response to individual experience, and even Gookin
admitted as much.11 But as a whole, the native residents
of the anglicized towns did not deserve the accusations
leveled against them at the beginning of King Philip's War.
The first insult involved an attempt to restrict the
free movement of the Praying Indians.

In August 1675, the

Massachusetts Council ordered that "all those Indians that
are desirous to Approve themselves Faithfull to the English,
be confined to their several Plantations" of Natick,
Punkapaog, Nashobah, Wamesit, and Hassanamesitt.

Further,

the act prohibited them from travelling "above one mile from
the center of such of their dwellings unless in [the]
company of some English . . .

on peril of being taken as our

enemies, or their abettors."

Massachusetts officials put

the burden of obedience squarely on the natives;

the

Council declared itself "wholly Innocent" of any injuries
inflicted on Indians who defied the restrictions,
proclaiming "their Blood or other dammage . . . will be upon
their own heads."12 This act indicated that, at least in
time of war, the colonists really saw no distinction between
recalcitrant natives and those who lived under English
authority.

The Praying Indians were to be confined and

supervised closely, and anyone who violated the letter of
the law for whatever reasons— innocent or otherwise— merited
summary judgment.
With popular feeling against all natives so widespread,
it became increasingly dangerous for any New Englanders to
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defend the Praying Indians.

Gookin clearly sympathized with

"the poor Christian Indians, who [were] much weakened or
diminished by the conflict."13 Feelings ran so strongly
against persons such as Eliot, Gookin, and Thomas Danforth
that they were openly accused of treason and even threatened
with violence.

Gookin was defeated in his bid for

reelection as an Assistant in 1676.

At one point, he

recorded that "he was affraid to go along the Streets;

the

Answer was made," by his overzealous detractors, "you may
thank yourself."14 Magistrates and missionaries were not
the only ones subject to such criticism.

Capt. Daniel

Henchman, for instance, became unpopular with some of his
men due to his moderate view toward the natives.

The

soldiers blamed Henchman's approach for his lack of success,
and when they refused to fight for him, the General Court
gave in and replaced him.15
Despite the criticism he suffered, Gookin suggested
that the colonists had ample cause for their bias, even if
he did not condone their actions.

He did not blame them

directly but rather "the malice of Satan against Christ's
work among those Indians" designed "to hinder their progress
in religion.1,16 Just as they denied playing any role in
antagonizing the Wampanoags to the point of hostility and
saw the war as God's punishment for their backsliding, the
colonists rationalized away any sense of guilt they may have
felt due to their prejudice against the Praying Indians by
blaming "the malice of Satan."

Another New Englander cited
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the behavior of "some few of the praying Indians."

"I say

it is not to be wondered at," he argued, "that they were
under a Jealousie by us.

. . .1,17 For a people who

believed that the sole cause of the war was their own
sinfulness, the Puritans certainly claimed an inordinant
amount of innocence in all areas of actual contact with the
natives.
New Englanders did not stop at confining the Praying
Indians to their settlements.

During the late summer and

fall of 1675, white neighbors of the Praying Towns wrongly
accused the natives of a series of transgressions against
their lives and property.

In spite of the absence of any

proof of native guilt, group after group faced indictments
and eventual deportation to wind-swept islands in Boston
Harbor.

For instance, eleven Indians from Hassanamesitt

were implicated in the August 22 attack on Lancaster by
Capt.

Samuel Mosely, who "found much Suspicion

against . . . them, for Singing and Dancing, and having
Bullets and Slugs, and much Powder hid in their Baskets."
Despite their acquittal in Boston, most of them were sent to
the harbor "for better Security, and for preventing future
Trouble in the like kind."18 Since the English were more
guilty of wrongs against the natives than were the
Hassanamesitts of injury to the residents of Lancaster, it
is difficult to determine just whose "better Security" was
served by the removal.

In any case, the General Court

sought to ease the peoples* minds by punishing a scapegoat;
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the real enemy continued as elusive as ever.
Even the residents of the colony's oldest Praying Town
did not escape suspicion;

the long history of contention

between them and the white inhabitants of Dedham stood as a
backdrop to the events of 1675.

On October 13, the

Massachusetts Council, upon an unspecified suspicion of the
Naticks having "some designe against the English," ordered
that "all the Naticke Indians be forth with sent for, &
disposed of to Deare Island" in the harbor.

The Council

proclaimed that "none of the said Indians shall presume to
goe off the said islands voluntarily, upon paine of death,"
making it lawfull for any Englishman "to destroy those that
they shall finde stragling off from the said places of
theire confinement."

Again, colonial officials claimed that

the incarceration of the natives served "their own & the
countreys security.1,19 Admittedly, innocent Praying
Indians could and did suffer from violence by prejudicial
colonists, but this concern could not have been primary in
the legislators' minds.

Their actions clearly answered the

fears and biases of their constituents, who doubted the
fidelity of the Praying Indians.
The natives on Deer Island fared poorly, uprooted from
their homes and placed on desolate spurs of land in the
middle of Boston Harbor.

In the Council's defense,

Massachusetts legislators initially instructed the
provincial treasurer to provide for the Indians on the
islands.

With approximately five hundred detainees confined
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by the end of 1675, however, the resources proved
insufficient.

According to Gookin, during that winter they

"endured inexpressible hardships," but did so "patiently,
humbly, and piously, without murmuring or complaining
against the English for their sufferings."

All the while,

the oppressed natives exhibited "much practical Christianity
in this time of their trials," a trait which unfortunately
their English counterparts failed to display.20 Eventually
the Council took notice of the natives* "present distressed
condition,

. . . they being ready to perish for want of

bread, & incapacitated to make provission for the future."
In response, the government ordered that someone be hired to
catch fish for them and authorized that some of the natives
could be hired out as scouts or laborers to augment the
sustenance of those left on the islands.21 Such small
gestures, though made with good intentions, did little to
remedy the wrongs already perpetrated against the natives.
With the colony "full of murmurings, and unreasonable
Rage against the enemy,"22 the Praying Indians were not
entirely secured in their exile even by the expanse of water
which separated them from the Massachusetts mainland.

In

February 1676, Thomas Sheppard of Charlestown testified to
the Council that he had been approached by certain
individuals about a plan to attack Deer Island.

The

motivation for the plot apparently resulted from recent
raids on Medfield and Lancaster.

The revenge-minded

conspirators "could not come at the enemy Indians, for they
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were too crafty and subtle for the English," mocked Gookin,
"therefore they would have wreaked their rage upon the poor
unarmed Indians our friends."23 While not many New
Englanders at that specific juncture considered even the
Praying Indians their "friends,"— and certainly did not
treat them as such— enough consciences fortunately were
awakened in time to prevent such a cowardly act.

The

General Court received information on the plan and squelched
it;

the legislators could not give in to public sentiment

to the extent of allowing indiscriminate violence against
the natives.

But the Indians remained in the harbor.

The Indians on Deer Island faced a serious lack of
provisions and the occasional threat of attack by angry
whites.

Those peaceful natives who were permitted to remain

on the mainland faced the latter, in addition to
depradations by New England's enemies.

Hostile Indians,

especially the Nipmucks of central Massachusetts, attacked
Praying Towns directly, but more importantly, they attempted
to damage the already tenuous reputations of their converted
brethren with their white neighbors.

The most serious and

long-lasting case involved the Wamesit Indians and the
inhabitants of Chelmsford.

The white residents were alarmed

during the fall of 1675 by a series of burnings, generally
haystacks and barns, in the town, and they immediately
suspected the Wamesits, several of whom subsequently stood
trial in Boston.

Evidence, however, indicated that the real

culprits were Nipmucks, whose motive was to drive a wedge
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between the Praying Indians and the townspeople, thereby
forcing the Wamesits to join Metacom's resistance.
When the fires continued, two Chelmsford residents took
matters into their own hands, killing one twelve-year-old
Wamesit boy and wounding five women and children.

The

murderers were arrested and tried for the crime, but the
white jury "pretended want of clear evidence," and released
them, "to the great grief and trouble generally of the
magistracy and ministry and other wise and godly men."

As

Gookin correctly lamented, there was no lack of evidence but
"rather a mist of temptation and prejudice against these
poor Indians that darkened [the jury's] way."24 In
December, while Chelmsford petitioned the General Court to
remove the "Dangerous" Wamesits, the Council formed a
committee composed of M aj . Simon Willard, Gookin, Eliot, and
Danforth "to examine those Indians there . . . [and] to
settle them" either at Wamesit or Deer Island "so that they
who are friends [of] the English may be secured & the
English m

those parts also secured."

25

Sensing they were

involved in a situation they could not win, caught between
hostile enemies and not-so-friendly allies, most of the
Wamesits fled during the winter and joined the neutral
Penacooks under the sachem Wannalancet on the upper
Merrimack River.

"We are not sorry for what we leave

behind," wrote the refugee chief Numphow to Captain
Henchman, "but we are sorry the English have driven us from
our praying to God and from our teachers."26 Whether or
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not this simple yet eloquent statement caused Massachusetts
residents any guilt is difficult to determine, but it does
clearly indicate that English actions, as well as those of
the enemy during King Philip's War, damaged the progress of
the mission to convert the natives of the region.
Had the Massachusetts government made effective use of
their resident Indians instead of confining or alienating
them, the war effort would have proceeded much more
efficiently.

Despite early admonitions from military

figures like John Pynchon that it was "absolutely necessary
to engage some Indians with us, whereby we may understand
the motions of Philip," the colonies took few steps in that
direction in 1675.

27

The Council did authorize the use of

fifty-two Praying Indians under M a j . Thomas Savage during
the first Mount Hope campaign of July 1675;

although "most

of them acquitted themselves courageously and faithfully,"
their terms of service ended within a month, and apparently
most of them went home to face eventual exile on Deer
Island.28 The General Court must have recognized the
natives' clear superiority in scouting because finally in
December 1675 it ordered Gookin to "ingage two of the
trustyest & fittest of the Indians at Deare Island to goe
forthe as spyes to gaine Intelligence of the enimy."

The

two chosen, James Quanapaug and Job Kattenamit, brought back
valuable information concerning impending assaults on
Lancaster, Groton, Marlborough, Sudbury, and Medfield.

For

some reason, however, their intelligence "was not then
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credited as it should have been," and the attacks proceeded
when English action could have deflected them.29
Massachusetts had a golden opportunity to spring a trap of
their own on their enemies and to save valuable English
lives and property, but in failing to respond to the
warnings provided, they paid a high price for their
distrust.
Not before the following spring did the colony again
arm a body of Praying Indians.

In April 1676, the Council

authorized Gookin to help raise a company of Naticks to
serve with other colonial troops.

The next month

Massachusetts created "a flyeing or Moving Army" of three
hundred soldiers, including one hundred Indians, to
"discover & Annoy the enemy upon their approach towards any
of our plantations.1,30 Of all the colonial commanders,
Benjamin Church made by far the most extensive and effective
use of native troops.

He did so not out of any special

feeling for them but rather out of a recognition of their
proficiency in wilderness warfare.

Church, however, did not

employ Praying Indians so much as he did enemies captured by
his company.

He approached captive warriors with the

promise that "if any would behave themselves well, he would
do well by them, and they should be his men."31
Church definitely valued his Indian soldiers, and
Gookin predictably credited the Praying Indians with
faithful service.

He claimed that once Massachusetts began

employing native companies, "the balance turned [to] the
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English side."

Of probably greater significance was the

praise given by various colonial military commanders.
Capt. Samuel Hunting, who commanded a company of Natick
warriors, wrote that "the said Indians behaved themselves
courageously and faithfully to the English interest."

Major

Savage echoed these same sentiments, while Captain Henchman
cited "the sobriety, courage, and fidelty of the generality
of those Indians."32 Furthermore, the natives believed
that they provided a positive force for the colonies in the
war.

"We have . . . been sundry times in your service to

the hazzard of our lives, both as spyes, messengers, scouts,
and souldiers," wrote four Natick leaders, "and have through
God's favor acquitted ourselves faithfully.

. . .»33

Unfortunately, most New Englanders did not share that
opinion.
Despite the good showing that the natives displayed in
battle and on campaigns, "the vulgar spared not to load them
with reproaches."

Even the white soldiers "conceived much

animosity against" their Indian allies.

Contradicting the

good reports of the commanding officers, colonial troopers
alleged "that [the natives] were cowards and skulked behind
trees in a fight, and that they shot over the enemies'
heads."

Such slanderous statements, Gookin surmised,

reflected "the rude temper of those times."34 If the
Praying Indians could get no better reviews from the popular
sort, the hopes of people like Eliot and Gookin that service
in the war would improve New Englanders' feelings about the
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natives seemed remote.

In fact, even when the colonial

government felt secure enough to release the refugees from
Deer Island, the Council sent them back to assigned towns
under restrictions only slightly less stringent than those
enforced early in the war.

Ironically, Gookin felt that

this action indicated a softening of English hearts toward
the natives, "by little and little."

The distrust

continued, however, as the government appointed white
guardians to oversee them and report on their behavior.

Two

men assigned to observe the Naticks testified soon after the
war how their charges "behaved themselves both religiously
toward God, and respectively, obediently, and faithfully to
35
the English."
Had this image penetrated deeper into New
England society, white prejudice against the Praying Indians
would have decreased and native assimilation would have
increased in the long run.
Prejudice against the enemy Indians was understandably
widespread during the war, and a marked double standard
appeared in English judgment of their actions as compared to
those of the colonial militia.

Members of the two forces

practiced some of the same extracurricular activities
against their enemies, but colonial chroniclers
characterized the natives' actions as barbaric atrocities
while giving little or no adverse notice to white excesses.
If the ambushes of Capt. Thomas Lathrop's detachment at
Bloody Brook and of Capt. Richard Beer's company near
Northfield in September 1675 were "massacres," so too were
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English attacks at the Narragansett Swamp in December 1675
and at Turner's Falls in May 1676.

In fact, in the former

instances, the English casualties all were militiamen or
their support units.

Native casualties at the Swamp and

Falls fights, conversely, consisted overwhelmingly of old
men, women, and children, with only a small percentage of
fighting men involved.36
Of course, Metacom's forces did attack New England
towns, and women and children were victims of such assaults.
But the Indians seemed more interested in taking
noncombatants as hostages rather than in killing them.

The

English, on the other hand, seemed to make no "separation
betwene the gilty and the inosent," while contemporary
international law advised that belligerents should do so.
Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, wrote,
"it is the bidding of mercy, if not justice, that, except
for reasons that are weighty and will affect the safety of
many, no action should be attempted whereby innocent persons
may be threatened with destruction."37 The key disclaimer,
however, was that New Englanders viewed all of Indian
society as guilty, or at least suspect, and believed that
native atrocities broke and voided rules of military
justice.

Indians, regardless of sex or age, were all

"Serpents of the same Brood."38 The survival of any
hostile elements was, to the colonists, a "weighty" matter
which did "affect the safety of many," so native society,
including noncombatants, had to be purged.
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Since New Englanders felt so strongly about their
enemies, and since they saw the struggle as a test of their
religious commitment, the colonies readily justified using
any means available to gain victory.

The "Lord calls alowd

to a speedy & vigorous prosecution of the warr," maintained
the Massachusetts Council in December 1675.39 This
assurance in virtually a blanket sanction, combined with
criticism and misrepresentation of the natives'
"uncivilized" practices, produced the dichotomy in English
minds regarding the behavior of the contending forces.

For

instance, Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote in reference to female
captives in the hands of their enemies, that "they first
forced them to satisfie their filthy Lusts and then murdered
them."

This citation reflects the depth of contemporary

English fears, but the evidence contradicts Saltonstall
entirely.

No New England women, including Mary Rowlandson,

recorded any instances of their Indian masters threatening
their virtue.

Fortunately, some writers, notably William

Hubbard, reported of "those poor captive Women and Children,
that they found so much Favour in the Sight of their
Enemies, that they offered no Wrong to any of their Persons,
save what they could not help, being in many Wants
themselves."

40

Regrettably, native women and children did

not get the same consideration from their English enemies,
either in combat or afterwards in captivity.
The native practice which seemed to incense the
colonists the most was the mutilation of their victims,
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especially by beheading.

Hubbard accused the enemy of

"insolent Rage and Cruelty" in the case of some of Captain
Beer's soldiers having their heads "fix[ed] upon Poles near
the Highway."

41

Actually, instances of the colonists

committing the same atrocities date all the way back to the
Wessagusset incident of 1623.

In 1671, the son of the

Nipmuck sachem Matoonas was executed in Boston for murdering
an Englishman, and his head was placed on a pole, "where it
long remained, as the terrific memorial of justice."
Fittingly, as frequent executions became commonplace on
Boston Commons during 1676, Matoonas, described by Hubbard
as an "old malicious Villian," himself faced the same fate,
his head placed "upon a Pole near the Gibbet where he was
hanged up."

In perhaps an even more extreme case, when

colonial soldiers found the drowned corpse of Metacom's ally
Weetamoo, the Queen of Pocasset, they cut her head off and
set it on display m

Taunton.

42

The chieftain himself had

a bounty of L50 placed on his head by the Massachusetts
Council, and when he was killed by an Indian in the English
service, the successful marksman demanded the right to
mutilate the body.
object.

Captain Church definitely did not

In fact, he authorized that after Metacom was

quartered and beheaded, in retribution for his causing "many
an English mans body to lye unburied and rot above
[ground],

. . . not one of his bones should be buried."

43

New Englanders did not stop at beheading in their
search for satiating revenge.

Early in the war, for
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example, proposals came before the Council suggesting the
use of dogs to hunt down Indians.

On October 16, 1675,

Captain Mosely wrote to Governor Leverett relating the fate
of an old squaw captured near Springfield.
Indian,

"This aforesaid

. . . was ordered to be torn in peeces by Doggs," he

stated rather matter-of-factly, "and she was soe dealt with
44
In another instance, some English sailors decided

all."

to test the rumor that all Indian children could swim
instinctively, like animals, and so overturned a canoe
carrying a woman and child.

The sailors got their answer;

the child, offspring of an important sagamore in Maine,
drowned.

It was no wonder that a particular group of native

hostages escaped from the colonists holding them, according
to Hubbard, "trusting more to the Celerity of their own Feet
than to the Civility of their English Friends."

And yet,

despite this long history of colonial excesses, Hubbard
criticized the Mohegan allies for torturing a captive turned
over to them by the English.

"Instances of this Nature

should be Incentive unto us," he sermonized, "to bless the
Father of Lights, who hath called us out of the dark Places
of the Earth, full of the Habitations of Cruelty."

45

He

offered no criticism of the colonists who knowingly provided
the torture victim nor regret at comparable English
practices against their captives.
While the natives tortured and mutilated their enemies,
they did so for far different reasons than did their English
counterparts.

The colonists seemed to be driven by no other
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motives than intense racial hatred and a desire to punish
their enemies with vengeful finality.

North American

natives, conversely, did not mistreat their captives' bodies
merely to inflict punishment;

rather, these practices

represented highly ritualized acculturation tools, designed
to teach bravery through the example of the victim and to
transfer that spirit through his body parts to the
executioners.46 In native societies, torture and
mutilation held deep spiritual meaning for both the captive
and his captors.
Perhaps, in the long run, the Indians who faced summary
execution by New England authorities were actually more
fortunate in their fate than were their compatriots who
survived.

Unwilling to let any hostile elements remain free

in the region, the colonial governments sold away into
slavery or bonded servitude those captives who escaped
death.

While no record of the exact numbers of Indians

transported as a result of King Philip's War exists, New
Englanders were well accustomed to the practice, which dated
back to the Pequot War.

The only relevant Massachusetts law

concerning the sale of prisoners was a 1641 statute which
prohibited "Bondslavery, Villenage or Captivity . . . unless
it be lawful Captives taken in just Wars.

. . . ”

Colonial

officials, of course, viewed the struggle as a just war, and
as a result, hundreds of Wampanoag, Narragansett, and
Nipmuck Indians found themselves sold as slaves in such
diverse places as Spain, Portugal, Bermuda, the West Indies,
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the Azores, and Virginia.

47

The immediate impetus for pressing captives into
servitude was embodied in various Council orders and
commissions.

Early in the war, the Council directed Captain

Mosely to "kill none that he

took alive, but

secure

Order to a Transportation."

Likewise, after

the victory

themin

over the Narragansetts in December 1675, Gen. Josiah Winslow
received orders from the Massachusetts government
"Concerning the disposall of the Indian prisoners."

"Our

Advice," wrote Secretary Edward Rawson, "is that if any
[are] present to buy them, they may be sould there &
delivered by your Orders.

..."

Even Captain Church, who

employed native captives, had the stipulation in his
commission that "it shall be

lawfull, and is

warrantable for him and [his

soldiers] to make Sale

hereby
of such

Prisoners as their perpetual Slaves."48 From the start of
the war, and even before, the colonial governments had
established a policy of disposing of Indian captives by
selling them out of the region as slaves, but not all
company commanders, including those who received the above
orders, implemented the policy consistently.
In July 1675, shortly after the assault on the Plymouth
town of Dartmouth, 160 natives who played no part in the
attack agreed to surrender to local military authorities
under a promise of protection and amnesty.

The response of

the provincial government, however, was to sell all except
six of them out of the country and into slavery.

In a
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similar case, a group of about 200 Maine Indians fled to
Cocheco (Dover, New Hampshire) under a promise of protection
from the local garrison commander, Ma j . Richard Waldron, but
they were captured by Massachusetts troops and marched to
Boston.

Of the group, seven or eight of the men faced

execution, and the rest were transported.

49

Whether

attributable to human inconsistency, lack of communication,
or merely insensitivity, the broken promises undoubtedly
hurt the colonial war effort.

"Had their promises to the

Indians been kept, and the Indians farely treated," Church
wrote, '"tis probable that most if not all the Indians in
those Parts, had soon followed the Example of those that
had . . . surrendered themselves;

which would have been a

good step towards finishing the War."50
Of course, not all captives faced a life of servitude.
The criterion employed to judge their fate involved their
behavior during the war, whether proven or suspected.
Regarding "Indian ennemyes seized," the Massachusetts
Council on September 16, 1676 proclaimed that "such of them
as shall appeare to have imbrued their hands in English
blood should suffer death here" and not receive the
favorable treatment of transportation "into forreigne
parts."51 None of the surviving records states just how
authorities decided which captured enemies had "English
blood" on their hands, but since New Englanders considered
all of Indian society guilty, at least by implication,
perhaps the distinction was not really significant to those
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sitting in judgment.

The most dangerous captives— warriors

and their leaders— deserved death, while noncombatants
needed to be secured for the safety of New England society.
Either way, the ultimate goal of eliminating any potentially
hostile elements was accomplished.
While the majority of colonists approved of Indian
slavery, a small number of men, generally the same ones who
also defended the Praying Indians, spoke out against the
policy of transportation.

John Eliot began a 1675 petition

to the General Court with the warning that "the terror of
selling away such Indians, unto the Islands for perpetual
slaves . . . may produce, we know not what evil
consequences, upon all the land.

Christ hath saide, blessed

are the mercyfull, for they shall obteine mercy."

Eliot

reminded the legislators, "when we came, we declared to the
world . . . the indeavour of the Indians conversion, not
theire exstirpation."

"My humble request is," he pleaded,

"that you would follow Christ his designe, in this matter,
to promote the free passage of Religion among them, & not to
destroy them."
amnesty;

The evangelist did not advocate total

those who deserved death should face it.

But as

for the rest, he declared, transportation was "worse than
death."

Eliot warned the court that "to sell soules for

money seemeth to me a dangerous merchandize," which would
result in untold evils to the mission in the long run.52
Far preferable in the view of people such as Eliot and
Gookin, especially in cases involving children, was to place
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harmless captives with Christian families in the colony as
servants.

The General Court concurred and in May 1677

regulated the system to insure that native youth bonded as
servants "be instructed in civility & Christian religion" by
their masters.

The court also decreed that these children

remain in servitude until the age of twenty four.53 After
that period of tutelage, the former enemies would apparently
be ready for assimilation into the Praying Towns, but
certainly not acceptance into the mainstream of New England
society.
Eliot's fear that a result of the war would be an
"exstirpation" of the region's native population did not
come true, at least physically.

Studies have suggested that

in most wars the victorious society does not completely
destroy its defeated enemy, but rather subjects the remnants
and imposes its own brand of culture upon them.54 Such was
the case in New England.

At the close of the war, any

natives not residing in English houses as servants or
apprentices were assigned to live at Natick, Punkapaog,
Hassanamesitt, or Wamesit, "where they may be continually
inspected."

At least once each year, authorities were to

compile a list of all the residents of each town, so that
the provincial government could keep close watch on its
native residents.

By the early 1680s, the Council saw fit

to punish natives who violated the imposed restrictions by
placing them in their local "House of Correction.1,55 Such
qualifications hardly classified the natives, whether

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
previously Praying Indians or captives who finished their
period of servitude, as free and equal members of New
England society.

The outcome of King Philip's War did not

eliminate Indians from the region;

it just made those

remaining strictly subject to colonial authority.
Hubbard credited "the special Hand of God" with shaping
the post-war situation, clearing the former recalcitrant
tribes from their lands and "making way to settle a better
People in their Rooms and in their Stead."56 Although New
Englanders felt superior to the natives throughout the
seventeenth century, the war hardened English attitudes of
themselves as the "better People."

The colonists seemed to

feel truly secure only when they could hold all proximate
natives in a subordinate position.

And when authorities had

the remaining natives restricted to the existing Praying
Towns, New Englanders seemed to lose interest in the mission
to Christianize them.

Of course, the question of just how

widespread the commitment had ever been is a matter of
debate.

But by effectively placing the Indians under

English authority, the colonists attained the ultimate goal
of making their counterparts dependent and controllable.

In

the end, secular power played more of a role than did
religious conversion, but the result was the same.57 New
England's native population was no longer a force to be
feared or proselytized but rather a collection of weakening
bands to be impounded and dominated.
However, the rhetoric of missionary responsibility
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survived among the more zealous clergy after 1676.

"There

are many [Indians], which maintain a Christian
conversation.

..."

wrote Cotton Mather in 1710.

He

expressed optimism about the future of the mission, noting
the natives' own desire "to preserve and improve the
Christianity already professed among them, and prevent the
loss of a noble work by some degeneracies," such as
alcohol.58 Mather and others were quick to publish tallies
of the numbers of native congregations, Indian teachers, and
Praying Indians, but by all accounts, the majority of the
figures came from Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and
Plymouth, where the missionary efforts had always proven
more successful.

Missionary activities never seemed to

revive in Massachusetts.

59

Four Praying Towns there

survived, but the spread of Christianity stagnated, at least
at the end of the seventeenth century, and many New
Englanders who had participated in the missionary effort
recognized the damage done by the war.

Gookin openly

lamented the "ill conceit" and unjust prejudice against the
natives, which greatly increased after the conflict, and
Increase Mather rhetorically questioned "how hath the Indian
work, I mean the work of Christ among them . . . been
slighted, scorned,

[and] vilified?"60 John Eliot provided

the answer for all of New England to hear.

"There is a

cloud," said the Apostle at the point of his death in 1690,
"a dark cloud upon the work of the gospel among the poor
Indians."

His last prayer was that "The Lord revive and
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prosper that work, and grant it may live when I am
dead."61 Unfortunately, the missionary effort in
Massachusetts reached a state of ill health, for all intents
and purposes, almost as serious as that of its founder.
King Philip's War resulted in the end of the
ambivalence with which New Englanders approached their
Indian neighbors.

The rhetoric of missionary responsibility

was at the heart of the colonial experiment from the start,
but the promises always outweighed the results.

Even those

Indians who accepted Christianity and English authority in
the Praying Towns faced the ever-present ambiguity.

The war

deepened the distrust already held against the Praying
Indians and transformed any mixed feelings concerning
resistant tribes to unqualified malevolence.

After 1676,

Massachusetts authorities brought cooperative natives under
strict supervision and virtually eliminated the rest;
either way, life could never be the same again for New
England's native element.

For the English, their handling

of the Indians represented a satisfactory solution to at
least one of the many problems facing the colony during the
post-war years.

The colonists, however, were not so

fortunate in resolving other matters of contention.
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CHAPTER 3
THE HIGH COST OF WAR

King Philip's War cost Massachusetts and the other New
England colonies dearly.

Especially hard hit were the

frontier areas of the Bay Colony, such as the Connecticut
River Valley towns.

Since most of the fighting occurred

there, the Hampshire County settlements suffered the
greatest numbers of casualties, both military and civilian.
Because of the vulnerable position of frontier communities,
many towns had to be abandoned, and other settlements had to
bear the burden of absorbing the refugees.
The problems were not all local in nature, however.
Provincial treasuries were also strained by the conflict,
and colonial officials had to pass the deficits on to the
citizenry in the form of unprecedented levels of taxation.
Much attention during the decades following King Philip's
War necessarily focused on recovering the vast expenditures
of the conflict.

But the colonial treasury was not alone in

its search for reimbursement.

While their government

demanded multiple levies, countless Massachusetts
individuals and numerous towns petitioned for direct
payments or tax exemptions as recompense for their wartime
losses.

The wounds left by the war were deep.
76
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Massachusetts colonists faced constant reminders of the high
price of the war, both in memories of their dead comrades
and in the persistent economic legacies.

The effort to

regain material stability represented a nagging and
troublesome problem in the postwar years.
In any war, the human cost is the most closely felt,
and the most difficult to recoup.

At a time when the total

white population of New England reached only perhaps 52,000,
the colonies lost over six hundred men— or close to
one-tenth of all adult males— in the fighting.

This figure

does not even include the countless noncombatants who
perished in isolated raids or who never returned from Indian
captivity.1 Naturally, such a traumatic loss had a lasting
effect on the surviving population.
The trauma was especially severe in the frontier areas.
At least 145 persons lost their lives in Hampshire County
alone in 1675?

another 64 died the next year and 16 more

were slain in 1677, for a three-year total of 225.

Many of

these victims were soldiers brought from other parts of the
colony to protect the frontier, but more than 80 of the
total lived in the county prior to the conflict.2 The two
bloodiest days of the war for the English occurred on
September 18, 1675, at Bloody Brook in Deerfield, when 74
men under the command of Capt. Thomas Lathrop lost their
lives, and May 19, 1676, at Turner's Falls, when the natives
reversed an apparent English victory, killing 38 troopers.
Included among the 74 casualties at Bloody Brook were 14 of
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16 Deerfield men employed by Lathrop as wagon drivers.
These 14 men, who ranged in age from 15 to 58, left 9 widows
and at least 40 fatherless children.

Since the victims

represented over one-third of the town's adult male
population at the time, the remaining residents
understandably agreed to abandon their exposed community
indefinitely.3 At the Falls Fight, where most of the
soldiers came from the Connecticut Valley towns of
Springfield, Northampton, Hadley, and Hatfield, 26 of the 33
casualties whose places of residence are listed in the
records resided in Hampshire County.

The largest number of

dead— 12— were from Northampton, with 6 from Hadley, 4 from
Hatfield, 3 from Springfield, and 1 from Deerfield.’ These
two engagements alone accounted for the deaths of 39
Hampshire residents, with Deerfield and Northampton
suffering most heavily.

Such examples support Thomas

Hutchinson's claim that "Every person, almost,

[in the

colony] lost a relation or near friend, and the people in
5
general were exasperated."
Naturally, one of the main concerns both of the
individual towns and of the provincial government was
finding a way to defend the vulnerable communities.
Relatively new and undeveloped plantations like Deerfield,
Northfield, and Westfield obviously could not supply all
their own needs and at the same time defend themselves from
the elusive natives.

Therefore, towns throughout the

province were protected by resident garrisons apportioned
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from the militia regiments.

The fact that "sundry persons"

sought to avoid service by absenting themselves when local
militia committees issued calls to fill their quotas must
have frustrated efforts to secure the frontier.6 Requests
for help kept coming from frightened colonists, and the
Massachusetts government did its best to meet the increasing
demands on its meager resources.
Raising troops to serve on the frontier was one matter;
paying and supporting them was another.

Part of the

soldiers' salaries was paid by the Massachusetts treasurer,
at least early in the war, but the bulk came from the towns.
The families of soldiers on campaign or garrison duty
received payment from their local treasurers, and as
recompense, the towns were granted an equal credit toward
their provincial tax rates.7 The responsibility for
supplying garrison troops with provisions and other
necessities fell to "the families in the several
fortifications where they [were] placed."

When Capt. Joshua

Scottow requested supplies for his soldiers in November
1675, the Council replied that according to practice, "the
country soldiers are provided for with victualls by the
people they secure."8 Even this requirement represented a
heavy burden for many frontier towns.

The residents of

Northampton, for instance, while expressing reluctance "to
burden the country, whose expenses have been great already,"
related their inability to support a garrison unassisted,
since "the losses & expenses by reason of the war have been
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such, as renders us uncapable of such a thing.”9 From the
start, the war drained the resources of the Massachusetts
colony;

individual towns could not afford the costs of

their own defense, and the resources of the provincial
government were far too limited to assure the complete
protection of all the exposed frontier communities.
As a result, many frontier residents had to abandon
their plantations and flee to safer areas.

In addition to

the obvious trauma felt by the refugees themselves, the
unsettled situation placed pressure on the towns which
received the frightened fugitives.

In an attempt to staunch

the flow of colonists from the frontier— both for the better
defense of the colony and for the relief of the towns which
strained under the weight of the evacuees— Capt. Samuel
Appleton issued an order on November 12, 1675, to the
soldiers and inhabitants of Springfield, Northampton,
Hadley, Westfield, and Hatfield forbidding anyone to abandon
those towns without his permission.10 This order affected
only the most secure settlements in the Connecticut Valley;
Deerfield and Northfield, the two most exposed areas, had
already been abandoned in September.

The residents of these

northernmost towns naturally followed the river south in
their retreat, returning in many cases to the communities
from which they had originally emigrated.
Regardless of ties of affinity or even simple sympathy,
towns along the escape route must have felt adverse effects
from the sudden influx, as evidenced by attempts of the
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colonial government to compensate for the situation.

On

November 3, 1675, the Council declared that "such
persons . . . who are so forced from theire habitations &
repaire to other plantations for reliefe, shall not, by
virtue of theire residenc in said plantations they repaire
unto" become burdens to the communities, "according to law,
title Poore."

In cases of extreme need, the Council allowed

their care to "be supplied out of the publicke
treasury."11 Whether it was supplying exiled Indians on
Deer Island, outfitting garrison troops on the frontier, or
providing for the refugees of abandoned towns, the colonial
government lacked the resources to meet the immediate and
increasing demands caused by the war.

As a result,

authorities had to become more selective and stringent in
allowing stragglers to impose themselves on the already
encumbered localities.
In the spring of 1676 the Massachusetts Council
authorized town selectmen "to take a particular account of
all Persons and Families so coming unto them," inquiring
specifically into their means of support.

The order further

required selectmen "to take effectual care that the
Incomers . . . settle themselves, or be by them settled in
some orderly and diligent way of Imployment and Government."
The concern evidently focused "especially [upon] single and
younger persons," the unattached element which traditionally
represented an internal threat to New England's communal
cohesion.12 To justify their presence in the safe havens,
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refugees had to provide some positive contribution to their
protectors.

The most obvious service involved participation

in the defense of their adopted localities.

In May 1676 the

Council countered those "forced to remoove to other places,
[who] doe account themselves free from duty in those
places," by ordering "that all such persons . . . shall
stand, in respect of charges and duty to the publicke, in
the same capacitie wth the propper inhabitants amongst whom
they make their aboade or residence.1,13 There were no free
lunches in seventeenth-century Massachusetts.
While such reluctance to welcome their brethen
unconditionally in their time of need may seem callous, the
tradition of tightly guarded community conformity was as old
as the colony itself.

The restrictions were no less

apparent in frontier plantations than in established towns.
As early as 1642, for instance, Springfield forbade its
inhabitants "under the Coulour of friendship or otherwise,
[to] Intertayne" any strangers "for longer tyme then one
month . . . without the generall consent and alowance" of
the other residents.

This ordinance was no mere formality;

the selectmen used the law to evict outsiders who "Thrust
themselves" into the town and to punish citizens guilty of
encouraging unwelcome strangers to linger.

14

Springfield

was not alone in "warning out" undesirable interlopers;

on

the eve of King Philip's War, for example, Lancaster evicted
a William Lincoln "in his majesties name," "utterly
disclaim[ed]" his right to live within the town, and ordered
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him and his family to depart immediately.

In doing so, the

selectmen took the opportunity to repeat their injunction
against "any that should com to inhabit without [their]
consent."15 Some writers, notably Douglas Leach, maintain
that the experience of King Philip's War lessened the
restrictions imposed by communities against strangers, but
town studies suggest that if any liberalization occurred
during the conflict, the results were temporary at best.
During the early 1680s, Springfield continued to warn out
persons of questionable motives or means and to require
established residents to post bond for newcomers admitted
into the town.

Likewise, in 1680 a committee assigned to

oversee the selectmen of Groton— ironically a town which
itself was abandoned in 1676— implored them to keep a
constant watch against any transient persons who might
"becom a charg to the towne" by their prolonged
presence.16 Even after the shared upheaval of King
Philip's War, New England towns still did not want to be
burdened by outsiders who would interrupt the tranquility
and prosperity of the majority.
Against this backdrop of Puritan tribalism, New England
also possessed a tradition of charity and communal concern,
dating back to 1630, when John Winthrop reminded his
compatriots, "wee must be knitt together in this worke as
one man."

In times of trouble, "wee must be willing to

abridge our selves of superfluities, for the supply of
others necessities," he warned.

Winthrop reasoned that God
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had a purpose in causing some people to be wealthy and some
poor, or in allowing some to suffer while others flourished.
The result of such a configuration, as interpreted by the
governor, was that "every man might have need of other[s],
and from hence they might be all knitt more nearly together
in the Bond of brotherly affeccion."

In theory, all New

England Puritans were united parts of the "one body in
Christ";

they were "made soe contiguous in a speciall

relacion as they must needes partake of each others strength
and infirmity, joy and sorrowe, weale and woe."17
Admittedly, New England had become a much more complex and
diversified milieu between the establishment of
Massachusetts Bay in 1630 and King Philip's War in 1675.
But the summons to Christian charity never faded, at least
in the sermons of the orthodox clergy.

Over a decade after

the conflict, Cotton Mather still reminded his fellow
colonists that "every Christian should Readily and
Chearfully Venture his All to serve the people of God, when
a Time of Distress and Danger calleth for it."18 Such
exhortations, at least at first glance, seem to indict New
England townsmen for serious transgressions in their
reluctance to unconditionally welcome their needy brethren.
Puritans saw no shame in poverty, as long as it
resulted from ill fortune or divine providence rather than
from personal negligence, and they did not question why God
would present some members of His flock with such adversity.
"The only reason why God sets his love on one man and not
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upon another," said the Reverend Solomon Stoddard, "is
because he pleases."

19

New Englanders were not entirely

devoid of sympathy for their less fortunate brethren, but
they showed a marked preference for aiding members of their
own local community.

Before the war, poor relief came

almost entirely through the town meeting and the selectmen.
For instance, in early 1667 Springfield residents voted to
allow their selectmen to provide "4 or 5£ to help a little
against the want of some familyes."

The meeting also voted,

in consideration "of the poore estate of Some in the
Plantation, who it is thought by Some need releife," to
empower a committee to study the overall degree of privation
in the community and to report on the most "convenient"
solutions.20
Relief for familiar neighbors naturally continued
during the war, but the emphasis shifted from solving simple
cash poverty to replacing material estates destroyed by the
Indians.

The effectiveness of these efforts varied from

town to town.

In response to petitions from people like

Preserved Clapp, who had his home and barn burned,
Northampton formed a committee "to view what other Land may
be found to Suite other Persons in the like Condition & to
Accomodate them as far as may be."

By the end of 1673, the

committee had "laid out Sundry Small Parcels of land to
Several persons on Condition they build on it & live on it
three years."

The good intentions of this plan were not

entirely realized in all cases, however;

William Smead, who
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had lived in Northampton since 1660, asked for relief after
his home, barn, and crops were destroyed in 1675.

Two years

later, the town awarded him a half-acre house lot in the
town.

Apparently frustrated by this slight allowance, Smead

packed up and moved to Deerfield, where land was more
obtainable, even if security was not.21 Other towns made
efforts to acquire title to parcels of land vacated by local
Indians during the war and to confirm those tracts to
townspeople who sustained losses in the conflict,

still,

most of these efforts were designed to aid established
residents and generally excluded recent arrivals.22
With provincial resources insufficient to completely
meet the new needs and with towns unwilling to encourage
refugees to seek aid from them, the answer had to come from
private sources or church collections.

During specified

fast days, congregations collected voluntary donations "for
the distressed Families Relief."

On three days in August

1676 alone, for example, the "Old Church"

(First Church) in

Boston procured f.69, the "North Church" (Second Church) ii68,
and the Charlestown congregation i/78 for the needy.23 This
represents a shift in relief measures from a system of
direct aid granted to specific persons who were well
acquainted with the donors to a more general system in which
strangers contributed to the maintenance of persons in need
throughout the colony.

When the residents of Brookfield had

to leave their plantation in September 1675, they fled to
Boston, "where they were plentifully relieved out of the
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Church Stock there."24 This sort of aid corresponded
closely to the spirit of charity and "brotherly affeccion"
Winthrop had outlined in 1630.

Expressions of generosity

even came from England, in the form of money, provisions,
and clothing.

On December 13, 1677, the Massachusetts

Council drafted a letter of thanks for "the Charity of those
many Pious Christians" in England, describing how their
contributions helped "thousands of persons in great Distress
without Habitation or Succor & Many familyes consisting only
of weomen & children utterly uncapable to subsist
themselves."

25

Among the most publicized and widely renowned
charitable efforts involved raising the funds needed to
ransom captives taken by the Indians.

Mary Rowlandson,

captured from Lancaster on February 10, 1676, benefitted
from -£20 "raised by some Boston gentlemen," and the ransom
of in paid for her son was raised by the people of
Portsmouth.

Upon their release, unable to return to

Lancaster, the Rowlandson family lived in a house rented for
them by the South Church of Boston.

Their trials were eased

considerably because, in the former captive's words, "the
Lord so moved the hearts of these and those [i.e.

diverse

strangers] towards us, that we wanted neither food, nor
raiment for ourselves or ours."26 Similarly, public
contributions played a large role in securing the return of
hostages captured from Deerfield and Hatfield by a raiding
party of Canadian natives in 1677.

In that instance, on May
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30, 1678, the Council ordered a public fast day and
designated the proceeds for the support of the redeemed
captives and their families, who incurred significant
expenses in tracking them down.27 Such signal examples of
need naturally brought benevolence from total strangers who
sought to help specific, dramatic causes.
When New England's charity toward the victims of King
Philip's War is viewed as a whole, town orders to strictly
regulate unattached intruders do not indicate any real
stinginess or callousness.

New Englanders, either

individually or collectively through their churches,
responded with an outpouring of contributions to meet
specific solicitations as well as the general needs of the
masses who suffered materially during the conflict.

The

traditional means of providing aid through the town
governments could not meet the unprecedented demands created
by the great Indian war because they were never designed to
do so.
efforts.

Charity had to come from larger and more general
Towns in vulnerable positions had to maintain

their standards in order to keep their own resources from
becoming overburdened and to hope that outside sources could
compensate for the new exigency.

Not surprisingly, the bulk

of the private contributions to the cause came from the more
secure towns which were most able to share their wealth.
One asset which the New England provinces gained from
the conflict was the vast amount of land vacated by the
defeated natives.

In March 1679 the Commissioners of the
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United Colonies "agree[d] that the severall Collonies shall
fully posesse and freely dispose to theire owne advantage
all such lands as lye within theire owne precincts
Respectively.1,28 The largest expanse of real estate which
fell to Massachusetts was the interior frontier, or the
Nipmuck Territory— the largely unsettled land between the
coastal towns and the Connecticut River Valley communities.
One of the major postwar expenses facing the government
involved compensating soldiers and other persons who had
provided services to the colony, and therein rested the
value of the Nipmuck Territory.
The years after 1675 witnessed numerous petitions for
land reimbursements.

Joseph Sill, for example, eloquently

requested from the General Court in 1685 "a small number of
acres of that land which hath bin recovered from the enimy,
that so a little part of what he hath seen with his eyes and
trod with his feet, in your service, may be committed into
his hands, and that so he may the more comfortably share in
the blessings of these peaceful days wherein men may beat
theyr swords into plow shares."

The deputies saw fit to

grant Sill a parcel of land within a new plantation
established in the Nipmuck country "for the Accommodating
such as were souldiers in the Late Warr."29 Countless
individuals wanted pieces of the newly secured land.
The colonies began promising land to their soldiers
even before the war ended and before they removed the
natives.

Before the campaign against the Narragansetts in
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December 1675, for instance, officials assured the troopers
that "if they played the man, took the Fort, & Drove the
Enemy out of the Narragansett Country . . . they should have
a gratuity in Land, besides their Wages."30 Despite this
pledge and the success of the expedition, however, dividends
did not follow immediately.

In fact, veterans of the battle

petitioned nearly a decade later for "some good Tract of
Land" with which to maintain their families, reminding the
General Court that during the war the "Petitioners left what
was Dear to them & preferred the publique weal above their
own private enjoyments.1,31 In the end, it took over fifty
years for the soldiers or their descendants to secure the
promised land from the Massachusetts government.

Not until

1728 did the Council authorize the selection of "two Tracts
of lands for Townships of the contents of six miles square"
for "all such Officers and Soldiers now surviving, and the
legal representatives of those that are deceased."
Massachusetts eventually chartered seven new townships for
the Narragansett veterans or their heirs;

the bulk of the

claimants resided in the eastern sections of the colony, but
Township Number IV (Greenwich) included grants to residents
of Northampton, Hadley, Deerfield, Worcester, and
Brookfield, while Township Number VI (Templeton) contained
claimants from Groton and Lancaster.

32

Naturally, by the

1730s, when the Narragansett Townships were formally
assigned, very few of the original soldiers were still alive
to enjoy their long overdue reward.
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The inordinate delay in providing these soldiers their
land pensions reflected not so much a lack of concern on the
part of Massachusetts legislators as an inability to
effectively manage the enormous flood of petitions for
various sorts for compensation from King Philip's War
veterans.

Long before the war ended, the Council began to

receive requests for aid from wounded soldiers and from the
survivors of the deceased, and the petitions poured in for
many years after the conflict.

Countless requests arrived

from soldiers like John Barnes, wounded at Brookfield, who
in January 1676 reported that "he yet remains under the
Chirurgions hand:
business."

and is altogether unable to doo any

He was awarded 40s as compensation.

Entreaties

also came from widows, such as Ruth Upham, who was left with
seven children.
husband.

33

She received L10 for the loss of her

The numbers of such petitions and the costs to

the colonial government compounded during the years
immediately following the war.
To cope with the worsening situation, colonial
officials attempted to handle the requests in an organized
fashion.

On October 17, 1678, the Council, in response to

the many soldiers who "Lost the use of their limbs and Are
becom uncapable of Labor:

or maintaining themselves,"

ordered an "annuall Alowance or pention paid by the
Country . . . for the relief of Such as Are soe Reduced into
distress."

The order provided for "the orderly Regulating

of this matter,

[that] the Court of Each County Concider the
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cases of such as make

Application to them," and report

worthy petitioners to

the provincial treasurer.

To

further

regularize the system of compensation, the General Court set
up a committee the following year to
those "men wounded in

hear the cases

ofall

the late warr, who moove for

releife."34 Later, in 1684, the Court authorized anyone
owed money by the colony "for salleries or
otherwise,

...

to receive their pay in the Towns where

they lived out of the Country Rates."35
Soldiers and their dependents were not the only persons
requesting compensation from Boston.

Civilians who had

provided services to the colony or its soldiers also swelled
the ranks of those seeking financial satisfaction.

These

petitions for reimbursement covered a wide range of services
rendered, including supplying garrisons, boarding wounded
soldiers, operating ferries, making shoes, and repairing
firearms, and the amounts requested varied from only a few
shillings to hundreds of pounds.36 Although the requests
came from all over the colony, a good number of them came
from the frontier areas, where most of the war-time activity
took place.
Estimates of the charges of the people of Hampshire
County alone suggest an amount over 4.5,000.

The Connecticut

Valley was experiencing economic decline even before the
war.

Many of the towns were relatively young and had as yet

no economic base beyond subsistence agriculture.

In the

more established communities, men who had relied on the fur
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trade as the major entrepreneurial venture in the region
suffered a decline in that traffic.
peaked during the 1650s;

The Valley fur trade

thereafter, commerce deteriorated

due to competition from the Dutch and Mohawk attacks on the
tribes of western New England.

Even so wealthy and

influential a person as John Pynchon of Springfield
reflected despair when he wrote to his son Joseph in 1671,
"I am altogether out of trade, wampum being fallen . . . and
besides there is no trade at all by reason of the Indian
wars.”

Four years later, just after the beginning of King

Philip's War, he expressed further frustration, "having been
wholly out of trade."

We "are now reduced to our best

contrivance for our comfortable living," he confided to
Joseph, "and much ado to make things hold out."37
Admittedly, Pynchon had diversified investments and economic
interests;

he was by no means left destitute.

But if even

he felt the adverse effects of commercial decline and Indian
hostilities, less fortunate residents of the frontier must
have been affected far more acutely.

On October 20, 1675,

Pynchon recounted his losses from attacks in the area and
added that "my farmers [are] also undone, and many in town
that were in my debt utterly disabled;

so that I am really

reduced to great straits."38 The whole fabric of the
frontier economy, therefore, was racked by the war, which
erupted on the heels of a period of economic decline.
Not surprisingly, many Connecticut Valley residents
sought recompense for their wartime expenses.

For instance,
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prominent Northampton residents David Wilton, Lt. William
Clark, and Medad Pomeroy all applied for reimbursement,
ranging from £20 to £40, for quartering or supplying
garrison soldiers.39 Similar claims came from all over the
colony.

Such individual expenses, multiplied by hundreds of

cases, inevitably compounded the strain on the colonial
treasury and forced the provincial government to initiate
drastic measures to recover the financial losses.
In September 1678 the United Colonies claimed total
expenditures resulting from the war of over £80,000, with
Massachusetts alone reporting an outlay of £46,292.40 Such
a huge deficit proved as long-lasting as it was
unprecedented.

So great were the demands on the colony's

finances that in 1678 the Council had to inform its agents
in England, "in very trueth the whole country is now .
greatly impoverished by our late trouble wth the Indians,
sicknesses, & mortallity, &tc."

Due to this situation, the

Council reported "that wee are not able to procure any more
money to be sent over to yow, our treasury being not only
empty, but many thousands of pounds indebted to merchants
here and in England."

Early the next year, the General

Court ordered the treasurer to send the agents, William
Stoughton and Peter Bulkeley, £150 each as "an expression of
our good affection to them" and "a personall gratuity," but
this action does not necessarily indicate that the colony's
financial problems disappeared so quickly.41 More than a
decade after the conflict had ended, the deficits continued.
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By 1690 Massachusetts still counted a debt of £40,000, with
"not a penny in the treasury to pay it withal."42 King
William's War, which began in 1689, compounded the problem
and sustained the chronic indebtedness which began in 1675.
To compensate for the unprecedented demand on its
funds, Massachusetts had to resort to greatly increased
taxation, in the form of multiple tax rates.

Colonists in

seventeenth-century New England generally paid two types of
taxes:

town levies, assessed by the selectmen to meet

normal operating expenses, and a "country rate" for the
support of the provincial government, assessed on towns by a
quota of one penny per pound of estate value plus ls/8d per
poll.

Town constables had responsibility for collecting the

tax and presenting it to the country treasurer, either in
cash if a "rate in money" was demanded or in bushels of
grain at values set by the General Court.43 During the
years preceding King Philip's War, the burden on
Massachusetts colonists was fairly light;

the bulk of the

levies came from the towns and the provincial treasury
generally survived on a single rate per year.

But on July

9, 1675, the Court instituted a policy of multiple rates,
ordering three rates, and it followed up on October 12 with
an additional "seven single country rates .

.

.

three of

the said rates to be payed at or before the last of November
next, & the other fower rates at or before the last of March
next."

The Court allowed payments in kind, with wheat

valued at 6s per bushel, rye at 4s/6d, barley and peas at
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4s, Indian corn at 3s/6d, and oats at 2s.

Those who paid in

cash received a twenty-five percent abatement.

A single

rate for the whole colony amounted to iil553/5s/4d, sc this
initial levy of ten rates for the year must have come as a
shock to the colonists.

Boston, naturally, paid the highest

amount— L300 in a single rate— but even the oppressed
frontier towns received warrants from the treasurer.
Springfield, for instance, was assessed i.26/5s/5d per rate,
Northampton fi22/2s/10d, Hadley il8/10s/9d, Lancaster
■L11/16S, Westfield iill/16s, Groton ill/10s, and Hatfield
■L8/12S.44 Multiplied by ten, this burden brought immediate
hardship, especially to frontier towns where other anxieties
also mounted.
The multiple taxation did not end in 1675.

In fact,

the General Court issued sixteen country rates in 1676 and
nine more in 1677.

Fortunately, in its May 1676 levy, and

again the following October, the Court "provided that such
of the frontier townes as are considerably weakned . . .

be

allowed a meet abatement of their proportions in the
rates."

45

This allowance must have saved the beleaguered

settlements invaluable resources both in cash and in taxable
provisions.

On the other hand, rates represented an

advantage to those owed money by the colonial government, as
they received either direct payments out of the funds
collected or credits in their assessments to cover their
claims.

To those who did not receive such allowances,

however, the multiple rates must have seemed exorbitant, and
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any subsidence in the levies was gradual at best.

Between

1675 and 1680 Massachusetts colonists suffered through
47-1/2 separate rates, and throughout the early 1680s the
Court continued to assess at least two or three rates per
year.46
All the while, the towns continued to levy their own
rates for local projects and expenses.

These assessments

usually did not fluctuate in direct response to the war, the
largest and most constant charges being the minister's
salary and local capital expenses such as the upkeep of the
meeting house.

In Springfield, for instance, both before

and after the war, annual town debts generally fell between
£.120 and £.150;

the major charge was invariably the

minister's salary, which by the late 1670s reached £.100.47
The constancy of town rates, however, did not mean that
residents felt no inconvenience at the cumulative demands.
Despite noting "the Townes Poverty by reason of the
warr," on August 24, 1676, the Springfield town meeting
voted to go ahead with plans to build both a new meeting
house and a suitable residence for the minister.
Undertaking such ambitious projects at a time when people
like John Pynchon were complaining of financial strictures
may seem improvident.

Indeed, in January 1677 the selectmen

were instructed "to take care from time to time for the
making & Collecting of Such Rates [as necessary] for the
Carying on of the worke," and the building project resulted
in an inordinately high town debt of over £.400 as of
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February 1683.48 Perhaps Springfield bit off more than it
could chew, because by early 1685 the town meeting enacted a
restrictive economic policy.

"For the satisfaction & ease

of the Town respecting Charges," the residents voted that
"the Select men shal contract no bargain or engage any sum
above Twenty pounds for the Inhabitants to pay by Rate,
without first advising with & consulting the Town, & having
their approbation concerning the same."49 The residents of
Springfield obviously wanted to keep an eye on the
expenditure of their tax money.
They were not alone in this concern.

In 1682 some

inhabitants of Groton petitioned "that the reats mad by
[the] salackt men be Justly proporshaned to every man his
Just dew to pay and no more."

As in other towns, the poor

of Groton especially felt the strain of increased taxation,
and since many found themselves unable to meet their
obligations, the town meeting authorized the selectmen to
search for some way of easing the demand.50 Unfortunately,
no such practical plan presented itself, and many New
Englanders found no recourse to the high rates short of
simply refusing payment.
Not surprisingly, some colonists chose just that
option, to the chagrin of many town constables charged with
the increasingly difficult task of collecting the rates.
Whether out of inability or unwillingness to pay their
taxes, recalcitrant colonists made the post of constable an
undesirable one in some towns because constables were
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responsible not only for collecting the assessments but also
for turning over the collection to the provincial treasurer,
regardless of any delinquency by their fellow townsmen.
Some shortcomings were unavoidable.

As late as 1681

Constable Samuel Reade of Mendon testified to the General
Court that a L13/12S discrepancy in his payment of the 1675
town rates resulted from an Indian attack which interrupted
his collection and caused the deaths of some of the town's
taxpayers.
obligation.

In response, the Court finally remitted his
51

In a similar case a decade later, however, Cyprian
Stevens of Lancaster defended a shortcoming of iil/19s/7d in
his town's country rate with the claim that the number of
people moving from the town or dying had upset the
assessment, and he had the support of the selectmen in the
matter.

Stevens also noted the continuing difficulty of

collecting both grain and money;

"the scarcity of the [one]

& not haveing the other, the Loss in a great meashur became
the Constabls," he feared.

The Court agreed;

the constable

was still responsible for the sum, and either he or the
selectmen had to provide the balance due.52 With the
provincial treasury in such a depressed state, the General
Court could allow very little leniency in tax collection.
At times, constables found themselves caught in an
uncomfortable position between their town meeting or
selectmen who chose to resist specific levies en masse and
the colonial authorities who demanded payment of the
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assigned quotas.

Two such cases occurred in Hampshire

County during the decades after the war.

In 1685, the

Springfield town meeting voted, "after serious debate," not
to pay a certain money rate in cash, but rather in corn.
The residents agreed to remit extra grain in the hope of
keeping constable Samuel Bliss out of trouble, but Bliss
could not have felt comfortable with the responsibility of
presenting to the provincial treasurer the product of his
town's arbitrary decision.53 In an even more extreme case,
Northampton authorized its "Selectmen not to deliver [a
1692] rate to the Constable & did also engage to Secure the
Select[men] from any Damage for their not delivering the
Same."

54

Again, the constable, whether or not he agreed

with the actions of the residents, had to fear confrontation
with a colonial government which was desperate to clear its
war-related debts.
Complaints against constables delinquent in their
accounts also occurred on the town level.

In 1684 the

selectmen of Springfield complained to the Hampshire County
Court that Thomas Merick, Sr., was short £2/9s/3d from an
authorized town rate of £35.

The court ordered Merick to

pay the amount "out of his owne estate" if he could not
raise it from the appropriate taxpayers.55 Not
surprisingly, constables also heard from their neighbors
when townsmen suspected any discrepancy in the opposite
direction.

Therefore, in 1681 Springfield created a

committee to "make inquisition and search After the overplus
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[i.e.

surplus collected] off all the severall Country rates

in the severall yeares past since the unhappy Indean war &
to endevour the recovery of it out of the hands of the
severall Constables or any other person or persons in whose
hands they shall find the sayd Monies."

The town vowed its

willingness to take legal action if necessary, and no amount
proved too small for scrutiny.56 Given such examples, it
comes as no surprise that filling the office of constable
often was not an easy task in the years following King
Philip's War.
Not all towns had to resort to obstinacy to escape
their rates.

In 1676 the General Court granted certain

frontier towns special abatements;

of the Hampshire County

settlements, Springfield was allowed L150, Northampton
i,18/12s/6d, and Hadley -£9/3s/4d.57 These liberal
allowances helped meet immediate needs at the end of the
war, but just as multiple taxation and indebtedness
continued for years, so too did municipal attempts to avoid
the increased burdens.

In 1679 Groton inhabitants led the

way with an eloquent petition to the General Court,
presenting themselves as a people "who have been great
Sufferers, by the hand of God, in the late wars by our
heathenish enemyes, as is well knowne to all."
"Apprehending it our duty, to addresse ourselves;
to our heavenly father;

not onely

but earthly fathers also, in this

time of need," the selectmen "humbly begg[ed] our case may
be seriously considered, & weighed, & that some direction,
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and releife may be affoarded unto us."

Groton's desired

solution was that the Court release them from the country
charges until order returned to the town.

The magistrates

and deputies concurred, in part, abating Groton residents
one rate per year for the ensuing three years.58
Ironically, Springfield proved to be one of the most
vocal and persistent communities involved in the effort to
seek relief from the country rates, at the very time when
the town undertook two major capital projects.

On May 2,

1677, less than one year after receiving the generous
abatement of -L150 from their rates, Springfield residents
instructed their deputy in the General Court "to get a
settlement of [our] accounts," taking care that every
allowable credit from the war be applied to the town's
ledger.59 By 1684 Springfield took the initiative in
trying to convince the General Court that conditions on the
frontier still prevented those towns from paying rates in
money.

The town meeting petitioned instead for the

privilege of paying all their rates in produce, even when
the Court requested cash, and voted to seek "the concurrence
of the Neighbor Townes of [Hampshire] County therein."60
The General Court found fault with sections of the
Springfield petition, judging "sundry expressions therein
doe deserve sharpe reprooffe," and apparently the
magistrates initially refused to grant the blanket request.
In the end, however, the Court took into consideration "the
difficulty of procuring money in those places" and allowed
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the residents to pay their rates "in good merchantable
corne," in lieu of money, "at one third part lesse price
then is set in the country rate," provided they "deliver the
same to the Treasurer, at Boston, at their owne charge."61
Springfield residents received their wish, but it cost them
extra grain.

Apparently, the shortage of hard cash in the

region made such an arrangement worthwhile.
Paying rates in grain instead of money did not relieve
the financial strain, however.

As the colony's economic

dilemmas persisted, along with lingering Indian threats,
especially in Maine, frontier communities continued to
experience difficulties in meeting their assigned rates.
The outbreak of King William's War exacerbated the problem;
the colonial treasury had not yet recovered completely from
the last conflict and neither had individual frontier town
economies, at least by their own appraisals.

Again,

Springfield was in the forefront, petitioning the General
Court on May 26, 1690, "that [our] want of Corn to live on
[necessitated] some abatement and that what we must pay may
be accepted in cattle, or may be forborne til we are able."
Less than a month later, Springfield residents again
addressed the Court about their extreme lack of provisions,
due to which "many of the Petitioners have not their daily
bread, but what they procure by their daily labors."

The

multiple tax rates had long ago become "an insupportable
burden."62
Northampton echoed Springfield's resistance to the tax
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burden.

In fact, in 1690 Northampton hosted a meeting of

commissioners from other Hampshire County towns whose
mission was to choose special representatives to send to
Boston with the message that the frontier towns simply could
not pay their money rates in specie.

Further, by 1692

Northampton had to claim an inability to meet its
obligations for the year lfin money or Provisions.1,63 The
same types of complaints resounded all over the frontier
during the 1690s;

Springfield, Northampton, Deerfield,

Lancaster, and Groton residents, among others, complained
about the rates, drove their constables to distraction, and
repeatedly petitioned the General Court for relief.64
Frontier residents seemed to have reached their practical
limit in providing support for the overextended colonial
economy.
The price which the Massachusetts frontier particularly
had to pay as a result of King Philip's War certainly placed
a strain on the relationship between individuals, local
governments, and the provincial administration.

Colonists

faced the immediate shock of physical casualties and burned
property, and frontier residents felt constant reminders of
the high price they paid in the form of unprecedented
multiple tax rates.

No colonial records specifically

document opposition to the government's overall handling of
the war and its legacies, but indications of dissatisfaction
surface in colonists' reactions to aspects of Boston's
policies.

The difficulties which the colony experienced in
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drafting men for the militia certainly revealed that
willingness to fight was not universal.

Even more revealing

of discontent were the stratagems and devices employed by
individuals and communities to lessen or escape entirely
their financial obligations to the colony.

Constables could

make neither their fellow citizens nor, on occasion, their
town selectmen comply with the provincial treasurer’s
levies.

Mere inability to pay the taxes was accompanied by

obstinacy evident in many of the petitions for abatement.
King Philip's War started a pattern of chronic economic
shortcomings in the Massachusetts treasury and thus a period
of sustained financial burden on the towns of the colony, a
burden which weighed especially heavily on the disrupted
frontier communities.

The war left many legacies in the

Massachusetts Bay Colony, but perhaps the most durable,
widely felt, and difficult problem proved to be recovering
the many and varied costs of the conflict.
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CHAPTER 4
THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY

When Metacom's warriors surged along the Massachusetts
frontiers in 1675 and 1676, they left behind scenes of death
and destruction in numerous towns.

Throughout the

Connecticut Valley, the Merrimac region, and even the
interior frontier, communities suffered from Indian attacks.
While the government expressed concern that the "out towns"
hold firm against the assaults, some of the more exposed
plantations succumbed, and their residents retreated to
safer areas.

After the war, when colonists began to show

interest in returning to their ruined homes, provincial and
local authorities advocated caution.

Even in the towns

which survived the conflict, an emphasis on compactness and
increased defense appeared in instructions for the ordering
of settlement.

Recovery from the trauma of King Philip's

War often proved to be difficult.

In no area was this

difficulty more apparent than in reestablishing order in the
frontier communities.

In most cases, the task would have

proceeded much more smoothly had not the fear of native
hostilities continued into the 1680s, culminating finally in
King William's War.

In some places, the search for a

stable, settled community configuration never really ended.
113
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From the start of King Philip's War, the Massachusetts
government showed concern for the safety of individuals
subject to native attacks, but authorities also enunciated a
policy of maintaining the frontier towns and defenses at all
reasonable costs.

On October 13, 1675, the General Court

ordered the militia committees of towns throughout the
colony to organize garrisons and otherwise look to their own
defense.

Further, the court required "all persons in the

severall townes, upon poenalty of five shillings per
day, . . .

to labour in and provide such fortiffication or

fortiffications as they shall agree upon."

While

emphasizing the protection of the frontier, the order
reflected the legislators' concern for their fellow citizens
in providing that "the severall smale frontier townes which
are judged not able of themselves to bear the distress of
the warr shall have theire weomen and
children . . . remooved" to the closest secure position.1
By October, however, Deerfield and Northfield, the most
exposed plantations on the Connecticut River, and
Brookfield, isolated in the interior, had already been
abandoned, and the frontier was reeling from the initial
assaults.

Thus the General Court attempted to stabilize the

situation by compelling the remaining settlements to
maintain a military presence, if not complete community
order.
In a further effort to prevent a stampede from the
frontier, Capt. Samuel Appleton issued an order on November
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12, 1675, to the residents of the upper Connecticut Valley
towns prohibiting their withdrawal "without liberty under
the hand of the Commander in chiefe."

In "this time of

trouble & danger," he proclaimed, "noe person shall remove
from or desert any of these townes soe longe as forces are
continued heer for their defence."

Appleton even made it

unlawful for anyone to "goe out of the Townes without a
pass" from him.

2

On May 3, 1676, the General Court

sustained Appleton's injunction, noting "the great
inconveniency that will ensue, if persons be left at liberty
to wthdraw from the frontier townes . . . thereby enfeebling
the remote parts of the country, and tending to the dammage
of the whole."

This ordinance required that each militia

committee arrange and execute daily scouting expeditions to
secure their towns and that neighboring communities commit
themselves to aid each other against attacks.3 Frontier
settlements began to take on the appearance of besieged
outposts, with soldiers and refugees swelling their
populations, plans implemented for quick removal to
fortified garrison houses, and all of the residents'
activities regulated by virtual martial rule.

Such measures

were central to the government's efforts to prevent the
frontier from crumbling entirely.
All around the relatively secure garrison sites in the
spring of 1676 lay the ruins of communities and homesteads
which had been destroyed by the natives.

The colonists who

left these exposed plantations generally followed
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predictable patterns of retreat— in many cases the same
paths previously travelled to reach the ill-fated towns.
For instance, during the 1650s through the early 1670s,
settlement advanced steadily northward up the Connecticut
Valley from the older villages;

substantially the same

route was traversed in reverse in 1675.

Likewise, residents

of the Merrimac and interior regions tended to flee to the
towns around Boston Harbor, whence they originated.4 The
actions of the frightened refugees reflected common sense
and the human drive for survival;
accessible secure sites.

they retired to the most

In addition, however, they

revealed a preference for familiar communities where they
had either personal experience or the benefits of close
relatives, or in many instances both.
Frontier residents generally did not race headlong back
to the deserted plantations, nor would the provincial
government have permitted such a precipitous action.
Instead, Boston prescribed a cautious, orderly approach.

On

October 22, 1677, the General Court addressed the towns in
Hampshire County, in particular, as "being in more hazard of
the incursions of the heathen ennemy then some others."
Because New Englanders still feared further incursions, the
court ordered that "each towne there doe endeavor the new
moddelling the scittuation of their houses, so as to be more
compact & live neerer together, for theire better deffence
against the Indians."

To oversee resettlement and to ensure

that the instructions concerning compactness were followed,
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colonial authorities formed a committee for Hampshire County
composed of M a j . John Pynchon of Springfield, Lt. John
Mosely and Ens. Samuel Loomis of Westfield, Lt. William
Clarke of Northampton, Peter Tilton of Hadley, and
Lt. William Allis of Hatfield.5 Nearly two years later, in
May 1679, the court reiterated that "for the greater comfort
& safety of all people who are intended to resetle the
villages deserted in the late warr, or the planting any new
plantation wthin this jurisdiction . . .

no deserted towne

or new plantation shallbe inhabitted untill the people first
make applycation unto the Governor & council, or to the
County Courts wthin whose jurisdiction such plantation is."
This new order again required "a principall respect to
neerenes & conveniency of habitation for security against
ennemyes, and more comfort for [Christian] communion and
enjoyment of God's worship, & education of children in
schooles, & civility, with other good ends."6 Doubtless,
the Indian assaults on the frontier towns and the fact that
a number of the exposed plantations had to be abandoned
during the war inspired the General Court to recommend an
orderly pattern of settlement, but there was nothing new in
such an emphasis.
From the inception of the colony, Massachusetts leaders
stressed the importance of tight community structure and
cohesion.

When expansion began to draw groups of colonists

away from the established harbor towns and into the
wilderness, concern over the maintenance of communal
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organization increased.

In 1645, for instance, when

granting a charter for the town of Nashaway, the General
Court enjoined the new planters to "sett not their howses
to[o] farr asunder."7 The motivations behind this policy
were not entirely linked to military defense, as the order
of May 1679 suggests.

In large part, Puritan New Englanders

insisted on community cohesion as both a support and a
reflection of their congregational religious orientation;
community and congregation went hand in hand.

As John Eliot

stated of frontier planters, "it is necessary that they have
the Ministry of Gods Word, and some other godly persons with
them, who may carry on Church-work among them."8 New
Englanders were thus strongly discouraged from setting out
on their own, in solitary or isolated enterprises, without
the benefits of the traditional close communal and religious
structure.
Contemporaries and historians alike have cited the
emphasis on community bonds as a major support in helping
New Englanders to survive troubled times such as King
Philip's War.

9

Certainly, the admonitions for compact

settlement after the conflict reflected a recognition that
the most healthy and defensible pattern involved close,
communal relationships.

But in contrast to the announced,

official position, colonists continually branched off into
smaller and more dispersed settlements in the wilderness as
land became crowded or social conditions became
uncomfortable in the established towns.

Cotton Mather,
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among others, recognized the paradox between the commitment
to expand and conquer the wilderness and the insistence on
community cohesion.

In a 1690 election sermon he pondered

the problem of "how at once we may Advance our Husbandry,
and yet Forbear our Dispersion;

and moreover at the same

time fill the Countrey with a Liberal Education" as well as
a strict congregational structure.10
This problem presented itself during the decades
following King Philip's War.

While provincial authorities

advised a cautious approach to resettlement and future town
ordering, especially in the Connecticut Valley, within a
decade after the return of peace Hampshire County residents
began petitioning for expansion of their town grants or even
for entirely new satellite communities.

Naturally, such

requests came from established and relatively populous towns
like Springfield and Hadley, which survived the war
substantially intact, but even so isolated and vulnerable a
plantation as Deerfield showed a tendency toward expansion
within a short time of its reestablishment.

Not all of

these efforts proved successful, and continuing Indian
threats, especially with the outbreak of King William's War
in 1689, discouraged and dispersed many of the potential
settlers.
The trend reflected a common pattern apparent in
seventeenth-century New England.

In times of extreme

danger, colonial officials loudly emphasized the doctrine of
compact community cohesion, and the affected colonists at
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least gave lip service to the requirements.

As soon as even

the semblance of safety returned, however, some colonists
sought more elbow room and personal latitude in new
communities.

Such was definitely the case after King

Philip's War.

Seventeenth-century New Englanders certainly

were not the hearty, individualistic pioneers of American
legend;

they almost invariably moved in prearranged groups

with an eye toward establishing communities.11 Still,
significant elements of the population, for a variety of
reasons, either were not content or were not permitted to
become sedentary but moved on to cast their lots elsewhere.
The task for the provincial government was to see that
distant frontier settlements were defensible and adhered to
established models of communal and congregational
responsibility.

Such concerns were apparent in the postwar

experiences of towns across the Massachusetts frontier.

Springfield
Springfield was the social anchor of the Connecticut
Valley.

Settled in 1635 by a group from Roxbury led by

William Pynchon, it was the first and, throughout the
century, the largest Massachusetts town in the region.
Largely through the efforts of Pynchon and his son John,
probably the most influential man in the history of
Hampshire County, it spawned every successive plantation in
the Valley.

Evidence of this involvement was clearly

apparent in both the origins and the subsequent struggles of
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the other Hampshire plantations.
By 1675, Springfield consisted of four distinct
villages:

the original town center;

a suburb opposite on

the west bank of the Connecticut River;
miles south of the town center;
northeast.

Longmeadow, four

and Skepnuck, three miles

M aj. John Pynchon viewed this settlement pattern

as a liability after the start of hostilities with the
natives.

"We are very raw," he informed Connecticut

authorities in August 1675, "and our people of this town
extremely scattered."

12

He clearly believed that the

situation invited disaster.
The major noted a "desire to rely on all sufficient
God," fearing an imminent Indian assault in early August.
On August 7, Pynchon wrote to Connecticut Governor John
Winthrop, Jr., informing him of the growing apprehension
among Springfield's residents.

The townspeople reportedly

were "so extremely frighted that, in the very heart of the
town, people remove from their own houses to any next that
they judge more strong."

Pynchon himself had neighbors

flocking to his house, "all our people being in fear of a
sudden surprisal at home."13 As the eminent authority
figure in the region, he understandably inspired confidence
in the local people, who looked to him for protection.
The anticipated attack came on October 5, 1675, and
cost the community some thirty houses, twenty-five barns,
and John Pynchon's mills.

Reportedly, only thirteen houses

were left standing in the town center after the attack.

On
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the day of the assault, Pynchon wrote to the Reverend John
Russell of Hadley, informing him of the destruction.

"I

believe 40 families are utterly destitute of subsistence,"
he claimed, and "I see not how it is possible for us to live
here this winter."

With grain stores and mills ruined, "the

sooner we were holpen off the Better."

14

By October 8,

however, Pynchon had moderated his opinion.

In a report to

Governor John Leverett in Boston, he stated that "I would
not have the place deserted nor give such advantage to the
Indians if possible."

He admitted that many residents had

"nothing at all left" and therefore were "discouraged
exceedingly."

Although opposed to abandoning Springfield,

Pynchon warned Leverett of the difficulty of "holding the
place" and of reassuring the people "without many
soldiers."15
The governor referred the matter to Captain Appleton,
the newly appointed commander of the Connecticut Valley
forces.

"If there should be a necessity of deserting

Springfield as Major Pinchon intimates it will be very awful
but," Leverett conceded, "the conclusion thereof must be
left with you on the place."

In response, Appleton

acknowledged that "the people are full of fear & Hazzarding
in their thoughts as to their Leaping or Leaving of the
place.

Those whose houses & provisions are Consumed," he

wrote, "incline to leave the place as thinking they can
better labor for a living in places of lesser danger than
that where now they are."

Despite the apprehension of the
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populace, however, Appleton advised holding Springfield, at
least as an "incouragement and help to others."

Abandoning

the town would result in "great discouragement to others and
hazzard to [our] passage from one place to another."16
This continuing debate over the fate of Springfield
reflected the important role it filled in the Connecticut
Valley.

The decision to hold or leave the town affected not

only the residents of the community but also the security of
the other plantations in the Valley.

Obviously, quitting

Springfield would have adverse effects on the defenses of
the other river towns, but as the oldest and most stable
community in Hampshire County, Springfield also supported
the upriver settlements psychologically.

In fact, the

decision to prohibit townspeople from leaving important
centers such as Springfield reflected concern more for the
overall defensive scheme of the region than for the
sentiment of the residents themselves.

The panic among the

Springfield colonists eventually subsided, and the town
resumed its position as the linch pin of the Connecticut
Valley defenses.
The ties between Springfield and the neighboring
plantations cannot be emphasized too strongly.

Aside from

the fact that newer communities were composed largely of
emigrants from the others, the Hampshire settlements shared
a prominent bond in the person of John Pynchon.

The

influential son of Springfield's founder served on the
organizing committees for virtually all of the subsequently
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founded river towns, beginning with Northampton in 1653, and
he played an important role in financing and securing land
for them.

In recompense, Pynchon received land grants in

each, giving him a continuing interest and influence which
lasted after the period of initial settlement.17 The
mutual relationships which existed between Springfield and
the communities it helped to produce were evident in the
defensive plan outlined for the Connecticut Valley by
Massachusetts authorities.
By March 1676, the Council ordered frontier commanders
to put "themselves in to such a Posture as may best
accommodate their security & provision."

The safest plan,

as judged by the councillors, involved "their gathering
together in such places & numbers as that they may be able
to defend themselves."

Springfield and Hadley were judged

the most secure positions, and officials in Boston advised
that ‘‘the lesser Townes must gather to the greater."

"To

remayne in such a scattered manner," warned the Council, "is
to expose lives & estates to the merciless cruelty of the
enemy [and] is no less than tempting Divine providence.1,18
The plan called for Westfield residents to retire to
Springfield, while colonists from Northampton and Hatfield
were to gather at Hadley.

From the start, opponents

resisted the advice, and the councillors noted "somethinge
working towards a frustration & disappointment of that good
end aimed at."19 They feared the worst if Hampshire
residents persisted in their "scattered manner" of
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settlement.

The colony could not muster enough troops to

defend each individual town, and the provincial government
hoped the towns would agree to concentrate in order to ease
the strain on available resources.

Also in March 1676, the

General Court informed Pynchon that he and his fellow
residents of Springfield "must ride it out as best you
can."

20

The defense of the entire frontier depended on the

ability of key points like Springfield to stand their ground
and to protect the smaller communities surrounding them.
The population of Springfield, reflecting the town's
age and settled condition, remained relatively stable during
the war and the decades which followed, especially in
comparison with other towns in the region.

The Indian

attack of October 5, 1675, of course, sent the residents of
the community scrambling to fortified garrison houses and
inspired thoughts of leaving the town.

Although Springfield

survived the war without a period of abandonment, its
population was touched directly by the conflict.

Twelve

Springfield residents, for instance, lost their lives at the
hands of the natives in 1675 and 1676;

in addition to

citizens killed in or near the town, three Springfield
soldiers died at Turner's Falls and two others in the
vicinity of Westfield.21 John Keepe and his wife were
among those "slaine by the Indians."

They left three small

children, whom the Hampshire County Probate Court bound over
to relatives.22 In these examples, Springfield shared the
experiences of towns throughout the colony, as residents
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were killed and families torn apart by the war;

but in the

overall picture, Springfield's inhabitants were able to
weather the storm more smoothly than were their fellows in
many other frontier communities.
The stability and relative security of the town were
clearly portrayed in the vital statistics of the late
seventeenth century.

In each of the three major

categories— births, marriages, and deaths— the general
trends of the period were uninterrupted by the war.

Except

for a slight decline in births for 1676 compared to the
surrounding years, the numbers of babies born to Springfield
citizens remained constant or increased noticeably
throughout the war period.

Likewise, the war had no

apparent effect on the general pattern of marriages in the
community, despite the fact that men of marriageable age
served in the militia and lost their lives in the conflict.
Mortality figures were understandably high in 1675 and 1676,
but the twelve deaths attributed to native attacks accounted
for only about one-fourth of the total;

disease must have

played a particularly virulent role in Springfield during
the period, as deaths jumped sharply again in 1683, 1684,
1689, and 1690, reaching two to three times the average
annual level.

23

One notable characteristic revealed by the town's vital
records was the web of associations which inhabitants of
Springfield had with other communities in the region.
Throughout the period, Springfield residents or their close
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TABLE 4.1
SPRINGFIELD VITAL RECORDS

Springfield Births

1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:

99
105
153

1675-79:
1680-84:
1685-89:

160
192
191

1675-79:
1680-84:
1685-89:

45
45
37

1675-79:
1680-84:
1685-89:

66
86
89

Springfield Marriages

1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:

24
14
24

Springfield Deaths

1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:

Source:

26
14
22

Indians:
1675:
8,
1675: 4)

Warren, "Births, Marriages and
Deaths."
See note 24
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relatives lived, married, and died in virtually every other
town in the Connecticut Valley.

Even more notable,

Springfield's connections with towns further south,
especially Suffield and Enfield, increased significantly
after the war, indicating perhaps that although Springfield
represented the anchor of the western frontier in
Massachusetts, a small portion of its inhabitants reacted to
the conflict and chose safer areas.24 Still, the
demographic trends reflected the permanence and continuity
which characterized the reaction of the majority of
Springfield residents to King Philip's War.
Aside from the effort to recover wartime expenses and
to avoid the multiple rates which followed, the residents of
Springfield seemingly experienced few long-term effects from
King Philip's War, at least according to evidence left in
the town proceedings.

Other than taxes, the official

documents for the period 1675 to 1680 reveal at least as
much interest in wolves, swine, fences, and highways as in
war-related issues.

In February 1678 the town meeting

"voted & concluded . . . that something should be done for
the fortification of the new meeting house," but rather than
indicating a sense of urgency, the issue of strengthening
the town hall was overshadowed by the attention given to
other capital projects adopted concurrently.

Plans to build

the town's first school (£14) and a new meeting house
(£400—5s) attracted more money and more attention than did
any effort to fortify the village center.25
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A main concern of Springfield residents after the war
was that all landowners pay their just share of the
increased tax burden.

For instance, when the General Court

abated the community -L150 in its 1676 rates, the loyal
residents insisted that "they who have deserted the towne, &
not runn the hazard with their neighbors [should] not [be]
allowed any share in the abovesaid abatement."26 Those
residents who weathered the storm wanted their less resolute
brethren to pay for their lack of fortitude.

Absentee

landowners, speculators, and the like upset the cohesion of
New England communities, but they also complicated tax
collection procedures.

In February 1677 the town adopted a

resolution requiring new grantees to remain a minimum of
"five yeers in the Town after the Land granted is
measured."27 Given Springfield's record, this policy
likely was designed less to foster communal cooperation than
to ensure that the recipients' actions did not interfere
with the interests of established residents.

Irony

permeated such a design, since Springfield's most
influential citizen, John Pynchon, was undoubtedly the
largest absentee landowner in the other towns of the region.
Population growth in Springfield led to further
dispersal by the 1680s.

In 1679 the selectmen advised the

county court of their "intent to setle a small Town or
village out of their Towns Lands at a place called
freshwater brook."

The court appointed a committee of

Pynchon, George Colton, Benjamin Cooley, and Samuel
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Marshfield to oversee the move, instructing the new settlers
"to Live nere togeather" for security "& other Good Ends."
Within four years, however, the residents of the Freshwater
Brook section of the town petitioned for and received
permission to form a new township, organized as Enfield, now
within the bounds of Connecticut.28
In 1688, as the threat of King William's War began to
take shape on the frontier, John Pynchon complained that
Springfield "consists much of out-farms and a few houses
together."

In a letter to Governor Edmund Andros on August

21 he noted that "above half our people are abroad and at a
distance from the town three or four miles each way,"
referring to the communities at Longmeadow and Skepnuck.
The next day Pynchon wrote to John Allyn of Connecticut
reiterating the perils of the scattered settlement but
assuring him that the town center was "in a tolerable secure
way by fortifying."

Further, town authorities saw to

"calling in some people in out [isolated] houses that were
alone,

. . . ordering them together where there were any

likelihood of self defense in case of a shock."29 But
Springfield residents persisted in their scattered brand of
settlement, coming together only when necessity pulled them.
Even during periods of peril they apparently tired of
their communal responsibilities.

By late 1694, in the

middle of King William's War, Pynchon had to admit that the
town was "not in any good posture."

"Fortifications gone to

decay, and for repairing or making new," he reported,
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"people a little willful, inclined to do what and how they
please or not at all."

He perceived that only an "order

from authority" would "enforce . . . what is meet
and . . . strengthen the hands of those here who would have
something done but find obstructions to their
discouragement.1,30 Pynchon's observations support a later
appraisal that Springfield residents generally tended toward
individualism and only cooperated with their neighbors in
times of extreme need.31

Westfield
One of the towns in Springfield's geographic orb was
Westfield, originally settled during the 1660s;

as was

common in the region, John Pynchon played a part in
organizing the outpost, and he continued his influence as a
major landholder.

Despite this persisting relationship and

their exposed position ten miles west of Springfield,
Westfield residents resisted drawing off during King
Philip's War and especially opposed the suggestion that they
retire to Pynchon's garrisons.

On April 5, a committee

composed of the Reverend Edward Taylor, Isaac Phelps, Thomas
Dewey, Josiah Dewey, and David Ashley related the desires of
their fellow townsmen on the matter to the Connecticut
Council.

"If we must be gone from hence many of us have

estates and friends calling us elsewhere," they wrote, "and
thereupon most of us incline, in case we remove, to come
downwards."32 This statement reflected the fact that of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132
the original settlers, more came from Windsor, Connecticut,
than from any other location.
Although feeling affinity to the Connecticut
settlements, Westfield was under the administration of
Massachusetts.

Noting the hardships occasioned by the war,

the town committee proclaimed to the General Court a desire
to "carey on Some thing together for the good of the whol
that so by Gods blessing and our labors wee may be in a way
of geting food for our familyes."

In the hope that the

"Counsel See not cause [to] draw us off," Westfield
residents pledged "to plowe and sow and cary on the
imp[rove]ment of this land in general."33 This statement
represented one of the clearest expressions of community
feeling to be found anywhere on the Massachusetts frontier
during or after King Philip's War.

Westfield residents

assured the provincial government that they could best
weather the threat by banding together and maintaining their
group identity.
Town authorities employed a variety of arguments to
dissuade the Council from ordering their withdrawal.

On

April 3, 1676, they produced their most effusive entreaty.
"To remove from habitations to none, from fortifications to
none, from a compact place to a scattered one, from a place
of less danger in the field to one of more, from a place
under the ordinary blessing upon our labors to one usually
blasted," the committee members judged, "seems to us such a
strange thing that we find not a man amongst us inclining
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thereto.”34 Westfield residents, by and large, opposed any
plan to make them leave their homes.
Instead, they chose to strengthen their own
fortifications and to ask the Massachusetts government for
garrison troops.

The townspeople agreed "to contract their

fortifications so as to be but about 70 rods in length and
20 broad."

This compacted stronghold was "to be strongly

and closely fortified" by the residents in proportion to
their rateable estates.

On May 8, 1676, the town meeting

ordered the work "dun with al speed."35 Whether the
advised urgency was designed to thwart a feared Indian
attack or to convince the provincial legislature of the
town's viability, the decision to draw within the
fortifications rather than scatter represented a conscious
emphasis on community cohesion and continuity.
The willingness of Westfield residents to gather into a
close community did not end with the defeat of Metacom's
warriors.

Although the town was never abandoned, and the

residents therefore did not have to undertake a major
rebuilding or reordering operation, they did give proper
attention to the patterns of compactness ordered by the
General Court.

The Hampshire County committee composed of

Pynchon, Clark, Tilton, Allis, and Loomis ordered in
November 1677 "that the Inhabietance [of Westfield] Doe all
posses and setell Together," in a central location near the
town meeting house.
universally popular;

This directive may not have been
some residents had to leave tracts of
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land situated too far from the town center, and others lost
shares out of the commons land reapportioned to those forced
to relocate.

As a result, Taylor wrote to Boston on May 15,

1679, asking the General Court to "Confirm in Law those
little bits of [unassigned] land unto those, who, in
obedience unto your Authority have them in actual 1
possession for which they have that, & only that to
Show."36 The court responded favorably to the request,
"particularly appoynting a tract of land for the inhabitants
of Westfield, to build on nearer together, at or by their
meeting house."

Since the inhabitants "by a gennerall vote,

consented to the setling thereon," the provincial officials
authorized that those proprietors who "parted with" land in
the transaction be repaid "two acres for [each] one [lost],
out of the townes adjacent lands intended for home
lotts."37 Westfield seemed intent on establishing a tight
community during the years immediately following King
Philip's War.
In fact, for some two years the residents of the town
reportedly lived in virtually an enclosed village as a
result of the enhanced fortifications and the active plans
for compact settlement.

Thirty-four families containing

some two hundred people occupied an area roughly two miles
in circumference.

By 1679, however, fifteen landowners felt

secure enough to return to their outlying holdings.38 In
that year, the aforementioned "Comity for Ordering compact
Dwelling together for beter Defence & safety," noted the
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recent defectors and approved their move with the provision
that they take proper steps toward defense.

But for the

remainder of Westfield inhabitants, the committee ordered
"their Removeing & setling" within the stated bounds as well
as the completion of the required labor on the
fortifications according to the assigned proportions.39 At
the end of the tumultuous decade, the officially stated
policy still adhered to the ideal design of a compact local
society, but already the seeds of its disruption were
beginning to sprout.
Perhaps inevitably, demographic progress spelled the
end of geographic compactness;

the community could not grow

in numbers and at the same time resist expansion.

Between

1679 and 1689, the population of Westfield increased fifty
percent, and the increase also reflected a significant
turnover among the residents.

Of 54 heads of households

present in 1679, only 37 remained a decade later.
Thirty-three new householders appeared by 1689;

20 were

adult sons of established residents and, 13 were newcomers
to the community.

To accommodate the petitioners, the town

authorized a division of the commons amounting to 617
acres.

40

Significantly, the selectmen ordered the new

grants issued in 1687 "to be taken up without 2 mile of the
Meting house unles they have liberty otherwise to some
perticler plase," more proximate.41 Within a decade of the
county committee's order requiring residents to live within
the meeting house environs, town authorities prohibited new
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landowners from crowding the town center.

With population

growth, the initially genuine emphasis on compact settlement
could not survive for any great length of time, but
adherence to the scheme began to break down by the late
1670s and apparently disappeared by the end of the 1680s.

Northampton
Twenty miles upriver from Springfield was Northampton,
the second oldest town on the Connecticut River frontier.
It was created in 1653 when John Pynchon, Elizur Holyoke,
and Samuel Chapin, "Inhabitants of Springfield,11 petitioned
the General Court for liberty to plant a settlement at
Nonotuck (Northampton).

The petitioners assured the court

that a sufficient number of families in the area showed "a
desire to remove thither";

more important, the committee

reported, "many of them are of considerable Quality for
Estates and fit matter for a Church."42 Although
Springfield residents initiated the plans for a new town,
well over half of the early settlers moved north from
Connecticut, the largest numbers coming from Windsor and
Hartford.

Barely fifteen percent of the colonists admitted

to Northampton during the first five years of its existence
migrated from the Springfield area, with the remainder
representing communities around Boston.43 Like other
Connecticut Valley towns which followed, Northampton from
the start felt common ties to Springfield political leaders,
especially John Pynchon, but the initial inhabitants of the
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new town also shared bonds with widely dispersed communities
throughout the region.
Following the October 5, 1675 attack on Springfield,
the residents of the Northampton area expected their turn to
come at any time.

Rev. John Russell of neighboring Hadley

believed the vicinity was "likely to drink next . . .
this bitter cup."
month;

44

of

The anticipated assault came within a

on October 28 natives burned four Northampton houses

and a number of barns, prompting the residents to erect
fortifications around the town center.

During the fall and

the ensuing winter, Northampton built "a Kind of
Barricado . . .

by setting up Pallisadoes of Cleft-wood

about eight Foot long."

The planners realized a wooden wall

would not necessarily keep the Indians from storming the
town, but they correctly judged that it would slow them down
enough to eliminate the element of sudden surprise.
palisade had another advantage.

The

On March 14, 1676, warriors

again attacked Northampton and succeeded in breaking through
the barrier but were trapped inside by the garrison's
counterattack.

Their backs literally against the wall, the

Indians "saw themselves like Wolves in a Pound," according
to William Hubbard, and "they could not fly away at their
Pleasure."45 Not only did the fortification allow
Northampton to repulse this attack, it also provided a
long-term deterrent.

Metacom's warriors did not again

attack Northampton or any other palisaded town during the
war.
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The successful defense of March 14 gave the colonists
added vigor in their resistance to the General Court's
suggestion that they concentrate at Hadley for security.
Two weeks later, a group of Northampton's leaders led by the
Reverend Solomon Stoddard imformed the General Court, "we
dare not entertain any thoughts of deserting this
plantation," for fear of appearing ungrateful to the God who
protected them.

Further, removing would "discourage other

plantations, as may prove no small prejudice unto the
Country."

Northampton residents thus employed the same

arguments for holding their town as the court had used
earlier in prohibiting Springfield inhabitants from
abandoning that community.

In asking for more soldiers, the

"generality of the Town" consented "at [their] own cost,
[to] bear the charge of a sufficient garrison."

The

residents preferred to pay the soldiers' expenses, "rather
then want them."46 Although the government decried the
town's unwillingness "to attend our advice to draw into a
narrow compass whereby wee conceved they would have been
able to deffend themselves better," provincial authorities
approved extra garrison soldiers from M a j . Thomas Savage's
company for Northampton on April 1, 1676.

47

As a result of

the town's initiative in building fortifications, refusal to
retreat, and maintenance of extra garrison soldiers,
Northampton, too, was able to survive the war despite its
exposed position on the frontier.
On the eve of King Philip's War, Northampton had a
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population of approximately five-hundred people.

No records

exist to indicate how many residents left the town due to
the hostilities;
chose to stay.

some undoubtedly did, but the majority
Rather than leave the area completely, some

landowners who lived in remote parts of the township
petitioned for lots near or within the fortifications.

Town

authorities complied with as many of these requests as
possible, issuing grants "wherever unapportioned land could
be found."

In all, eight Northampton landowners received

new town lots as a result of King Philip’s War.

Many of

them apparently never returned to their dispersed holdings,
but at least one recipient, William Smead, became so
discouraged by the smallness of his new plot that he soon
left the town altogether and moved to Deerfield.48 By and
large, however, most of Northampton's residents seem to have
been satisfied with the measures taken by their town in
reaction to the conflict.
King Philip's War affected the population of the town
in other ways as well.

Of 31 Northampton residents engaged

at the Falls Fight, for instance, 12 were killed.49 Town
records revealed inordinately high numbers of deaths for
1675 and 1676— 14 and 29 respectively— and the records noted
that many of them were "slain by the Indians."

Mortality

figures had never reached such heights in any year before
the war and did not again in the years after 1676 until the
outbreak of King William's War in 1689.

In spite of the

sharp increase in Northampton deaths, however, the war seems
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TABLE 4.2
NORTHAMPTON VITAL RECORDS

Northampton Births
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:

74
106
109

1675-79:
1680-84:
1685-89:

130
154
131

1675-79:
1680-84:
1685-89:

27
21
18

1675-79:
1680-84:
1685-89:

46
38
43

Northampton Marriages
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:

25
15
17

Northampton Deaths
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:

Source:

20
24
31

Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 101, 107.
Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages.
See note 51.
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to have had no adverse effects on births or marriages among
the town's residents, as both either increased steadily or
remained fairly constant during and after the war.

The

ratio of births to marriages fell slightly during the period
1675 through 1679 but rebounded to reach an unprecedented
level for the entire decade of the 1680s.

In fact, births

in Northampton outnumbered deaths in every year during the
last three decades of the seventeenth century, except 1689,
and the population of the town more than doubled during the
period, from 450 persons in 1670 to 937 in 1700.50 This
demographic progress seems all the more remarkable given the
fact that the bulk of the wartime victims presumably were
soldiers and therefore males of marriageable age.
Northampton residents approached the postwar period
with the caution advised by the provincial government.

At a

January 1678 meeting, "The Town being Sensible that it was
their duty to [prepare] in a prudent way for their own
Safety did . . . vote & Agree to make & maintain their
fortification till a more Settled peace appear."

The

inhabitants of Northampton stipulated "that every man Should
make & maintain that particular part of [the] fortification
which is Already laid out to him."

Where gaps of

unapportioned land crossed the pallisade, the townsmen
provided for its maintenance "in a general way."51
Northampton took seriously the concerns of compact defense
even after Metacom's defeat.
Town authorities expressed the same concerns with
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regard to postwar settlement.

Although people continued to

live, and the town continued to grant land, "without the
present Fortification," officials overseeing settlement in
Northampton during the 1680s emphasized a nuclear town plan.
In February 1680 they instructed that new house lots "be
taken up as near the Town as may be" and preferably
adjoining land already occupied or laid out.

The order also

required the new grantees to improve their lots within one
year and to clear the land within four years.52 Unlike
similar orders issued in Springfield at the same time, the
motivations behind these instructions seem to have been
community defense and cohesion.
This did not mean that Northampton was not changing
during the period;

the town experienced an impressive

population increase, as noted, between 1675 and 1700.

The

composition of the population was remained fairly constant,
however, and most of the growth resulted from natural
reproduction.
war.

Migration into the town was slight after the

The proprietors decided to divide the commons for the

first time in 1684, reflecting the population growth, but
apparently most of the recipients were sons of established
townsmen.

53

Therefore, the town possessed a great degree

of continuity, both in population and in experience.
The "danger they were in of being Assaulted by an
Enemy" did not end during the 1680s, of course, and the
residents' concerns naturally intensified at the end of the
decade, with reports of renewed hostilities on the frontier.
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On March 5, 1690, the town meeting voted to re-fortify the
town, a project which consisted basically of restoring the
old palisade and enlarging it in some places to accommodate
a decade of community growth.

All householders living

within the fortification, as well as those from outside who
chose to seek refuge there in times of danger, were to help
build and maintain the structure.54 Although these
instructions appeared in a period of renewed warfare, they
still indicated ongoing recognition of the advantages of
compact settlement.

John Pynchon, on more than one

occasion, reported that Northampton being, "pretty compact
and together," was probably the best equipped of any of the
Connecticut Valley towns to meet the new Indian threat.55
Such sound preparation did not occur overnight;
Northampton's attention to compactness and community order
evidently benefitted the town in the years after King
Philip's War.

Deerfield
The Northampton area represented the last bastion of
relative safety in the upper Connecticut Valley.

Deerfield,

fifteen miles upriver, was a wilderness outpost in every
sense of the term throughout the period.

The roots of

Deerfield, or Pocumtuck as the settlement was originally
known, went back to Dedham and the dispute between the
residents there with the neighboring Praying Indians at
Natick.

In response to a petition from the Dedham
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plaintiffs concerning a large tract of contested land
between the two towns, the General Court in 1663 granted the
claimants 8,000 acres "in any Convenient place . . . where
it can bee found free from former Grants."56 The
recipients then dealt through John Pynchon to purchase a
tract from the Pocumtuck Indians, but most of the Dedham
proprietors never moved to the remote plantation.

Only

approximately one-third of Deerfield's original settlers
migrated from the Dedham area, while the remaining
two-thirds came from Northampton, Hadley, or Hatfield,
following the path of settlement progressively up the
Connecticut River.57 Settlers began to arrive on the site
of Deerfield by 1669, and the town was still very much in
its formative period on the eve of King Philip's War.
In 1675, 125 persons, including approximately 25 to 30
adult males, lived in Deerfield, and the town took the
precaution of fortifying three houses with palisades to
guard against Indian attacks.

When the assault came on

September 1, the residents apparently all made it safely to
the blockhouses, but their scattered houses and barns
suffered heavy damage.

This event prompted the women and

children of the community to seek refuge in safer
plantations while the men of the town and the militia
garrison remained to defend the remnants of the outpost.58
The darkest day for Deerfield occurred on September 18, when
14 of 16 men employed as wagon drivers by Capt. Thomas
Lathrop perished in an Indian ambush at Muddy Brook while

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145
attempting to harvest the town's grain.

Among the victims

were at least 9 married men who left at least 40 fatherless
children, and 4 more men approaching marriageable age.

This

debacle must have had a devastating effect on the remaining
citizens of Deerfield;

in one instant, over half of the

town's adult males and over ten percent of its entire
population perished.59 Not surprisingly, United Colonies
officials wrote to Pynchon three days later concerning the
"sense about quitting the Pocumtuck garrison," and the town,
garrison and all, was abandoned.

According to the Reverend

John Russell of Hadley, Philip was free "to make his
planting place and fort this year [1676] at Deerfield," once
the English settlers had left the place.60
Of 24 individual proprietors or families who fled from
Deerfield and whose places of destination are known, 18
retired to Northampton, Hatfield, or Hadley.

Three others

proceeded farther down the valley, and 3 returned to the
Boston area.61 These figures correspond roughly to the
pattern of immigration to the town in the years before the
war, further indicating that as the bulk of settlement
progressed generally northward up the valley, so too did
withdrawal recede along the same routes.
The fear that caused Deerfield's inhabitants to flee
from their plantation apparently did not last long, for by
the spring and summer of 1677 a handful of the former
residents returned to rebuild their homes.

At least four

optimistic proprietors and one boy were on the scene by
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September 19, 1677, when a group of natives from Canada,
which also included at least some Pocumtuck and Narragansett
refugees, descended on the encampment and took all five into
captivity.

Three of the colonists, Sgt. John Plympton, John

Root, and the boy Samuel Russell perished in captivity,
while the others, Benoni Stebbins and Quinton Stockwell,
eventually regained their freedom.62 With the advantage of
hindsight, William Hubbard judged that the Deerfield
captives "had unadvisedly too soon returned" to their
exposed plantation.

The frontier residents, hoping to set

their lives back in order, "were a little too secure, and
too ready to say the bitterness of Death was past," he
declared, "because they had neither seen nor heard of any
Enemy in those Parts for half a year before."63 From the
safety of Boston, Hubbard could editorialize about these
events, but the refugees who attempted to return to their
settlements were simply responding to an apparent cessation
of hostilities and a human impulse to resume their lives.
The tragic incident in September 1677 apparently did
not daunt the inhabitants* desire to resurrect their
community nor did it deter the provincial government from
advising them to return quickly, albeit cautiously and
prudently.

Less than a month later, on October 22, 1677,

the General Court ordered a garrison established at
Deerfield and instructed the inhabitants to "repaire thither
this winter (if the [Hampshire County] committee doe judge
it safe)."

The court authorized "the setling thereof in the
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spring,

. . . in a compact way."64 Few if any of the

residents took steps toward returning to Deerfield at that
time, but neither did they give up their sense of belonging
to the community.

On April 30, 1678, a group submitted a

petition to the General Court, referring to themselves as
"the small Remnant that are Left of Deerfield's poor
Inhabitants."

Despite noting that their plantation had

"become a wildernesse, a dwelling for owles and a pasture
for flocks" and that the inhabitants were "separated into
severall townes," the petitioners expressed a desire to
"Returne and plant that place Againe . . . for the advancing
the Cause & kingdome of Jesus;
comfort.

and for [our] owne safetie &

. . ."65 Even in their dispersed exile, the

Deerfield proprietors retained a feeling of community.
On March 30, 1680, the Hampshire County Court created a
committee composed of Lt. William Clark, Peter Tilton,
Lt. Philip Smith, Medad Pomeroy, and John Aliys to oversee
the reestablishment of Deerfield, and the refugee
proprietors met in Northampton nine months later to plan
their return to the town.

The committee and the proprietors

set one basic rule for land distribution during the
resettlement period:

any person who possessed or received a

grant of land was required to "come and settle in Deerfield
and Inhabit there three years" before they gained "liberty
to Allianate or sell the same."66 The proprietors realized
that because of the exposed position of the plantation, they
had to strive to assure a stable community structure.

In
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order to have any chance for survival, the town had to be
able to depend on its members' commitment to each other.
This residency requirement aimed at a problem the
optimistic proprietors encountered in drawing the community
back together.

Although the return to Deerfield was

encouraged by an ardent group of the refugees, not all
landowners who had fled in 1675 displayed a willingness to
risk their lives there again so soon.

In the April 30, 1678

petition, the town committee expressed concern that a goodly
portion of the land in the village "belongs unto eight or 9
proprietors, each and every of which are never Like to come
to a settlement amongst us."

The "Plantation will be

spoiled if thes proprietors may not be begged, or will not
be bought (up on very easy termes) outt of their Right," the
petitioners lamented.

They asked the General Court to help

"Remove that Impediment that is soo great a Lett and
hinderance to the plantation's growth and the planters'
outward happiness."

The court replied by leaving the matter

to the townsmen and the county committee to settle among
themselves.67 Again, the petitioners showed a genuine
concern for cohesion within their town.

Proprietors who

refused to return to their land in Deerfield could only
damage community morale, growth, and defense.

In the spring

of 1682, the planters finally convinced some of the
obstinate refugees to "give up every tenth acre or
otherwise, as they shall see cause, it being a very probable
way to gaine more usefull inhabitants for planting & setling

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
said place."

The General Court urged the rest of the

absentee proprietors to follow this "good example.1,68 The
residents who initiated and participated in the resettlement
of Deerfield left consistent and repeated references to the
importance of community order and stability.
The Deerfield vital records reveal little about the
demographic effects of the war, mostly because the town
itself was so young in 1675, having been planted only six
years earlier.

Demographic trends had not even had a chance

to become established before the war interrupted their
progress.

During the 1680s, however, Deerfield apparently

experienced significant growth, the population reaching well
over 200 by the end of the decade.

Most of this increase

resulted from the arrival of newcomers to the town after
resettlement;

of 54 male landowners present in 1688, only 8

of them owned land in the town in 1675.
of deceased pre-war proprietors.

Another 3 were sons

Of the 40 new immigrants

whose previous residences were recorded, 24 came from the
Northampton area, while 10 moved north from Springfield or
Connecticut.
Massachusetts.

Only 6 migrated from towns in eastern
The figures are similar for women who came

to reside in Deerfield during the 1680s.69
This population influx reflected two facts about the
nature of Deerfield's postwar population.

First, the new

residents for the most part made their way to the town from
older communities farther south in the valley, where land
had become scarce.

Step by step, settlement had made its
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TABLE 4.3
DEERFIELD VITAL RECORDS

Deerfield Births
1 0 0 3- 0 ?

1675-79:
1680-84:

2
6

1690-94
1695-99

33
35
51

Deerfield Marriages

1685-89
3
1690-94
16
1695-99
(None recorded before 1689).

Deerfield Deaths
1680-84:
1
1690-94:
1685-89:
9
1695-99:
(None recorded before 1681).

Source:

11
22

Baldwin, comp., Vital Records of Deerfield.
See note 70.
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way almost the entire length of the Massachusetts frontier
along the Connecticut River in approximately half a century.
Second, in its new formative phase, Deerfield was still very
much an open community in accepting new residents.

But many

of them either migrated from the same locality or had
pre-existing ties to the frontier plantation, and thus
Deerfield possessed a sound basis for community cohesion
from the start.
Like the residents of Westfield, however, the Deerfield
planters soon found that demographic growth precluded
physical compactness.

By the late 1680s, most of the choice

homelots in the village center were either occupied or owned
by absentee proprietors, and new landowners began
establishing suburbs at Green River, two miles north of the
town, and at Wapping, two miles south.

Neither hamlet ever

amounted to more than about twenty homelots during the
period.

With the renewal of hostilities in 1689, many of

the outliers retired to the safety of the Deerfield
fortification on the meeting house hill, and the suburbs
languished.70 On February 26, 1690, the town meeting
ordered the fortification strengthened and provided a plan
whereby persons from outside the village center could
receive shelter within.

For "all prsons whose familyes

canot conveniently and comfortably be [taken] into the
houses that are already upon the meeting-hous hill," the
townsmen authorized a special committee of Sgt. John
Sheldon, Benoni Stebbins, and Edward Allyn to grant them
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small tracts of land at an unstated charge, wherever
available.71 As did their neighbors in Northampton,
Deerfield residents seem to have accepted the necessity of
enlarging their settlement due to increased population but
still had faith in the benefits of community consciousness.
By all accounts, Massachusetts authorities considered
Deerfield a key to frontier defense during King William's
War, apparently in reaction to the destruction of the
northernmost plantations fifteen years earlier.

But the

selectmen reminded the Council that since 1680 the residents
had "Been much Exercised and at great Expenses in purchasing
And setlinge [the] place Anew," and that with the resumption
of hostilities, they were "Exposed to many
straits,

. . . Brought very Low & in a likely way to Come to

Extremity."

Town leaders warned that without substantial1

aid, "we must of necessity forsake [our] habitations, and
draw off to some Neighbouring towns."72 As in 1675, the
provincial government's resources were limited, but the
General Court did all it could to help.

In fact, noting the

"very Considerable Sums of money [which] have been Expended
in the defense and for [the] preservation of the out Towns
and Frontiers," the court in 1695 passed an "Act to prevent
the deserting of the Frontiers."

The act ordered that no

frontier town, including Deerfield, "shall be broken up, or
voluntarily deserted," without government approval and
prohibited individuals, especially adult males, from leaving
their plantations prematurely.73 So despite weathering
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seven attacks during the decade and having twelve persons
killed and five captured by the natives, the residents of
Deerfield had to hold out.74 They had their fortification
to fall back on, but their insistence on community cohesion
and the bonds which predated the new threat also must have
contributed to their resolve.

Northfield
By far the most exposed position on the Massachusetts
frontier during the late seventeenth century was that of
Squakeag, or Northfield, fifteen miles above Deerfield and
fifty miles west of the interior settlements.

A group of

colonists from "Northampton & other townes" in the region
began to petition for a grant above Deerfield in 1670, and
two years later the General Court approved "a convenient
quantity of land at Squakeag for a village," provided that
"twenty able & honest persons, householders" pledged to John
Pynchon a willingness to "setle upon the place . . . within
eighteene months."

Also in 1672, the court appointed a

committee of Lt. William Clarke, William Holton, Lt. Samuel
Smith, Cornet William Aliys, and Isaac Graves to lay out the
plantation, grant town lots, and "order all the prudentiall
affaires of the said village."75 The committee required
the proprietors to occupy their land and build on it within
four years or risk forfeiting their claims.
Residents of the new town had barely begun to settle in
when King Philip's War broke out.

On September 2, 1675, the
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natives attacked a group of inhabitants and garrison
soldiers outside the town and killed eight, including
Sgt. Samuel Wright, age 45, Ebenezer Janes, 16, and Jonathan
Janes, 14, all of Northfield.

The others who perished were

Ebenezer Parsons and Nathaniel Curtis of Northampton, John
Peck of Hadley, and Thomas Scott and Benjamin Dunwich, of
undetermined origins.

Two days later, when Capt. Richard

Beers and his company attempted to rescue the remaining
residents, natives ambushed the party.

Among the twenty-one

victims was Joseph Dickinson, from the distressed
settlement.76 These losses and the threat of more led the
survivors to leave Northfield as soon as possible.
On September 7, the refugees were escorted from the
town by a strong military detachment.

Although most of the

promoters and original proprietors of Northfield resided in
Northampton, many of them apparently did not actually move
to the new outpost before 1675.

Rather, they remained in

more secure towns as absentee proprietors and sent sons or
other representatives to establish their claims.

When the

young plantation was abandoned, the inhabitants naturally
retraced their steps, many, of course, returning to
Northampton.77 So stood the status of Northfield for
nearly ten years.
Not until May 27, 1682, did either the General Court or
the proprietors take any steps toward reorganizing the town.
On that date, the court revived the committee to oversee the
settlement of Northfield, and in 1683 the committee set the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155
conditions for the resettlement.

The instructions

stipulated that a minimum of forty families settle on the
tract, that the proprietors reside in the town by May 10,
1686, and that every person possessing "sixty acres of
interval land" set up "two persons on it."78 By 1685,
however, fewer than twenty families had returned to the
exposed town, and even they reportedly did not insist on
compact settlement.

Despite this slow trickle, in June of

that year the proprietors of Northfield petitioned the court
to extend the town's boundaries 2-1/2 miles, claiming a
shortage of land and seeking to "encourage those that are to
setle there."

79

Although the residents authorized the

building of fortifications in the town center, they seem to
have sought physical expansion before they had even come
close to attaining the forty families authorized by the
resettlement committee in 1683.
In fact, Northfield continued to have trouble filling
its ranks.

"Honored Sir," reported the committee to

Governor Edmund Andros in 1688, "wee have had a great deal
of care and trouble in the Resettling of this plantation.
Many have had grants and have forfeited them again," causing
discouragement among the residents and "fear [that] the
place will be defeated."80 The cause of their urgency, of
course, was the outbreak of King William's War.

Natives

struck Northfield on August 16, 1688, killing six residents
and sending over half of the population from the plantation.
Five days after the attack, John Pynchon wrote to the
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governor regarding the "great hazard" in Northfield.

With a

maximum of twenty-six able men available to the town,
drawing off appeared to be a matter that many of the
inhabitants "incline to."81 Thus the others who wished to
avoid losing their plantation to the natives for the second
time in fifteen years expressed their concerns to Governor
Andros.
By all accounts, Northfield was in no position to
defend itself.

"Have pity on us!"

pleaded the remaining

residents to the General Court in June 1689.

"Our place

[is] burnt, and laid desolate," they reported, "our people
slain, and the rest all driven away."

"If you see meet to

order us to throw up all, and leave it wholly to the
enemies," the petitioners admitted, "Tho its hard (we feel
it) we would submit."

They preferred to persevere, however,

and asked the court to take some action against the
proprietors who had quit the plantation.

Provincial

authorities ordered the deserters to return "or provide
sufficient men to bear arms and do service in their rooms";
by that time, though, "but nine or ten families" remained in
the town.82 Northfield could not endure much longer.
Pynchon advised "that some speedy care must be taken to cull
them off from Northfield or to send up some men to secure
them there."

Pynchon favored the latter, but on June 25,

1690, the General Court authorized "all the inhabitants of
Northfield that have any corn or other provisions, viz.
hogs, horses, cattle, etc.

[to] transport it down within
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the space of 6 or 8 days."83 The refugees once more made
their way back down the valley to their former areas of
residence, and no effort was made to resettle the town for
more than two decades.
The most obvious explanation for Northfield's inability
to withstand the successive Indian attacks was its naked
position.

But other towns, such as Westfield and Deerfield,

suffered from similar exposure and managed to persist more
successfully.

More telling about Northfield's problems was

the town's short history at the outbreak of both King
Philip's War and King William's War, having been planted
only in 1672 and resettled in 1685.

The townspeople had

never had the opportunity to nurture any lasting community
bonds before 1675, and the reluctance of proprietors to
return even during the mid-1680s left the town in the same
underdeveloped condition on the eve of the next crisis.
Neighboring Deerfield prudently emphasized community
compactness and cohesion after King Philip's War, even when
demographic growth necessitated expanded settlement, and the
town evidently profited by this adherence in meeting the
trials of the 1690s.

In seventeenth-century Northfield,

bonds which might have helped the community through troubled
times had neither the time nor perhaps the encouragement to
develop.

Groton
The Connecticut Valley was not the only Massachusetts
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frontier area affected by King Philip's War and its
legacies.

Towns on the northern fringe also fell victim to

native attacks.

Residents of Groton, settled in 1655, for

instance, by August 25, 1675, felt "very much discouraged in
their spirits."

Capt. James Parker reported to Governor

Leverett that the townspeople were "in a very great strait"
and "in a very weak capacity to defend" themselves, lacking
both guns and ammunition.84 The war had not yet touched
the Middlesex County town directly, but with hostilities
breaking out all around them, the inhabitants began to
examine their situation with trepidation.
Such was the state of affairs, though perhaps
intensified with the passage of time, when Parker and
M a j . Simon Willard wrote to the General Court in February
1676 concerning the colony's "day of Calamity & distress."
The two town leaders related the troubled condition of
Groton's residents, "brought into a narrow compasse" in
anticipation of an Indian attack, their "provision neere
consumed," and their "wives & children, some removed, others
removing."

"These things portend to us a famine,

&

poverty," stated Parker and Willard, "Coming upon us with
great fury on the one hand, as the enemy on the other."

as
The

townsmen "humbly, & upon [our] knees," requested the court's
"direction & assistance in this case, as the Lord shall
direct whither wee shall goe or stay, or what way

we

may be

set in."85 This anxiety and indecision continued until the
town experienced its first assault by the natives on March
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2.
In fact, Groton suffered three attacks during the first
two weeks of March 1676.

Its population consisted of "about

sixty F a m i l i e s a n d the residents who had not previously
retreated "gathered into five Garrisons," four of them
clustered in the town center plus another "near a Mile
Distant from the rest."86 By the end of the month, the
Council conceded that the remaining residents could "abide
no longer than untill carts bee sent to bring them" away,
and the government authorized Capt. Joseph Sills' company to
escort the retreat.87 "Things looked with a pritty sad
face about those parts at this time," concluded William
Hubbard.

The refugees from Groton reportedly "scattered in

different directions among their friends and kindred."
Seeking to avoid a panicked rush from the northern
frontier, the General Court had ordered on March 28 that the
residents of Middlesex County towns "that are forced to
remove;

and have not some advantage of settlement

(peculiar) to the bay" should "settle at the frontire townes
that remain for their strengthening."

As the additional

population was supposed to be an advantage to the threatened
settlements, the order instructed "the people of the said
townes to which [the evacuees] are appointed are to see to
their accommodations.1,88 Although Groton had been settled
for twenty years at the time of its abandonment, the
residents probably still felt ties of affinity, at least, to
communities in the Concord area, from whence many of the
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original settlers had migrated.

Many of the refugees

retired to Concord in 1676, and the town leaders apparently
adopted that town as their temporary headquarters in exile.
On February 10, 1678, Capt. James Parker, Lt. William
Lakin, Ens. John Lawrence, and •'Goodman" John Morse called
"a generall town metting of the inhabitants of
groaton . . . assembled at Concord."

This improvised town

meeting agreed and vowed "that if the providence of god
prevent not by death or sicknes or by the enimy . . . then
we will go up in the spring follooing and begin to Repayer
our habitations againe."

Further, the proprietors who set

their signatures to the agreement pledged to "ingeage the
forfiture of [their] wholle Right in groaton unto those that
doo goe up and cary on the work."89 This document revealed
some significant characteristics of the Groton population.
Even in their exile, the town proprietors and their
established municipal leaders retained a strong sense of
community.
Admittedly, the relatively long history of the town, in
comparison to other abandoned frontier plantations,
represented a definite advantage to Groton's inhabitants.
They had had two decades in which to establish community
ties and thus were undoubtedly more dependent upon each
other than could have been the case among residents who
settled frontier outposts only in the early 1670s.

This

interdependence was clearly exhibited in the 1678 agreement,
whereby the residents pledged fidelity to their town and to
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their neighbors in advance of resettlement.

A similar

pledge existed among Deerfield's proprietors before their
successful return to the plantation, but in Northfield,
where strong community bonds had obviously not developed by
1675, no such unity appeared between the refugee landowners.
In both Deerfield and in Groton, community cohesion and
accord, even under trying circumstances, seem to have
benefitted the resettlement process, while in plantations
lacking an evident sense of community responsibility,
resettlement generally proceeded awkwardly and imperfectly.
The Groton population apparently survived the war
without any traumatic devastation, though the existing vital
records reflect some demographic interruption during the
period.

For instance, the records reveal no deaths at all

between 1676 and 1679.

This gap unquestionably represented

the period of exile, when no town records were kept;
persons who died away from the town and were buried
elsewhere would not necessarily appear in either municipal
or church records.

More noticeable is the sharp decline in

births registered for the late 1670s.

After Groton's

residents welcomed 57 infant arrivals for the five-year
period from 1670 to 1674, the vital records reveal only 20
births between 1675 and 1679, with 13 of those coming in
1675 and only 7 during the remaining four years.

Again, the

fact that Groton was abandoned during this time contributed
to shortcomings in the records, but the deficiencies could
have been made up partially through retrospective notations
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TABLE 4.4
GROTON VITAL RECORDS

Groton Births

6

1660-64
1665-69
1670-74
1675-79

45
57

20

1680-84
1685-89
1690-94
1695-99

26
41
36
72

1680-84:
1685-89:
1690-94:
1695-99:

1
7
3
5

Groton Marriages
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:
1675-79:

2
7
5
2

Groton Deaths
1660-64
1665-69
1670-74
1675-79
(1676-79

Source:

1680-84
1685-89
1690-94
1695-99

9

6
10

Vital Records of Groton.
See notes 91 and 92.
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of baptisms in the local church records.

The number of

births recorded rebounded slightly during the first half of
the 1680s and regained pre-1675 levels during the second
half of that decade.90 Still, although the unsettled
conditions caused by the Indian attacks and removal may have
resulted in some decline in the number of conceptions and
births among Groton's residents, the severe discontinuity in
the town's corresponding vital records must reflect more an
absence of accurate registration than a breakdown in the
reproductive process of the population.
New marriages continued during the period, though
apparently fewer in number;

town records revealed only

three unions between 1675 and 1684, and all three occurred
in Chelmsford.

Marriages sealed in neighboring towns were

not unheard of before the war, but they became much more
common after the conflict.

Of 16 marriages noted in the

Groton records between 1660 and 1674, only 3 took place
outside the town, all in Chelmsford.

During the last

quarter of the century, 14 of 18 weddings involving at least
one Groton participant occurred elsewhere, most commonly in
Chelmsford or Concord.91 This trend probably reflected
bonds of affection, either direct or indirect, formed during
the period of exile.
The refugees began returning to Groton in 1678 and
apparently had the work of reorganizing their community well
underway by the 1680s.

Town records indicated no

obstruction to the process before the opening hostilities of
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King William's War.

On August 31, 1688, Capt. Francis

Nicholson, the lieutenant-governor of the Dominion of New
England, reported that the people of Groton and Lancaster
"were very much affraid (being out towns)."92 Indeed, the
town records reveal the same sense of anxiety from the
residents themselves over their "present unsetled and almost
destracted condition."

In July 1689 they wrote to

provincial authorities in Boston, "craving youer advice and
asistanc if it may be obtained, that we may go on with ouer
bisnes:

to gat in our harvest and do other nessary worke."

The General Court apparently never considered abandoning
Groton during the 1690s, and in fact ordered a military
presence maintained there for "the Deffence of the
Frontiers."93 But this time, the residents did not show
any insistence to leave either.

The 1689 petition was not a

plea for permission to withdraw but rather a matter-of-fact
request for instructions so that the inhabitants could "go
on with [their] bisnes."

The degree of community cohesion

which existed among Groton's residents apparently
contributed to their ability to reorganize and reform the
settlement in a secure manner before the next trial during
the 1690s.

The Interior Frontier
In addition to the western and northern fringes, the
Massachusetts colony also had another frontier area in the
sparsely inhabited region between the harbor towns and the
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Connecticut Valley.

This interior frontier included such

communities as Brookfield and Worcester, both settled during
the late 1660s, and Lancaster, established in 1643.

These

plantations shared similar circumstances during the late
seventeenth century, but in each case, records for the
period are scarce.

Of the three, Lancaster probably had the

most illustrative, or at least the best documented,
experience.
The residents of Worcester and Brookfield fled their
plantations early in the war and "removed safely with what
they had left to several places, either where they had lived
before their planting or sitting down there;
had Relations to receive and entertain them."

or where they
The first

stop for at least some of the refugees retiring toward the
east was Boston, "where they were plentifully relieved out
94
of the Church Stock."
Lancaster managed to hold out
through the winter, benefitting from a Council order for
Lt. Thomas Henchman to provide garrisons for the remaining
towns of the region.

Indians attacked the place in force,

however, on February 10, 1676, causing the residents to
petition the General Court on March 11 concerning the "sad &
dismall havocke" inflicted upon them.

The "poor destressed

people of Lancaster" claimed an "Incapasity to subsist,"
many of them lacking "bread to last .

.

.

[one] month."

"We are sorowful to Leave the place, but hopelesse to keep
it . . ."

pleaded the petitioners, noting a reluctance "to

give any Incuridgmt to the enemy, or leave any thing for
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them to promot their wicked designe."

Still, in the final

analysis, Lancaster's remaining residents concluded it
"better [to] save our Lives then lose Life & Estat
both."95
Officials in Boston had ordered carts from Concord and
Sudbury to carry off the Lancaster residents who were
"disenabled from continuing there" on February 24, 1676, but
apparently the help "nevr came for want of a small gard of
men."

The townsmen repeated their request for help in

removing in the March 11 petition, and by the end of that
month Lancaster was abandoned.

Like their neighbors in

Groton, the Lancaster refugees who had no "peculiar" place
to flee "in the bay" were ordered by the General Court "to
settle at the frontire townes that remain for their
strengthening.1,96 The desertion of the interior
plantations further compounded the plight of threatened
areas on the other Massachusetts frontiers.
Lancaster's vital records are more revealing of the
immediate postwar years than any previously discussed.

Most

strikingly, of 40 deaths recorded in 1675 and 1676, 38
resulted from Indian attacks.
were Lancaster residents.

Thirty-six of these victims

Thus the town's population

directly and sharply felt the effects of the hostilities.
Of even more significance, in the long run, the records
reveal to some extent where the residents fled during their
period of exile from the abandoned town.

The deaths of 16

Lancaster residents were recorded between 1677 and 1681.

Of
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TABLE 4.5
LANCASTER VITAL RECORDS

Lancaster Births
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:
1675-79:

35
50
54
17

1680-84:
1685-89:
1690-94:
1695-99:

30
14
10
3

1680-84:
1685-89:
1690-94:
1695-99:

6
5
4
9

Lancaster Marriages
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:
1675-79:

5
9
15
8

Lancaster Deaths
1660-64:
1665-69:
1670-74:
1675-79:
(Killed
1675:

Source:

1680-84:
12
1685-89:
13
1690-94:
15
1695-99:
53
by Indians:
8, 1676:
30)

8
4
9 (Killed by Indians:
28 1692: 4, 1697:
21)

Nourse, ed., Birth, Marriage and Death Register
of Lancaster. Nourse, ed., Records of
Lancaster,
313-326.
See notes 98 and 99.
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that number, 15 succumbed away from Lancaster;

4 died in

Dorchester, 4 in Charlestown, and 2 in Concord.97 By and
large, Lancaster's death registers indicate that the
residents retired to the towns surrounding Boston when the
natives forced them from their frontier homes.
The town's birth records disclose the same pattern.
The number of births declined sharply during the period,
from 54 between 1670 and 1674 to only 17 for the remainder
of the decade and 30 between 1680 and 1684.

Again, this

decline may have resulted as much from a disruption in
record-keeping during the years of abandonment and
reorganization as from any disruption in the population's
reproductive process.

But the Lancaster registries noted 20

births which occurred elsewhere within two decades of King
Philip's War.

Eight additions to two Lancaster families

arrived in Sudbury;
at Concord;

6 babies among three families were born

and 4 children came into the world at

Charlestown.98 These births reasserted the continuing ties
between Lancaster in the interior and the coastal towns
around the bay.

Only thirty-five miles from the relative

safety of Boston, Lancaster residents understandably felt an
affinity to the more secure towns in which many of them
originated.
Just when the refugees began to return to Lancaster or
any of the other interior towns is difficult to determine,
due to the sparsity of surviving documents.

Some residents

apparently made their way back to Lancaster by 1679, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

169
more sought to do so.

On October 7, 1679, "the Inhabitants

of Lancaster" petitioned the Middlesex County Court for a
committee to oversee the resettlement of the place, in
accordance with the General Court order that no abandoned
towns be planted anew without proper permission from county
or provincial authorities.

The proprietors expressed an

earnest desire "to returne to Lancaster from whence wee have
beene scattered," and the court appointed a committee of
Capt. Thomas Prentice, Deacon John Stone, and Corp. William
Bond to supervise the effort." By early 1682, as many as
eighteen families had returned to the town "with a desire to
build the plantation againe," despite the "many
difficulties" occasioned by their "povertie."

The returning

colonists set "about building and fencing that soe they may
provid bread for their families, and not be troublesom and
burdensom to other townes, which of nesesitie must have been
If we had Continued where we were" as refugees.100
Most Lancaster proprietors during the late 1670s thus
exhibited not only a desire to live in their own town but
also to exist independent of the charity and good works
which supported them in exile.

Apparently, however, not all

of the landowners returned to the town promptly;

as late as

1684 the residents petitioned the General Court about
absentee proprietors and asked that they "may be assessed in
proportion to the value of their Estates as the Inhabitants
are."101 The difficulties and poverty of which the
proprietors complained in 1682 carried over further into the
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period of reorganization, and those residents who desired to
make a commitment to their community evidently resented the
intransigence of their fellow proprietors who refused to
contribute to the resettlement of the town.
Worcester experienced an even more difficult period of
adjustment.

In March 1679, sixteen persons interested in

returning to Worcester met in Concord under the direction of
a committee which included Daniel Gookin, Thomas Prentice,
and Daniel Henchman.

They agreed that "if God spare life,

and peace continue, to endevor, either by their [persons],
or by their Relations, or by their purses, to Setle the Said
plantation" by the summer of 1680.

The proprietors also

pledged "to build in a way of a towne" with such priorities
in mind as "Security from the enimys," "the beter Convenicy
of atending God's worship," "[the] Better Educatio[n] of
their Children in Scooles," "the better Accomodation of
Trades men," "Better Helps to [civility]," and "more
convenient Helps in case of Sicknes, fyre or other
Casualty.1,102 The optimistic Worcester refugees planned a
close, interdependent community but one which could also
accommodate commercial growth through the encouragement of
"Trades men."

Despite this agreement, however, 1680 came

and went, "but there was no goeing by an[y] of them, or hope
that they would So doe, for divers of them importu[ned to]
goe, would not."

Impatience evidently spread to Boston, for

in October 1682 the General Court gave notice "that if
Something was not [done] to begin the Said place it would
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bee Lost” and the charter forfeited.103 Time was running
out for the Worcester proprietors who sought to reorganize
their community.
The court's warning had the desired effect.

On May 16,

1683, the court renewed the town charter under the
supervision of the county committee, and some of the
residents began to return.

One year later, in April 1684,

the town planners ordered anyone who had taken a lot in
Worcester to settle on it within a year's time or lose their
claim.

The committee also laid out rules for the

arrangement of the resettlement.

Land for houselots was

resurveyed in the town center "to the end the inhabitants
may Setle in a way of defence as injoyned by law."

From the

start, the organizers realized that not all of the eventual
residents could or would live in the concentrated plat.
"And those who will not Setle in the Said cittadel but [on]
therre plan[ting] or farme lotts," provided the committee
order, "shal So build as to have 2 or morre houses within
musket Sh[ot] of each other, that soe they may be in a way
of Defense."

104

Worcester residents were slow in returning

to their plantation, but once they did, they sought to order
the resettlement in a prudent way, giving proper attention
to the General Court's instructions concerning compact
settlement.
As with other towns in the region, the old proprietors
and the new settlers of Worcester had barely planted
themselves before they were once more shaken by news of
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Indian hostilities.

In July 1689, Lancaster residents spoke

for all of their neighbors in the "out towns" of the exposed
interior when they admitted harboring "som fears of being
surprissed by the Indians, we being by foremer experience
sencsible of theire mallice and crueltie."105 Lancaster
managed to hold out, but Brookfield, whose recent
resettlement was far from complete, and Worcester once again
had to be abandoned during the 1690s.106 In spite of the
emphasis Worcester's proprietors placed on compact
settlement, community cohesion, and defense, the town could
not pull together sufficiently to resist the native attacks.
Lancaster, the closest of the interior settlements to
the more settled areas of the colony, probably benefitted
from an extended security network.

After an optimistic

resettlement effort and with knowledge gained from
experience that they had survived the Indian onslaught,
Lancaster residents could return to their town with at least
some small degree of confidence that the communities of the
Concord River region were near.

Worcester and Brookfield,

conversely, were literally miles from anywhere, as close to
the Connecticut River frontier towns as they were to the
haven of Boston.

This fact could have proven little comfort

to the refugees who faced a return to their isolated homes.
They had no proximate support system upon which to lean,
only miles of open wilderness in any direction.

At least

the Connecticut Valley plantations had a familiar and
regular elongated security network which stretched the
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length of the region;

each town had another relatively

close by down the valley to fall back on.
existed for the isolated interior outposts.

No such comfort
No wonder the

residents of Brookfield and Worcester were so reluctant to
return and so quick to scatter again.

While towns and plantations across Massachusetts1
frontiers shared many experiences during King Philip's War,
the paths followed by each in the crucial postwar period of
recovery were sufficiently varied as to make generalizations
risky.

All of the towns felt the effects of the Indian

hostilities in 1675 and 1676, either directly in the form of
native attacks or indirectly in the form of an overall
regional fear of enemy depredations.

Three of these

communities— Westfield, Springfield, and
Northampton— survived the war intact, while the other
six— Deerfield, Northfield, Groton, Lancaster, Worcester,
and Brookfield— suffered periods of complete abandonment
ranging from under three years to over ten years.
Surprisingly, no patterns directly relevant to the towns'
specific experiences during the war carried over into the
recovery period.
Of the three which survived, for instance, Westfield
and Northampton benefitted from community cohesion after
1675, while Springfield, undoubtedly the most physically
secure of the towns, was not blessed with strong communal
bonds either before or after the war.

Conversely, of the
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abandoned plantations, Deerfield and Groton residents
developed and expressed a vibrant sense of social
responsibility during their respective resettlement efforts,
and this cooperation paid off in meeting the next crisis.
Residents of the other deserted towns either never had ample
opportunity to develop lasting commitments with their
neighbors or never voiced such assurances as confidently as
did the proprietors who led the resettlement of Deerfield or
Groton.

Wartime experiences thus give no sure indication

about postwar community development.
Of only slightly more significance in explaining
community patterning during the years after King Philip's
War in these towns was their age.

The oldest were

Springfield and Lancaster, settled in 1636 and 1643
respectively;

neither exhibited an impressive record of

communal cooperation during the last quarter of the
seventeenth century, but both managed to survive King
William's War intact.

Northampton, Groton, Westfield,

Brookfield, Worcester, and Deerfield all were established
between 1654 and 1669, so each had time to develop
neighborly bonds and commitments before 1675.

The most

successful towns in community rebuilding or reorganization
after the war came from this group;

only Worcester and

Brookfield residents failed to arrange their resettlement
quickly enough or efficiently enough to weather the next
war.

The case which lends itself most clearly to analysis

in the category of town age is that of Northfield.

Settled
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only in 1672, the isolated fledgling outpost had developed
by 1675 neither the community strength to withstand King
Philip's War nor the community commitment necessary for a
speedy and effective return.

Therefore, Northfield's tender

age hurt the plantation both in 1675 and in 1690.
The most successful formula for community development
during the postwar years involved a combination of town age
and geographic location.
ensure community order.

Longevity did not necessarily
In the case of Springfield, in

fact, the long history of the town contributed to a sense of
individualism and noncommunalism uncharacteristic of
frontier plantations.

Other towns, which had existed for

approximately a decade or two, seem to have been still new
enough that some degree of interdependence remained among
the residents, yet settled enough that they either survived
the war or initiated a positive return effort fairly
quickly.

Such was the case in Westfield, Northampton,

Deerfield, and Groton.
Worcester and Brookfield, of course, were the
exceptions among this group.

As such, they reflected the

importance of the second component of geographic location.
These two interior settlements were geographically isolated,
whereas those of the Connecticut Valley were links in a
chain which stretched nearly fifty miles.

This chain

provided an extended security system which in the long run
supplemented the community stability of the individual
members.

Northfield, unfortunately, could not benefit fully
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from the support of its neighbors because it had not had the
opportunity to formulate its own base of communal
interdependence.

Groton and Lancaster both had fairly

direct contact with Boston via the secure and proximate
towns of the Concord River region.

Of the two, the former

displayed a more apparent sense of postwar community
commitment.

A combination of factors thus served to

strengthen commxmity order in certain frontier plantations
directly affected by King Philip's War and thereby aided
their residents in banding together during the difficult
decades which followed.

But in towns like Northfield,

Worcester, and Brookfield, which lacked the existence of
either a firm pre-war community structure or an extended
support system, the problems of resettlement and
reorganization were never really resolved satisfactorily in
the years following King Philip's War.
Nearly all of the towns discussed had at least one
characteristic in common during the last quarter of the
seventeenth century.

In spite of General Court admonitions

for compact settlement and local committee instructions to
the same effect, community leaders across the frontier had
to face and regulate the phenomenon of expansion and
dispersal of settlement away from their town centers.

Even

in frontier plantations such as Westfield and Deerfield,
where the residents seem sincerely to have espoused the
doctrine of compact settlement, newcomers and even
established landowners or their sons began to branch off to
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detached farmsteads or, more commonly, satellite
communities.
This concern was not new to Massachusetts authorities;
their predecessors had attempted to enforce compactness
throughout the colony's history.

Likewise, other town

studies have indicated the extent to which communities
throughout the colony experienced geographic diffusion
during the seventeenth century.

For instance, Philip

Greven, for Andover, and Kenneth Lockridge for Dedham found
towns which originated as close, compact, communal entities.
In both, population growth and land divisions led
inhabitants to move away from the village center.107 So,
similar instances in the frontier towns were by no means
unique;

only their timing lent them any degree of novelty,

coming as they did in such an unsettled time.
Expanding and dispersing when a continuing Indian
threat existed may have represented a gamble.

But in a

larger sense, perhaps the attraction toward expansion was a
healthy sign in the postwar frontier communities.

By

branching off, residents who had been forced to flee into
garrison houses or to abandon their communities altogether
just a few years earlier reflected a confidence in their
ability to weather the threats encountered on the frontier
and in the belief that they could rely on the support of
their neighbors without necessarily having to live in
immediate physical contact with them.

The idea of community

thus remained vibrant, even while its form was changing.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178
Had frontier residents chosen to remain huddled in their
fortified houses or, worse yet, refused to return to their
houses at all, the Massachusetts frontier would have been in
peril.
Each town on the Massachusetts frontier underwent
different experiences during King Philip's War and each one
dealt with the problems of recovering from the conflict in
its own way.

The General Court provided guidelines, and

county committees supervised resettlement efforts to
encourage prudent procedures, but in the end it was left to
individual towns and their residents to determine the exact
course their communities would follow during the postwar
decades.

Resolving the problems of resettlement and

reorganization remained one of the most difficult tasks of
the period.

The physical scars on the frontier provided

lasting reminders of the conflict.

Some communities met the

challenge and started over or even expanded;

others could

not regenerate quickly or sufficiently enough to heal the
wounds.

Therefore, all of the Massachusetts frontier

communities were affected, directly or indirectly, by the
longterm legacies of King Philip's War in the region.
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CHAPTER 5
POLITICS:

STABILITY AMID ADVERSITY

In addition to the physical, economic, and demographic
legacies left by King Philip's War, political issues also
became prominent in the last quarter of the seventeenth
century.

From the local to the provincial level, colonists

became increasingly sensitive to the governmental climate in
the colony, but the political problems themselves had no
direct relationship to the war.

On all levels of

government, Massachusetts residents looked to familiar
leaders for guidance throughout the period.

The preference

for continuity was most apparent in town politics on the
frontier.

At the same time, townspeople became more

assertive in their approach to political issues.

This

assertiveness resulted from the trials faced during King
Philip's War and its aftermath.

In reaction to the physical

threats they faced, Massachusetts colonists became more wary
of the varied forces they encountered in the world around
them.

So while citizens across the colony called on trusted

leaders to see them through troubled times, they did so with
a new sense of watchfulness, warning both town and
provincial officials that public assent no longer came
without public scrutiny.

The Indian conflict did not cause
192
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the political problems which existed during the postwar
years, but it did influence the ways in which colonists
responded to the perceived challenges of the period.
The "Indian war set off a chain of events that
profoundly altered the colony's political culture," argued
Douglas Leach.

Economic troubles resulting from the war, he

found, made colonists more politically sensitive and
skeptical, and "transformed colonial authorities from
trusted agents into outsiders whom villagers increasingly
identified with interests beyond the local community."

The

financial legacies of King Philip's War "inevitably
stimulated popular participation in government affairs," and
"as the economy weakened, local people challenged
traditional authority."1 Other writers have echoed Leach's
connection between war, taxes, and popular political
upheaval.

Christine Young, for instance, claimed that

strains between the established leaders and a rising
generation existed in Salem by the 1670s and that the
legacies of King Philip's War, particularly the economic
costs, exacerbated the tensions.2 New England communities
stressed local autonomy in their political administration as
well as in their Congregational churches.

Any forces that

threatened local self-determination and control, whether
Indians attacking the outposts in the wilderness or crown
officials challenging the cherished charter, sparked
Massachusetts residents to the defense of their accustomed
order.3
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Echoing Leach's general statements, numerous studies of
town politics have emphasized the importance that colonists
placed on the value of local autonomy.

In the years

following the Indian war, the increased taxation represented
an intrusion to many colonists and led them to reevaluate
their relationship with both local and provincial
authorities.

Young found this to be the case in Salem,

where resistance to tax rates authorized in Boston affected
relationships between residents and their elected selectmen.
Whereas before the late 1670s the selectmen had acted with a
fairly free hand, even in financial transactions, by the
1680s the town began to require greater public
accountability in matters of taxation and expenditure.
Young even found a breakdown in the previous consensus over
the selection of selectmen, as a larger number of nominees
attracted the votes of Salem residents.4
Kenneth Lockridge and Allan Kreider discovered much the
same situation in Dedham and Watertown.

As serious

issues— such as increased taxation— arose which directly
affected the townsmen, the colonists became more politically
active.

During the late seventeenth century, residents of

both towns took back powers which had gravitated to the
selectmen earlier in the century.

The authors theorized

that the town meetings' reassertiveness resulted from either
a new degree of self-confidence on the part of the citizens
or a lack of confidence in the ability of their
selectmen.5 Either way, issues of local importance which
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arose during the years following King Philip's War led
colonists in both Dedham and Watertown to take a harder look
at local administration.
Both communities also experienced a marked increase in
turnover among the selectmen.

Before the 1680s, most

selectmen served for long periods of time;

after that time,

more residents received nominations and those elected
generally served fewer and shorter terms.

In fact, Dedham

voters chose an entirely new slate of town leaders in 1689.
Leach went so far as to say that the tendency to drop
established "local civil and military" leaders— "village
brokers"— was widespread across the colony.6 Some of these
same patterns appeared in Massachusetts frontier towns which
faced reorganization after the traumas of the Indian war,
though the extensive repudiation of the political leadership
suggested by Leach and evident in Dedham never materialized
in any of the towns studied.
In Springfield, the cornerstone of the Connecticut
Valley, demographic stability was accompanied by political
stability, at least in the election of selectmen.
elected five men to that office annually.

The town

Of nine residents

who served at least twice between 1670 and 1674, three died
during the mid-1670s, but the remaining six each served at
least two more terms during the next five-year period.
Indeed, John Dumberton and Henry Chapin continued to be
elected regularly— generally every other year, as was the
common pattern in Springfield— into the early 1690s, while
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Benjamin Parsons, George Colton, and Samuel Marshfield
remained politically prominent into the middle or late
1680s.7 Neither did a large turnover occur after 1689.
Twelve men in all served two or more terms during the 1680s.
Dumberton, Chapin, Parsons, Colton, and Marshfield were at
or nearing the end of long political careers by that time,
each spanning at least twenty years of regular service.

Of

the seven remaining, only one, Samuel Ball, failed to be
reelected, while the other six, Jonathan Burt, John
Hitchcock, Japhet Chapin, John Holyoke, John Warriner, and
Thomas Stebbins, each

served at least one more time during

the early 1690s.

names

New

did

appear on the selectman

lists of Springfield between the end of King Philip's War
and the Revolution of

1689,

but

the first time during

those

years, eight bore the same

surnames as previous selectmen.

of fourteen men electedfor

Similarly, of ten new men

chosen as selectmen during the five years after 1689, six
had relatives who had previously held the position.8
Persistence was definitely a characteristic of Springfield's
leaders during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.
While Springfield residents remained fairly consistent
in the men they chose to order the affairs of their town,
they did not give them an entirely free hand during the
postwar period.

On July 17, 1678, the town meeting took

notice of ''some scruple made concerning the Select mens
Acts, because the Major part of them are not freemen
according to order."

The matter caused no political
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upheaval because Nathaniel Burt, one of the selectmen,
resigned his seat to his brother Jonathan Burt, thus
creating the desired majority of confirmed freemen on the
panel.9 By demanding this simple adjustment, the town
meeting gave notice that it was keeping an eye on the
actions of the elected town leaders.
In a more noteworthy incident, the residents of
Springfield tightened the reins on selectman powers in a
manner similar to that described by Young, Lockridge, and
Kreider.

The townsmen authorized the selectmen "to take

care from time to time for the making & Collecting of Such
Rates" as necessary for the building of a new meetinghouse
in January 1677.

With building costs mounting and

provincial taxation remaining high, however, eight years
later, in 1685, the residents withdrew such discretionary
authority from the selectmen, ordering them to "contract no
bargain or engage any sum above Twenty pounds for the
Inhabitants to pay by Rate, without first advising with &
consulting the Town, & having their approbation concerning
the same."10 Springfield residents voiced confidence in
their selectmen during the last quarter of the seventeenth
century by generally reelecting them at regular intervals,
but the town meeting also followed a pattern apparently
prevalent in the colony by reasserting its authority,
particularly in burdensome financial matters.
Persistence was also notable among Westfield's
selectmen after King Philip's War, though a paucity of town
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records makes the patterns less readily apparent than in
Springfield.

Still, taking into account a complete absence

of records between 1682 and 1685, certain names stick out
among the fifteen men who served as selectmen during the two
decades following King Philip's War.

Of that number, nine

were chosen at least twice in a town which elected only
three selectmen per year.

Josiah Dewey served at least six

terms between 1677 and 1695, David Ashley five, and Jedediah
Dewey, Nathaniel Weller, and Samuel Root four each.

By far

the most prominent Westfield selectman was Isaac Phelps,
elected eleven times, exclusive of the period 1682 to 1685.
Phelps never missed more than one year at a time between
terms and in fact was reelected five years in a row from
1688 through 1693.11 Clearly, Westfield residents did not
repudiate their established leaders.

Unfortunately, the

sparse town records provide no further indications of the
political climate in Westfield.
Politics in Northampton followed the same patterns.
The same men who led the town through King Philip's War
continued to exert their influence during the postwar
decades.

At the time of the conflict, William Clark

dominated the town's politics;

his career as a selectman

stretched from 1661 to 1684, and he served twenty terms in
twenty-three years.

Six of the other eight selectmen

elected in 1675 and 1676 finished their careers by the end
of the decade, but the other two, Jonathan Hunt and Medad
Pomeroy, became two of the most persistent town leaders for
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the next fifteen years.

In addition, all four of the

subsequent selectmen who first appeared during the late
1670s went on to serve the town repeatedly.

John King and

Jonathan Hawley particularly gained the favor of Northampton
voters, but Aaron Cooke and Judadiah Wright also served at
least three terms each.12 Ten new men became selectmen
during the 1680s.

Six of them served only one or two terms

each, but the other four, Ebenezer Strong, Joseph Parsons,
Samuel Wright, and Preserved Clapp, were fixtures in the
town leadership well into the 1690s.

Strong, Parsons,

Wright, and Clapp, together with Hunt, Pomeroy, King, and
Hawley, dominated elections between the mid-1680s and the
mid-1690s.

These eight men held thirty-six of the fifty

seats during that period, and in the ten years, 1685 to
1694, they occupied three or more of the five annual
selectman positions eight times;

in two straight years all

of the seats were distributed among the entrenched
leaders.13 No political backlash occurred against the
traditional leadership in Northampton after either King
Philip's War or the Revolution of 1689.
As in the other towns studied, the Northampton town
meeting made an effort to control the power of the
selectmen, but it had done so before the war as well.
Ostensibly to relieve their leaders of the obligations and
burdens incurred in holding the office repeatedly, the
residents in 1674 prohibited their selectmen from serving
consecutive terms.

14

Whatever the intent of this order, it
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Deacon Phelps
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John Parsons
X
William Holton. Jr.
x
Timothy Baker
X
S. Allen
X
Noah Cooke
X
Source: Northampton Town Records
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clearly did not loosen the hold of the chosen few on the
prominent positions.

Each of the powerful selectmen

regularly served terms consecutively or even in strings of
three years at a time, and the voters of Northampton who
consistently returned their leaders to office apparently saw
no need to restrain their terms of service.15 Political
cohesion and continuity reigned in Northampton during the
decades after the Indian war and during the colony's most
politically disruptive period of the seventeenth century.
The towns which were abandoned during the war naturally
had their political processes interrupted.

Deerfield, for

instance, was so young in 1675 that no significant degree of
continuity could have developed before the inhabitants fled
down the Connecticut Valley.

Furthermore, even while

residents and newcomers began to return to the town during
the 1680s, a court-appointed committee composed of men from
throughout Hampshire County controlled most administrative
matters in Deerfield.

Not until 1687 did Deerfield

residents elect a board of local selectmen, who were
assigned to "continue in office until others be Chosen and
they discharged,11 and not until 1689 did the town begin to
hold regular annual elections.16 Six selectmen— William
Smead, Joshua Pomeroy, John Sheldon, Benoni Stebbins,
Benjamin Hastings, and Thomas French— served that first
extended term, but none of them was reelected in 1689, when
Thomas Wells, John Catlin, Jonathan Wells, Samuel Northam,
and Joseph Barnard took over.

Although six of these ten
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Thomas French
Thomas Wells
John Catlin
Jonathan Wells
Samuel Northam
Joseph Barnard
John Allvn
David Hoyt
Daniel Beldin
Eleazur Hawk
Edward Allvn
Samson Frary
Godfrey Nims
Henry White
Simon Beamon
John Porter
Source:

Melvoin,

1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693* 1693* 1694
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
ed., D e e r f i e l d T o w n B o o k

* I n M a r c h 1693 the town chan g e d f r o m a p a t t e r n of Dec e m b e r
e l e c t i o n s to M a r c h elec t i o n s , thus the occur r e n c e of two
s e p a r a t e e l e c t i o n s for the y e a r 1693.
Th e 1687 s e l e c t m e n s e rved u n til

the n e x t election in 1689.
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original selectmen served at least one more term during the
early 1690s, the position was not characterized by the
persistence evident in other Connecticut Valley towns.

In

fact, in 1692 an entirely new group came into office.17
Deerfield at the time was still building its political
foundations.
A problem inherent in the politics of any town similar
in size and age to Deerfield was the number of necessary
elected municipal offices relative to the number of eligible
adult male residents.

In Deerfield, for instance, the

inhabitants annually elected about twenty officeholders out
of some sixty adult men living in the town during the late
seventeenth century.

The town meeting in June 1689 claimed

that elections of selectmen could not be carried out
regularly "without greatly burthening some particularr
persons."

To ease the burdens incumbent on their town

leaders, the residents agreed to "bind themselves to stand
by them in said office and to obey all such acts and orders
as said Selectmen shall doe and put forth for the good and
benefit of the town provided such acts and orders shal not
be repugnant to the Laws of this Jurisdiction."18
Deerfield townspeople pledged to do their utmost to preserve
political harmony in the town so as to make their
selectmen's tasks as light as possible.

The frontier

residents there were too concerned with establishing their
own political order to be influenced by the political
atmosphere of the province at the time.

The degree of
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continuity present in town elections elsewhere did not
appear in Deerfield because no basis for cohesion existed
yet, not because the residents of the outpost were
dissatisfied with their leaders.

Far from exhibiting

dissatisfaction, Deerfield's inhabitants entered into
sincere agreements, during both resettlement and the initial
stages of redevelopment, to make the administrative
functions of the community run as smoothly as possible.
The only other town included in this study which had
either adequate records or a tenure of existence long enough
to provide any relevant information about a political system
is Groton.

Groton's administrative functions, like

Deerfield's, were interrupted by a period of abandonment,
but unlike the Connecticut Valley outpost, Groton residents
had over a full decade of previous political experience to
build on when they returned in 1678.

An established and

vital leadership structure developed between 1662 and 1675;
when the town was resettled, and even while they were
scattered, the inhabitants looked to these same leaders for
guidance.
Although Groton residents generally elected between
five and seven selectmen per year, during the period from
1662 to 1676, a total of only sixteen men held the office.
Half of them— John Morse, James Knop, William Longley, John
Page, William Lakin, John Fiske, William Martin, and James
Parker— served five or more terms apiece;
in thirteen of the fifteen years.

19

Parker won a seat

Most of these men
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resumed positions of sustained leadership during the 1680s.
Parker, Lakin, Morse, and John Lawrence played important
roles in keeping the residents united when they fled Groton
and in organizing the return to the town in 1678.

Of the

eight men who predominated during the 1660s and early 1670s,
all except Martin and Fiske went on to serve repeatedly
after the town was resettled, with Parker holding the office
eight times between 1679 and 1689, William Lakin seven
times, Page six, and Knop five.20
These established leaders were joined by ten new
selectmen during the 1680s, but persistence continued to be
a trait among the members of the governing board.

Jonas

Prescott and Jonathan Morse, who made their first appearance
in 1680, served seven and five years, respectively, while
Josiah Parker, elected in 1682, held office six times during
the remainder of the decade.

The same patterns of

leadership continued into the 1690s, as both persistent
selectmen from the pre-war period and newcomers from the
1680s continued to serve the town.

Such familiar names as

James Parker, William Lakin, James Knop, Jonas Prescott, and
Josiah Parker all appeared on Groton selectmen boards in the
early 1690s.

21

The length of the careers of some of these

selectmen and the regularity with which they won reelection
suggest no dissatisfaction among Groton's residents with
their established leaders, even during the troubled times of
the late seventeenth century.
Harmony did not always reign supreme in Groton,
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however, and the town meeting took an extreme measure to
ensure that the selectmen served the best interests of the
residents.

In December 1680 the meeting created a committee

"to view and to give Instructions to the sellect men to act
in town affaires."

The initial committee included James

Parker, Richard Blood, William Lakin, John Lakin, and John
Page;

all the them except Page had just completed terms in

office.

Some tension arose in the town over the building of

a new meeting house, so the residents instructed the
committee members to help the selectmen "doe what they can
to healle the differences."

By the end of the month the

disagreements apparently were settled because the contesting
factions agreed to "forgive each other wheirin we have been
Instrumintall of greiving each other in word or deed" and
"to promote and increase lov and doe nothing to break the
peace now mad[e]."

22

Still, the Groton town meeting continued the practice
of appointing advisory committees composed of former
selectmen to ensure that the current leaders "doe mak and
maintain [peace] and love [one] with another in the
town."

23

Groton voters showed their trust m

the

established local leaders by reelecting them regularly, but
the townspeople also reacted to potentially divisive issues
by creating a panel to consult with the selectmen prior to
major decisions.

This appointive committee structure really

did not take power away from the elected officials because
its members were drawn from the same group which regularly
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served as selectmen.

But the presence of these auxiliary

advisors probably made Groton residents feel more certain
that weighty issues would receive greater consideration from
the men in authority.
In spite of the efforts of town meetings across the
colony to reassert their power over their selectmen,
residents remained constant in the local leaders they chose.
With various issues, especially financial matters, magnified
in the aftermath of King Philip's War, townspeople naturally
wanted to have more control over, or at least knowledge of,
decisions which directly affected them.

All the while,

however, they repeatedly put their trust in the same men to
order town affairs.

In the uneasy years which followed the

conflict, Massachusetts colonists generally looked to
familiar leadership, and they did so on the provincial level
as well as on the town level.
In addition to the legacies left by King Philip's War,
another crisis arose during the 1680s, as the crown
initiated proceedings to revoke the Massachusetts charter.
The two conflicts, coming as they did, one on the heels of
the other, laid the foundation for political upheaval in the
colony.

People were understandably agitated by events of

the last quarter of the seventeenth century.

The resulting

tensions became most apparent in the political sphere in
Boston, where the constitutional showdown threatened to
wound the Massachusetts Bay colony gravely.
The internal troubles of the postwar years cannot be
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separated from the charter controversy, which became a major
concern to Massachusetts residents by the late 1670s.

Royal

plans to revoke the charter, which had been removed from
England to the colony in 1630, began early in the
Restoration period at which time the colonial leaders
expressed the belief that "the pattent (under God)

[was] the

first and maine foundation of our civil politye here."

The

General Court in 1661 maintained that the charter provided
"full power and authoritie, both legislative and execcutive"
for the government of the colony, "without appeale,
excepting lawe or lawes repugnant to the lawes of England."
As long as they stayed within the laws of the realm,
Massachusetts legislators proclaimed "any imposition
prejudiciall to the country . . . to be an infringement of
our right."

24

From an early date, Massachusetts residents

considered the rights laid out in the charter to be supreme
in the colony.
Complaints sounded from various offices in the imperial
system about the colony's presumption, and most of the
objections revolved ultimately around the subject of trade.
Governor Lord Vaughan of Jamaica, for example, suggested to
the Committee for Trade and Plantations in September 1675
that perhaps the time was ripe for the king to take action
against Massachusetts' refusal to obey trade restrictions,
"the Indians being in rebellion . . . and not like to be
reduced" in the near future.

The committee concurred.

"The

present laws of the Massachusetts are so different from the
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laws of England, and the government so arbitrary," noted the
lords, "that it occasions murmuring among all sorts of
people."

They further charged that the provincial leaders

hoarded power and that the people had no real voice in the
annual elections.

25

The colony's most ardent and perhaps

most dangerous enemy was Edward Randolph, an agent for the
crown who came to Boston in the mid-1670s to report on the
merits of the allegations.

One month after Metacom's death,

Randolph reported to the king that Governor Leverett
considered crown and parliamentary directives meaningless if
they contradicted the colony's interests and accused him of
stating "that all matters in difference are to be concluded
by their final1 determination, without appeal to your
Majestie."26 So the charter controversy began, as
Massachusetts' enemies took the opportunity provided by the
confusion surrounding King Philip's War to compile evidence
against the colony.
The General Court recognized the danger, and as soon as
the Indian threat was extinguished, the Massachusetts
government turned to counter the royal challenge, not with
force as against the natives but rather with an act of
courtesy.

In October 1677, the court sent King Charles a

gift of ten barrels of cranberries, two hogsheads of
"speciall good sampe," and three thousand codfish.

Leverett

petitioned the king to accept the native commodities of the
region as a sign of Massachusetts's good faith and earnest
desire "to repell those false clamours which have been layd

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

213
before your majesty against us by some that have not binn
well affected to us, nor to your majesties service with us."
He assured the crown that the colony remained "at all times
religiously observant of our duty to God, and [loyal] to
your majesty, our king."

27

The wording of Leverett's

assurance may have contained some underlying significance;
orthodox Puritans placed their loyalty to God above their
loyalty to the king and viewed the charter in almost
religious terms, as the sanction for their errand into the
wilderness.

With a battle over their charter brewing,

Leverett and the members of the General Court attempted to
mollify the king's suspicions while subtly affirming the
order of their priorities.
One year after sending the gifts to England, the
General Court took an even more conciliatory tone in
addressing the king.

Massachusetts authorities expressed a

hope that the crown would "receve no impressions from any
that, for their own evill ends, shall endeavor (by false &
mistaken reports) to represent us as affecting & aspiring to
a greatnes independent [of] your majestie's soveraignty over
us, or incompatable with the duty of good & loyall subjects
to a most gratious king, in whose prosperity wee most
heartily rejoyce, & for which wee dayly pray."28 Clearly
on the retreat, at least in the image they hoped to present
in England, the court also wrote to its agents in London
approving a "declaration of our readiness to amend any thing
which, through ignorance or neglect in any kinde, wee have
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transgressed the rules given us by his majesty in our
charter, and to begg his pardon for the same."

Apparently

this propitiatory approach proved successful, at least for a
time, for by early 1682 the General Court reported to its
agents Joseph Dudley and John Richards that the king had
"gratiously intimated . . . that he hath no intention to
violate or infringe our charter."

Therefore, Dudley and

Richards were to cooperate with the Privy Council, thereby
assuring "the continuance of his majesty's grace and favour
toward us, who have alwayes endeavoured to approove
ourselves his majesty's most loyall subjects, & promoters of
his Crowne & dignitie."29
While the provincial government worked to mend fences
with royal authorities, however, well-known and outspoken
colonists continued to make inflammatory statements.

"By

our Pattent," wrote the Reverend Samuel Nowell in 1683, for
instance, "we have full and absolute power to rule and
governe, pardon and punish, etc."30 With the likes of
Edward Randolph lurking around Boston, reports of such
sentiments certainly found their way across the Atlantic and
hurt the colony's attempts to save the charter from royal
abrogation.
In June 1683 the Lords of Trade received from Randolph
a list of seventeen "Articles against the Government of
Boston."

The list contained a wide variety of indictments,

from the matter of the colony setting up its own "Publick
mint" to "imprison[ing] his Majesties Officers for doing
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their Dutyes."

Among the offenses cited was a complaint

against the license supposedly afforded to the
Congregational churches by the charter.

"They impose upon

the Consciencyes of his Majesties Subjects in matters of
Religion," Randolph accused, "by their Lawes Ecclesiasticall
being repugnant to the Lawes of England."31 On July 20,
1683, the lords issued a writ of quo warranto against the
Massachusetts charter, noting "some crimes and misdemeanors"
committed by the elected officials in the colony.

However,

if the colony made "a full submission and entire resignation
to our pleasure," the lords offered to preserve the charter
and only "regulate [it] in such manner as shall be for our
service and the good of that our colony, without any other
alterations then such as wee shall find necessary for the
better support of our government there."32 Massachusetts
officials were faced with the choice of submitting to the
crown's proceedings and hoping for the best or of fighting
the challenge and risking the complete loss of the charter.
A debate ensued among the leaders of the colony in
Boston in January 1684.

The most forceful voices in the

debate were those of the orthodox leaders, particularly
Increase Mather, who likened the struggle over the charter
to the battle against the Indians;

both the hostile natives

and the royal challengers represented forces of evil
threatening the holy mission in New England.

Thus, just as

the effort to withstand the Indian attacks came to represent
a reflection of the Puritans' spiritual worthiness, the
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colonial clergy portrayed resistance to the suit against the
charter as another test of their religious fortitude.

The

two challenges were twin prongs in the campaign between good
and evil.

In reference to the advice of the Lords of Trade

that Massachusetts surrender its charter voluntarily for
alteration, Mather warned the freemen of the colony that
"wee shall sin against God if wee vote an affirmative to
it."

Just as numerous lay and religious leaders exhorted

their followers to place their complete faith in the
Almighty during King Philip's War, Mather advised his fellow
colonists in 1684 to "keep ourselves still in the hands of
God, and Trust ourselves with his providence."33
While refusing to relinquish their charter, colonial
officials continued to maintain their innocence against
accusations of political and administrative improprieties.
"Not being conscious to ourselves that wee have wittingly
donn anything to the just offence of your majesty thro our
weakness and ignorance," the General Court wrote to the king
in October 1684, "we beleive £ readily acknowledge wee may
have committed some unwilling errors or mistakes."

To show

remorse, the members of the court pledged, "wee prostrate
ourselves at your majesty's feet, humbly begging and
imploring your majesties free pardon & forgiveness, with the
continuance of our charter & priviledges therein conteyned.11
In a subsequent letter they asked royal authorities to
disregard "the many ill representations & informations that
lye against us" and to believe that "we are true lovers of
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your majesties person and of the English government.

34

Such deferential and conciliatory missives fell on deaf
ears;

on October 23, 1684, the crown officially revoked the

Massachusetts charter.
The battle over the charter was not merely fought
between contending forces separated by the Atlantic Ocean.
Even within Massachusetts influential colonists differed in
their approach to the problem, and political factionalism
became a hallmark of the postwar period.

In fact, the most

conservative group, consisting of orthodox Puritans who
adhered to the old, established order in politics as well as
religion, became known simply as "the faction."

Men such as

Increase Mather, Leverett, and Thomas Danforth led the
opposition to any alteration in the charter.

The colony

also contained a group of "moderates," also generally well
known and pious, who believed that they represented a more
realistic position than that of the intransigent faction.
Simon Bradstreet, Peter Bulkeley, and William Stoughton,
among others, saw the futility in complete opposition to the
crown and preferred to compromise in order to gain as
advantageous a settlement as possible, both for themselves
and for the colony.

Finally, a small but powerful group of

"prerogative men" stood ready to carry the crown's cause
against the conservative elements in the colony.

This

group, consisting largely of royal appointees and other
recent immigrants, was led by Edmund Randolph and Joseph
Dudley.35 These three parties vied to influence the crown
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during the proceedings over the charter's fate and during
the subsequent establishment of the Dominion of New England.
Randolph and his royalist party blamed the orthodox
clergy for all of the opposition to the crown.

He claimed

that the elected government of the colony was composed of
"inconsiderable mechanics packed by the prevailing party of
factious ministry," whom he found "generally inclined to
sedition, being proud, ignorant, and imperious."

Governor

Edward Cranfield of New Hampshire echoed Randolph's opinion
of the Massachusetts clergy and described Harvard College as
a breeding ground for "pernicious and rebellious
principles."

"From this source all the towns . . . are

supplied with factious and seditious preachers," Cranfield
reported, "who stir up the people to dislike of the King, of
his Government and of the Church of England."36 The clergy
seemed to be most influential in the lower house of the
assembly, among the deputies;

in December 1683, a group of

magistrates wrote to Sir Leoline Jenkins in England that the
"major part of the [upper house] have for weeks contended
and voted to submit to the King's pleasure rather than
contest with him in a court of law" but could "by no means
prevail with the Deputies."

The signers of the letter

included such moderates as Bulkeley, Bradstreet, Nathaniel
Saltonstall, Bartholomew Gedney, James Russell, Stoughton,
and William Brown.
affairs to the king.

Randolph related the same state of
A majority of the magistrates,

the best estates, were for an entire submission."

"men of

Those of
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the upper house who opposed alteration of the charter he
described as men "of inconsiderable fortunes but factious
spirits;"

likewise, he characterized the deputies as

"mostly an inferior sort of planters."37
According to Randolph, at least, the economic as well
as religious positions of political leaders influenced the
way they aligned themselves on the charter issue.
this observation had some merit.

Perhaps

Magistrates, more than

deputies, tended to be socially and financially prominent in
the colony, reflecting their more distinguished political
position, and therefore they had more to gain from a smooth
transition from the old charter government to royal
administration.

Moderates saw the triumph of the crown's

will as inevitable.

They wanted to minimize the trauma to

the colonial system and to their position within it.
Deputies, on the other hand, relied more closely on the
local nature of their prominence and were more directly
responsible to the neighbors who chose them.

Their actions

therefore were more likely to reflect popular sentiments.
By the mid-1680s, this factionalism and the ultimate
fate of the charter gave the voters a new perspective on
some of the magistrates they had regularly elected in
previous years.

In the spring of 1684, Randolph reported

that the citizenry was dissatisfied with the views expressed
by some of the more prominent moderates, and indeed, in the
May elections that year, Dudley, Brown, and Gedney lost
their seats in the upper house.

Bulkeley and Stoughton, in
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reaction and as a show of sympathy for their fellow
magistrates, resigned their positions and "refused to
serve."38 These election results represented by far the
largest turnover in the upper house during the decades
immediately preceding or following King Philip's War and
distinctly reflected the political dissatisfaction stemming
from the charter controversy.
If the behavior of the moderate magistrates
dissatisfied Massachusetts voters, the establishment of the
Dominion of New England under Sir Edmund Andros caused them
unparalleled consternation.

While division existed within

the colony over the charter question, the residents were
more unified, at least eventually, in their opposition to
the newly imposed government.

When Andros arrived in 1686,

he delivered his royal commission requiring "all officers &
ministers civill and Millitary and all other inhabitants of
our said Territory and Dominion to be obedient Aiding and
Assisting unto" him.39 The wording and intent of the
commission offended New Englanders, especially those of the
"faction."

"It would require a long summer's-day to relate

the miseries which were come, and coming in upon poor
New-England, by reason of the arbitrary government then
imposed on" the colony, wrote Cotton Mather.

40

Indeed, the

lists of complaints against the Andros regime were many and
protracted, but they all revolved around a set of basic
offenses.
Among his administrative abuses, members of both the
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"faction" and the moderate group complained that the
governor neglected the

advice of his councillors who knew

the country and relied

instead upon "the advice only of a

few others, the principal of them Strangers to the Countrey,
without Estates or Interest therein."

Furthermore, many of

these close advisors were "persons of known and declared
Prejudice against [the

colony], and that had plainly laid

their chiefest Designs

and Hopes to make unreasonable

profit" from their involvement in the Dominion.

To prevent

the citizenry from voicing opposition to this arbitrary
method of administering the government, Andros limited the
number of town meetings to one per year.

In addition, under

the Andros regime, "the publick Ministry of the Gospel, and
all Schools of Learning, were discountenanced unto the
Utmost."

41

The colonists had already lost their cherished

charter and then the new royal governor came in and attacked
two of their most honored institutions, popular government,
including the town meeting, and the influential clergy.
Probably the most serious scenes of opposition arose,
however, when the Dominion government began to threaten
their estates.
Andros and his favorites, at least in the opinion of
many colonists, "for the enriching themselves on the ruins
of New England, did invade the property as well as liberty"
of the inhabitants.

With the charter legally revoked, the

governor declared Massachusetts land patents defective,
"under the pretence of [the property] belonging to king
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James," regardless of what the landowners considered "honest
and just and true titles to [their] land."42 The granting
of land under the old charter probably was inconsistent with
royal policy, but New Englanders reacted strongly to fears
that they would have their land taken from them or that they
would have to pay exhorbitant processing fees and quitrents
to keep it.

Samuel Sewall expressed the disquietude of the

people over threats to their landholdings in a 1688 letter
to Increase Mather, who was in London at the time.

"The

generality of People are very averse from complying with any
thing that may alter the Tenure of their lands," he stated,
reflecting that Massachusetts colonists were not prepared to
give up their property to the regime which had already
robbed them of their political institutions.43
The attack on land titles combined with increased
taxation under Andros to raise the popular voice against the
Dominion.

High taxes resulting from King Philip’s War still

burdened the colony when Andros arrived, so his seemingly
arbitrary levies, demanded without consulting an assembly,
further alarmed the colonists.

The governor ordered new

taxes based on rates of one penny per pound of estate value
plus twenty pence per poll, in addition to stricter import
and excise duties.

The manner in which these taxes were

levied, "without the consent of the people either by
themselves or by an assembly," led many towns and their
selectmen to resist collecting the authorized rates.
One such town was Ipswich, in Essex County.

Although
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not alone in its refusal, Ipswich was singled out by the
Andros regime as an example to the others.

The proceedings,

however, did more to raise hard feelings against the
governor than to compel compliance to his orders.

When the

Ipswich selectmen argued that taxes levied without the
approval of an elected assembly violated English law, John
West, one of Andros's imported councillors, scornfully
answered that the colonists "must not think the Lawes of
England follow [them] to the Ends of the Earth."

As

disobedient subjects who refused the instructions of a royal
governor, "you have no more priviledges Left you than not to
be sould for slaves," West informed the defendents in a
pre-trial hearing.
The selectmen, John Wise, John Appleton, John Andrews,
Robert Kinsman, William Goodhow, and Thomas French, were
then tried by a panel of judges composed of Joseph Dudley,
William Stoughton, Edward Randolph, John Usher, and George
Farewell.

Chief judge Dudley, in a ploy "that pleased

himself . . . more than the people," harangued the jury on
their duty to convict the defendents.

"I am glad (says he)

ther be so many worthie Gentlemen of the Jury so Capable to
do the King service, and we Expect a good verdict from you,
seeing the matter hath been so sufficiently proved against
the CriminalIs."

44

The jury fulfilled its charge,

convicting the defendents, fining them, barring them from
holding office, and requiring them to post bond for their
good behavior.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

224
While opposition to the revocation of the charter and
the Dominion government was often expressed in religious
terms, attacks on the colonists' property and purses were
the real issues which spurred hard feelings against
Andros.45 Citizens and selectmen had resisted the multiple
tax rates which resulted from King Philip's War, but they
had always based their actions on financial hardship and
inability— real or contrived— to meet the unprecedented
demands.

These protests generally took place in hopes of

winning abatements from the General Court until conditions
improved.

Financial difficulties still prevented full

compliance with tax levies during the late 1680s, at least
in the view of many town selectmen across the colony, but
Andros provided further basis for opposition by employing
means which the colonists considered illegal.46 The manner
in which his councillors flaunted their power in the faces
of the Ipswich defendents could only have the effect of
exacerbating a people already disgruntled over issues of
taxation.
Massachusetts residents also doubted the governor's
intentions for the good of New England, especially in his
dealings with the enemies of the colonies and of the errand.
Fear that Andros might deal with the natives of the region,
even to the point of encouraging them to attack the colonies
anew, gave the colonists another reason to believe that the
political difficulties which afflicted them during the 1680s
were just a continuation of their time of trials which began
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with King Philip's War.

In fact, suspicion that Andros

favored the Indians over the colonists dated back at least
to the closing stages of the war, when he was the governor
of New York;

in fact, Massachusetts suspicions of Andros

and his manipulation of the Indian situation were accurate.
On August 15, 1676, John Pynchon warned Governor Leverett
that most of the surviving natives from the Massachusetts
frontier had "drawn off toward Albany, where they are
harbored under Andros, his government."

"We shall be in

danger to be continually disturbed," warned Pynchon, as long
as Andros chose to "harbor our enemies."

47

Thus, distrust

of the governor's Indian policies preceded him to Boston.
When serious hostilities broke out in Maine in 1688,
many colonists complained that Andros "delayed and neglected
all that was necessary for the publick defence."

In doing

so, he reportedly "manifested a most furious displeasure
against those of the council, and all others" who showed
concern "for the security of the inhabitants."

The force he

finally sent to the Maine frontier proved ineffective;
"there were more of the poor people [colonists] killed than
they had enemies there alive," Cotton Mather wrote later,
and yet the governor's forces, led by royal officers, could
not track down the hostile natives.

Quite understandably,

"this added not a little to the dissatisfaction of the
people."48 Not only did Andros seem to sympathize with the
natives, but accusations also surfaced, after the fact, that
the governor even fraternized with the enemy.

At least one
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colonist testified that on one occasion Andros got drunk
with four Indian women in Maine, allegedly enemies, and gave
them powder and shot.

49

Drinking with Indians was bad enough, but Massachusetts
colonists came to suspect that Andros had formulated "a Plot
to bring in the Indians upon u s ."

Keeping in mind the

upheaval caused by King Philip's War, certain Massachusetts
leaders found "it was easy unto us to conceive, How
serviceable another Indian War might have been to the
Designs" of those working for the Dominion.

According to

the various indictments, Andros "hired . . . Indians to kill
the English," released enemy Indians captured in the
colonies, and negotiated with French Canadians and Mohawks
"to take the Country in possession for the King of
France."50 Although some of these accusations, including
reports of his revelry with Indian maidens, may have
represented exaggerations or even fabrications used to
support the successful revolution in retrospect, they
nonetheless exhibited how deeply Massachusetts residents
distrusted Andros's Indian dealings and thus how the
colonists connected his political regime to the native
threat they thought they had defeated a decade earlier.
Although Metacom had been killed in 1676, some colonists saw
in Andros his political successor in the work against the
New England mission living in Boston in 1686.
Just as New Englanders eliminated the Indian opposition
of the 1670s, they saw both a duty and a necessity in
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removing the threat posed by Sir Edmund Andros and his
regime.

By the spring of 1689, revolution brewed in the

region, especially as reports of the Glorious Revolution
spread through the colonies, in spite of the governor's
efforts to suppress the news.51 Neither Andros nor anyone
else could stop the momentum once it began.

In fact, by

April 18, five moderate members of the governor's Council
were moved to the point of taking part in the revolt, as
some "principal gentlemen in Boston," described by Cotton
Mather as "Considerate Persons," took charge of the mob
agitating for Andros' overthrow.

These veterans of

Massachusetts politics saw trouble approaching, and they
decided to head off violence and bloodshed by taking charge
"with a Declaration accordingly prepared."52 As moderates
they reacted to a potentially chaotic political situation in
1689 with the same pragmatism they exhibited during the
charter crisis earlier in the decade.

In both instances,

the moderates saw changes coming and wanted to guide affairs
toward the smoothest solution possible.
Fifteen men signed the declaration demanding Andros's
surrender of the government.

The presence of such moderate

leaders as Wait Winthrop, William Stoughton, Samuel
Shrimpton, Bartholemew Gedney, and William Brown gave a
solid foundation to a group which also included such New
England traditionalists as Simon Bradstreet and Thomas
Danforth.

Their declaration of grievances contained a

warning to Andros that although they were "surprized with
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the Peoples sudden taking of Arms . . . whereof we were
wholly ignorant," the popular leaders expected him to
cooperate in order to prevent bloodshed.

As justification,

they cited the "Illegal . . . Malicious and Unreasonable"
nature of the colony's treatment by royal officials from the
time the crown vacated the Massachusetts charter.

In

addition to reciting and describing in detail the list of
specific grievances held against the regime, the declaration
expressed a strong resentment about "Strangers" and "Haters
of the People" being given a virtual license to exploit the
colonists.

"Accordingly," the signers declared, "we have

been treated with multiplied Contradictions to Magna Charta,
the Rights of which we laid claim unto."53 Therefore, they
felt justified in abolishing the illegitimate and arbitrary
regime.
Furthermore, New Englanders could point to King
William's invasion as justification for their actions.

The

news from England finally spurred the colonists to action,
according to one apologist, and they naturally associated
Andros with King James, "who had invaded both the liberty
and property of English protestants."

54

To the extreme

members of the "faction" and even to many moderates who
originally cooperated with the governor, the Dominion of New
England had come to represent an annoying extension of King
James's unpopular rule.

Edward Randolph blamed the

political upheaval of the times on "a violent and bloudy
zeal stir'd up in the Rabble acted and managed by the
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preachers," but members of the governor's own council also
played leading roles in the revolts and in the
twenty-six-member Council of Safety established on April 20
to administer the government of Massachusetts until
instructions for a settlement arrived from England.55
A great deal of political tension existed on the
provincial level during the 1680s, and the fulcrum of the
dissent was an effort to remove an overbearing royal
presence in Boston.

Although factionalism existed within

the colony, especially over the fate of the charter, the
real enemy resided across the Atlantic.

Still, the

disquietude was connected to other internal concerns because
many colonists, especially orthodox Puritans, viewed the
Dominion as a continuation of attacks unleashed by the
forces of evil against the New England mission.

First in

the series, of course, was the tumult of King Philip's War.
The Indian conflict was connected to the Revolution of 1689
in that both occurrences alerted New Englanders to outside
threats, but not in the sense that the tension which
resulted from the war necessarily led New Englanders to
challenge their traditional political order.

In fact, the

colonists showed a preference to maintain or return to
familiar patterns of leadership throughout the period, on
the provincial level as well as in local politics.
Although colonists in distant frontier communities for
the most part played no direct role in the Boston revolt of
April 18, 1689, they largely gave their assent to the action
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in retrospect.

On May 2, the Council of Safety requested

that the towns in the colony give "farther consultation and
Advice" on the current political situation, and the replies
came back overwhelmingly in favor not only of Andros'
repudiation but also of resuming the former charter
government.

Fifty-four towns sent representatives to Boston

by May 22 to signify their approval of the rebellion;

forty

of them carried instructions to call for the return of the
governor and assistants elected in May 1686, according to
the old charter rights.

Such optimistic declarations came

from all over the colony, and the frontier towns were no
exception.

The town meetings of Springfield, Westfield,

Deerfield, and Lancaster all echoed the sentiments of
Northampton's residents that the government officials of
1686 "should be Continued in or Reassume their former Power
for the year ensuying unlesse orders Come from England to
the Contrary."56
The Council of Safety reacted cautiously to the
recommendations;

the councillors apparently had no

opposition to turning the reins of government over to the
deputies of 1686, and many of them served on both bodies,
but they also recognized the potential danger in arbitrarily
declaring the charter revived.

Even though James II no

longer sat on the throne, the councillors prudently
acknowledged that the charter had been legally revoked, at
least in the eyes of royal authorities.

To assuage their

own citizens without offending the crown, the Council in May
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1689 agreed to reinstate the officials "chosen and Sworn
in . . . according to our Charter Rights . . . Hoping that
all People will rest Satisfied till we have Confirmation
from the Crown of England which we daily hope for."57
Simon Bradstreet, the elected governor of 1686 and the
president of the new provisional government of 1689, wrote
to King William for the whole Massachusetts legislature,
assuring him that the actions taken were only temporary and
employed as expedients because of familiarity, "until
further directions should arrive from England."58 Most
colonists probably wished that no further directions would
appear and that the crown would leave them alone to enjoy
their preferred mode of administration.
Just as colonists exhibited a marked preference for the
familiar in the leaders they chose on the town level and in
the charter government/ Massachusetts voters also largely
elected trusted men to the provincial offices after 1689.
This trend was somewhat difficult to distinguish on the
deputy level, since many towns, both before and after the
revolution, sent representatives irregularly, if at all.
New and relatively new frontier towns especially often could
not afford the expense of sending deputies to the General
Court sessions which met at various times throughout the
year, and many colonists had personal concerns at home which
made service in Boston burdensome.

While larger,

established towns like Springfield and Northampton could
generally support a deputy each year, other towns like
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Groton, Westfield, and Lancaster did so only
59
sporadically.
Outposts so recently established as
Deerfield or Northfield were not represented in the Chamber
of Deputies.
The same patterns continued during the last decade of
the seventeenth century.

Frontier outposts still elected

representatives irregularly, if at all;

between 1689 and

1699, for instance, Deerfield sent members to the General
Court only three times and Lancaster did so only five times.
In towns which did choose deputies annually, traditional
leaders surfaced in the provincial elections.

During the

decade between King Philip's War and the establishment of
the Dominion of New England, Springfield voters most
consistently elected Elizur Holyoke, Samuel Marshfield, and
Joseph Pynchon.

Marshfield and Holyoke had long careers as

town selectmen.

In addition, Holyoke was a brother-in-law

of the powerful John Pynchon, while Joseph was the major's
son.

During the decade after the revolution, Springfield

representatives included Henry Chapin, whose career as a
selectman began in 1670, John Holyoke, Elizur's son, John
Hitchcock, another long-time selectman, and John Pynchon
III.60 The Springfield deputy elections represented an
example of the colonists' preference for familiar leaders on
the provincial level.
The provisional government created in 1689 continued
until 1692 when the new royal governor, Sir William Phips,
arrived in Boston with his commission.

The old charter was
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dead, and Massachusetts colonists finally had to admit it.
"It was not in the King's Power to Reverse the Judgment
against the Old Charter," admitted Increase Mather;
"nevertheless, his Majesty had Power to Re-incorporate his
Subjects, thereby granting them a New Charter, which should
contain all the Old, with New and more Ample Priviledges."
Actually, the new charter placed certain restrictions on the
colony.

The crown approved Massachusetts's representative

legislature, for instance, but with a governor appointed in
London instead of elected in Boston.

In addition, the

franchise became based entirely on property requirements
rather than upon church membership, and after 1692, final
approval of colonial laws clearly rested with crown
officials.

Massachusetts residents could no longer claim to

possess their own Magna Charta.

Even Increase Mather

realistically came to agree with certain Privy Councillors
who advised "that it was not only Lawfull, but, all
Circumstances considered, a Duty to submit to what was now
offered."61 Although this charter did not provide all that
some colonists had hoped, they were pleased to have
confirmation of their removal of the arbitrary Dominion
government.
Twenty-eight men served on the first appointed colonial
council named under the new charter;
stood for election every year.

thereafter councillors

Between 1692 and 1695, a

total of forty-five men held the office, and even though the
reconstructed body contained members from the former
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Plymouth Colony, Maine, and the northeastern coast, sixteen
of that number had served as Assistants in the Bay Colony
before 1686.

Furthermore, thirteen of them won reelection

repeatedly after 1692, serving an average of nearly fifteen
years apiece.

Samuel Sewall, an Assistant from 1684 to

1686, went on to hold a seat on the Council for thirty-four
years.

Other former magistrates, including John Hawthorne,

Elisha Hutchinson, Isaac Addington, and William Browne,
served terms of twenty years or more.62 Increase Mather
expressed confidence in the councillors of the 1690s,
proclaiming ‘'every man of them is a Friend to New England,
and to the Churches and Interest of Christ therein."
Regardless of the merits of his appraisal, Increase's son
Cotton accurately commended Massachusetts voters because
"they wisely made few Alterations in their Annual Elections;
and they thereby shew'd their Satisfaction in the wise and
good Conduct of those whom they had Elected."63 Other
councillors, who had served under Andros, were not as
fortunate.

Actually, ten of the council members who sat

during the early 1690s also sat during the Dominion period,
but four of them came from Plymouth.

Of the six from the

Bay Colony, five redeemed themselves by participating in the
revolutionary group which demanded Andros' surrender in
1689.

John Pynchon, who served under Andros and did not

take part in the revolt, went on to hold a council seat
during the 1690s, but his case was atypical.

Most of his

colleagues who did not come out publicly against the
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Dominion regime did not again hold a provincial public
office.64 Thus, even on the highest elective level after
1689, Massachusetts colonists showed a preference for
familiar, trusted leaders.
The political upheaval of the late seventeenth century
in Massachusetts was connected to the upheaval of King
Philip's War in that both represented efforts to eliminate
outside threats to the colony's accustomed and cherished
mode of existence.

The Indians supposedly attempted to

destroy the Puritan errand into the wilderness while the
Dominion of New England served as the means of abolishing
the charter upon which the mission was based.

Therefore,

the colonists faced a constant struggle between 1675 and
1689 to restore order as they knew it.65 But the
accumulated chaos of the postwar years did not make
Massachusetts residents repudiate their established
political leaders;

instead, in the effort to deal with the

legacies of the period, colonists turned to selectmen,
deputies, and councillors they knew they could trust.
If any repudiation of established leadership occurred
during the postwar years, it did so in the militia.
Indiscipline within the colonial military appeared during
the war, as Massachusetts officials expressed concern over
their inability to recruit sufficient numbers of troopers.
Even during the war, many colonists denied the necessity of
serving in the militia and their duty of contributing to the
military goals of the colony.

Fighting Indians became

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

236
unpopular in some areas even before Metacom's defeat;

when

the necessity of defense continued after 1676, unpopularity
in some cases turned into open insubordination.
As early as September 1675, Secretary Edward Rawson
reported "much dampened . . . spirits for the war.

Some men

escape away from the press," he wrote, "and others hide away
after they are impressed."

Such aversion to military

service lowered morale in the ranks, as "plaine Contempt"
resulted in "the Publicke Service and safety [being]
neglected in such a perilous day."66 The end of the war
against King Philip did not bring an end to the threat to
the colonial frontier, and it certainly did not end the
efforts of colonists to evade military service.

While

hostile natives remained on the eastern frontier in Maine
throughout the late 1670s and 1680s, many Massachusetts men
showed their displeasure at having to defend what they
considered a distant and desolate region by devising new
ways of dodging conscription.

In 1679, for instance, to

combat the practice of potential soldiers who constantly
travelled back and forth between two or more towns to avoid
militia calls, the General Court prohibited men from moving
without first obtaining registration certificates from the
corresponding local officers.67 Colonial authorities thus
had to engage in a virtual cat-and-mouse game to commandeer
troopers for the frontier defenses after King Philip's War.
Discontent within the ranks deepened during the 1680s,
especially under the Andros regime.

Militiamen in Maine
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complained of unfamiliar British regular army officers
forced upon them by the governor, and rumors ran rampant
through the ranks that Andros would "Sacrifice 'em" to their
combined native and French enemies.

As soon as the

opportunity arose, in April 1689, the soldiers "seized their
officers and sent them home prisoners."

Dissatisfaction

centered on Lt. John Jordan, one of Andros' imported
officers, who admitted to striking several militiamen for
their indiscipline and disrespect toward him and other
appointees.

Although Jordan claimed that the "charges of

cruelty [against him] are malicious lies," his soldiers
seized him, further complaining that he "intended to go to
New France."68
After the rebellion in Boston toppled the Andros
regime, the troopers already in Maine generally abandoned
their posts, and the provisional government could not
recruit other soldiers to replace them.

"Some questioned

their pay, some the authority for the press," a contemporary
reported, "and few or none went."

Even after the removal of

Jordan and the other regular army officers, problems with
discipline continued in the region.

In October 1689, John

Swayne complained that the soldiers on duty in Maine were "a
company of prayerless people" who constantly absented
themselves and regularly disregarded orders.

He asked that

the General Court take "a Speedy & Severe course . . . with
Such persons."69 Severe punishment, however, was not the
solution to the long-term problem.

Discontent in the
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militia erupted most notably on the Maine frontier in 1689,
but throughout the colony the system suffered from the
dissatisfaction which began during King Philip’s War.
During the war, the colonial government attempted to
establish firm control over the militia.

In October 1675,

the General Court issued a set of "Lawes and ordinances of
war .

.

.

for the better regulating their forces, and

keeping theire souldiers to theire duty."

These

instructions prohibited such abuses as negligence of duty,
disobedience to superior officers, or unexcused absence on
pain of corporal punishment or even death.70 Civil and
military officials attempted to stem the problems which
existed in the ranks through the threat or use of strict
discipline, but religious leaders also exhorted militiamen
to recognize their obligations.
Rev. Samuel Nowell, for example, reminded citizens that
military training was "a commendable practice, yea of Duty
of Great Consequence."

He pointed out that only through

"Frequent Trainings" and the establishment of "military
Discipline" could soldiers "be ready and expert for
War,

...

a Duty," according to Nowell, "which God

expecteth" of His followers.

Furthermore, he indicted those

who took their responsibilities lightly;

"they are greatly

to blame that do neglect it, or slight over it, [or] do not
make conscience of it."71 Nowell, and other clergymen,
reminded eligible men that they had not only a legal
obligation to answer the calls of their militia committees,
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but that they also had a moral calling to carry on the
crusade against the physical forces of evil in the world.
The orthodox clergy continued its perceived function of
guiding and directing the citizenry into proper channels of
unified, responsible, communal activity, and preachers like
Nowell and the Mathers expected the colonists to fall into
line.
One problem which plagued colonial militia companies
was that the soldiers, in the words of John Pynchon, "much
desire & Insist upon it, to have Commission officers of
their owne,

. . . such as they know."72 Just as in the

area of taxation, Massachusetts colonists turned against any
hint of outside authority which appeared to threaten local
autonomy in militia affairs.

Although only the General

Court could actually appoint commissioned officers,
provincial law permitted active militiamen and militia
committees to choose nominees for the positions, and the
soldiers guarded this privilege closely.

Traditionally,

colonial officials dared not reject the soldiers'
nominations.73 But in the decades after King Philip's War
a high degree of turnover occurred in the local officers
corps, for various reasons, and many of the elections of the
period attracted unusual attention.
Admittedly, much of the turnover resulted from natural
attrition.

Across the colony, in towns from the coast to

the Connecticut Valley, local militia officers asked to be
relieved of their positions after the war.

In Springfield,
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for instance, Ens.

Benjamin Cooley petitioned the General

Court, in May 1679, for permission "to lay downe his place,
being aged & deafe."

Likewise, about the same time,

Lt. Samuel Smith of Hadley complained of "being very aged &
weake, & not . . .

so well able to dischardge [his] military
74
The Court granted these and

trust as heeretofore."
similar requests.

Many incidents of local tension and dissension,
however, interrupted the flow of militia affairs during the
period.

Hingham militiamen, for example, elected Lt. John

Smith their captain and Ens. Jeremiah Coall their lieutenant
on October 11, 1682, but the selection of an ensign caused
contention among the voters.

The older members of the

company supported Sgt. Thomas Andrews, who had a good record
of service, while the younger men voted for James Hawk, who
"never was in any office, but a privatt souldier."

Hawk won

a small majority, but Andrews’s supporters petitioned the
General Court to overturn this election.

Finally, on March

17, 1683, Thomas Lincoln was chosen ensign, apparently as a
compromise.

75

A similar incident occurred m

Topsfield.

Sometime during the late 1670s, Ens. John Gould lost his
commission due to "some uncomfortable misunderstandings
amongst" members of the company, but in March 1679 his
comrades reported that the troubles had been solved and
asked the General Court to reinstate him "to his former
Commission or an higher."

The court agreed.

By 1686 Gould,

by then a lieutenant, again fell into trouble, leading "a
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Riotous Muster" against service to the Dudley regime.

He

was arrested, fined £50, and released on bond for good
behavior.76 In Enfield, "the next place to Springfield,"
the soldiers elected a lieutenant for their company in 1689,
although the small size of the band did not entitle them to
a full complement of commissioned officers.

When M a j . John

Pynchon challenged the election, the ringleaders, or "at
least one that was the mouth," answered that "they had
chosen commissioned officers and them they would obey."
Pynchon, the commander of the Hampshire County regiment,
asked the government in Boston to support him in putting
down this insurgency.77 All three of these incidents, and
others like them, indicated the existence of dissension and
disdain for authority within the militia ranks after King
Philip's War.

Many of the soldiers involved were openly

defiant of the status quo, and the older, established
leaders naturally became alarmed at this development.
The most serious upheaval occurred in the town of
Northampton, one of the most secure towns in the Connecticut
Valley.

In 1689, when the provincial government attempted

to turn the clock back by reinstating or reaffirming
officeholders of 1686 across the colony, certain members of
the Northampton militia company turned against their former
elected officers in favor of a new generation of leaders.
"At Northampton Sergeant [John] King cavilled about my
Power," Pynchon complained to the governor and Council, and
the disruption quickly reached mutinous proportions.

King,
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with his allies, Medad Pomeroy and Preserved Clapp,
attempted to convince their comrades to reject the board
which consisted of Capt. Aaron Cooke, Lt. Joseph Hawley, and
Ens. Timothy Baker, and in general, the dissidents "bid
defiance to the old Commission[ed] officers."

The two

ringleaders displayed "such a height of Pride," said
Pynchon, "that nothing would or could be done by or from my
orders & direction."78 The major reported that "on many
accounts" militia affairs were "in no good posture," because
King's insubordination in Northampton had spread to other
towns in the region;

the upheaval "disquieted some others

that were quiet before" and filled the plotters with
confidence that "they have now liberty to do what they
please."79 At least the General Court sided with Pynchon
in the controversy and responded by confirming the officers
of 1686.
Still, King kept up the effort in the hope that
eventually "he might be Captaine" of the company.

Pynchon

feared that the ambitious troublemaker might gain enough
popular support to carry the day, "having so many
Relations . . . who have holpen it on & are the Faction in
that Busyness."

Captain Cooke sought to influence the

General Court to take strong action against the
conspirators, describing King and his followers as enemies
of authority, lawbreakers, and known heavy drinkers.80
Such descriptions were probably exaggerated but not entirely
wide of the truth.

In the eyes of the traditional leaders,
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at least, the trouble in Northampton resulted from lack of
respect on the part of unqualified newcomers who wanted to
propel themselves into positions of undeserved power.
King's supporters, however, obviously felt justified in
seizing leadership positions from the representatives of an
older generation.
The "Disorders & Irregularetys" which plagued the
Northampton company continued into 1690, when Cooke died,
opening the way for King and his associates.

Pynchon wrote

to Lieutenant Hawley, the ranking officer, on December 5,
1690, recommending that he encourage the soldiers to lay
"aside al headyness, prjudice, commotion . . .
affection" in the upcoming election.

& misguided

The major implored the

men "to act Judiciously with respect to the Publicke good &
advantage," and to "make noe alteration but what may be safe
& beneficial to the Company & Publicke."

Throughout the

whole affair, he advised Hawley to "Consider & not overlooke
the way & mode of Military discipline.1,81
Three days later the lieutenant wrote to the General
Court complaining about the outcome of the election.

Clapp

won the contest for captain, but Hawley expressed doubt that
"a Competent Number" of voters participated in the election.
Further, he claimed that the newly elected officers
continued their contrary practices which interrupted the
progress of militia affairs in the town.

Given the

difficulties he faced as one of the holdovers from 1686,
Hawley petitioned the court to relieve him of his
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commission, assuring the legislators that his request
resulted "not from a Backward spririt to serve . . . the
Country," but rather from the animosity he experienced from
within the company.

He concluded his letter by calling on

the provincial government to intervene so "that [our] poor
Divided town may once again be setled."

The General Court

responded by confirming Clapp's election, accepting Hawley's
resignation, and approving the choice of King as
lieutenant.82 Officials in Boston thus took the course
which appeared to offer the least resistance in restoring
peace and order to Northampton, but the whole incident
reflected Pynchon's observation by the 1690s that "the
People [had become] a litle wilful, inclined to do what and
how they pleased or not at all."83
Ironically, the ringleaders of the militia unrest in
Northampton did not represent a new generation of men trying
to break into positions of influence in the town;
already attained public prominence by 1689.

they had

John King and

Medad Pomeroy both served the town as selectmen on a regular
basis during the years immediately following King Philip's
War.

Likewise, Preserved Clapp began his career as a

selectman during the mid-1680s.84 These three men, who
played such prominent roles in the disruption of the town's
militia company, did not need to speak out in order to gain
the attention of their fellow townspeople.

Why, then, did

they practice such stratagems to subvert the established
officers of the company?

Personality factors must have
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played some part in the controversy;

Cooke's repudiation of

the conspirators' characters betrayed personal animosity.
In addition, however, advancement through the militia
represented another way for ambitious men like King to
cement their own power.

They were not only turning against

established officers but also trying to assure for
themselves places in the town's leadership structure.
The disruption which occurred in the militia system was
difficult to reconcile with the trend toward continuity in
both local and provincial politics.

The turnover in many

militia companies had no parallel on the selectman boards of
the period.

Controversy in the selection of officers,

however, was not a new phenomenon after King Philip's War.
As long as the institution existed, local companies
periodically experienced disruptive elections.85 Perhaps
as a result of the war the colonial military passed through
a state of increased flux and transition, but no one
involved in the turmoil challenged the traditional political
structure.

Instead, more men sought to elbow their way into

it.
Massachusetts colonists came to feel that the end of
King Philip's War did not represent the end of their trials
at the hands of the forces of evil.

The relief they felt at

the defeat of the Indians was shortlived, as a crisis of
leadership ensued within the colony during the 1680s.

The

charter controversy of that decade created a chaotic and
disruptive period in colonial politics, but in their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

246
resolution of the situation, New Englanders turned to
trusted and established leaders for stability.

In

individual towns, however, where royal officials did not
directly control day-to-day administrative matters,
colonists for the most part never turned away from their
familiar officials.

Even on the frontier, where Indian

attacks had caused the greatest disruption, selectmen
elections revealed a marked degree of continuity.

Colonists

clearly sought a return to the old order in the face of new
opposition, whether from native assaults or royal policies.
If King Philip's War left any political legacy in the
Massachusetts Bay colony, it did so in making colonists wary
of perceived threats to their integrity and existence.
First the natives and then the crown represented challenges
to the orderly, accustomed progress of the colony.

In

reaction, colonists during the later decades of the
seventeenth century became more watchful, even within their
own ranks, for forces acting against their own best
interests, and this vigilance made them more assertive in
questioning authority.

Their initiative was apparent not

only in the opposition to the Dominion of New England but
also in individual community affairs.

Although there was no

notable disruption in local politics— townspeople continued
to elect established selectmen— colonists throughout the
region began to reassert more power for themselves and their
town meetings, while imposing restraints on the assumed
powers of their elected officials.

The accumulated
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challenges of the period, beginning with King Philip's War,
led New Englanders to become less passive in accepting their
world at face value and more willing to question political
affairs as well as other, less tangible, aspects of life.
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CHAPTER 6
THE BATTLE WITHIN

Massachusetts residents readily recognized the
economic, demographic, and political legacies of King
Philip's War.

Less tangible but of greater magnitude in the

long run were the intellectual and attitudinal changes which
resulted from the conflict and continuing tensions.

The

accumulated challenges they faced contributed to a sense of
uneasiness and even fear which led many colonists to
question the dogmas and practices of the New England way.
While New Englanders shared an apprehension about the
possibility of renewed native and even French hostilities on
the frontier, orthodox Puritans, especially the clergy,
pointed to a greater danger within the Massachusetts
communities.

In an effort to save the errand into the

wilderness from destroying itself, Puritan ministers led a
crusade against the many manifestations of indiscipline and
ungodliness running rampant in the region during the late
seventeenth century.

Men like Cotton Mather and Samuel

Nowell exhorted their congregations to resist the forces of
evil infiltrating Massachusetts towns and families, but the
excesses continued.

King Philip's War fostered an unsettled

period in New England history, and the far-reaching
258
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intellectual repercussions were much more difficult to
accommodate than were the physical legacies.
This sense of disturbing change and unwelcome flux was
not unique to the New England experience nor was the
phenomenon, in its more generic forms, related inherently to
the Puritan character of the region's English inhabitants.
Societies throughout history have faced social change and
upheaval in the aftermath of warfare.

In many ways, the

colonists exhibited typical reactions and behavioral
patterns in response to the war-time tensions imposed upon
them.

For instance, Puritan New Englanders cited God's

displeasure combined with the malice of the supernatural
forces of evil as the orthodox explanation for King Philip's
War.

They therefore portrayed the war itself as a necessary

struggle to rectify the situation and to reassert their own
spiritual worth, both to themselves and to God.

Obviously,

Puritan theology contributed to this interpretation of the
conflict, but sociologists have noted such rationalization
as a common human characteristic.1 Human beings naturally
seek to explain misfortune or turmoil by blaming outside
forces.

The colonists did just that in their evaluation of

native hostilities in 1676.

Metacom and his followers

became associated with all of New England's problems.

As

agents of the forces of evil in the world, the natives
became symbols of everything the Puritan mission stood
against.

Thus the enemy represented the target at which New

Englanders could direct their fears, desires, guilt, and
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aggressions.2
War, therefore, served a valuable purpose to
Massachusetts communities, just as it has to countless
societies in the past.

By focusing opposition against a

perceived threat, most notably a military enemy, leaders
have sought to solidify their own group unity.

In facing an

easily distinguishable foe, people tend to pull together and
consolidate their efforts, thus augmenting their defensive
measures and further defining their collective identity.3
Civil and religious leaders constantly reminded
Massachusetts residents that the natives represented alien,
evil forces, and thus fostered a virtual fortress mentality
which portrayed a dichotomy between New England and all of
its enemies.

In the moment of extremity, the threat of

Indian attack led a iuajoi'ity of New Eiiglanders to cooperate
with each other in opposition to the common enemy.
The clergy attempted to use the war to combat sin and
backsliding within their congregations.

By explaining the

native attacks as signs of God's displeasure with His chosen
people and by correlating each English victory with
indications of the colonists' penitence, ministers sought to
regenerate a sense of spiritual vigor among their fellow
sinners.

From John Pynchon in Springfield and Mary

Rowlandson in Lancaster to Increase Mather in Boston,
prominent figures across the colony proclaimed that
salvation and victory over the Indians could come only
through sincere repentance.

Devout Puritans recognized the
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war as an opportunity and even a mandate to reinvigorate the
religious errand into the wilderness.4
While creating the possibility of increased unity as an
immediate reaction, wars have often resulted in internal
disorder and social change.

On the most superficial level,

war creates an atmosphere in which normally forbidden
activities— such as killing— are permitted, thus opening the
way for challenges to other, more subtle, social
conventions.

The high tension levels which lead to initial

group solidarity against the outside threat are also capable
of nurturing discord within.
in opposition.

Therefore, the two forces work

Although authorities attempt to use wartime

tensions to augment conformity, the inherent instability
leads some members to question accustomed practices and even
to adopt apparently deviant behavior.

As a result, once

peace returns, periods of warfare often result in longer
campaigns against perceived degeneracy and backlashes
against any social change, positive or negative.5
Certainly New England witnessed this struggle between a
conservative reaction and the agents of change.
King Philip's War, of course, was not the only crisis
which New Englanders faced during the late seventeenth
century, nor was it the direct cause of all of the problems
and tensions which plagued the colonies at the time.

The

war left lingering legacies, but the economic and
demographic costs of the conflict were compounded by new
political and spiritual challenges which appeared
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concurrently.

Although the roots of some of these troubles

cannot be attributed specifically to the struggle against
Metacom, King Philip's War did represent a focal point to
the colonists who lived through the troubled period.

In a

quarter-century characterized by a sense of continuing
crisis, the war that ended in 1676 was the one crisis to
which the colonists repeatedly referred.

New England was

under attack throughout the period, and with the new
challenges imposed on top of the legacies of King Philip's
War, the colonists really never had an opportunity to
recover from the conflict.

By the time King William's War

broke out in 1689, Massachusetts residents were already
anxious and uncertain, and King Philip's War was the signal
event which set the tone for the last quarter of the
seventeenth century.
According to Douglas Leach, victory over Metacom
brought "a great sense of relief and joy," tempered by a
realization of the destruction caused by the conflict.
Still, he found the postwar years "characterized not by
harmony, but by internal strains."6 The war presented New
Englanders with images of everything they came to America to
avoid or amend, both in the forms of their unregenerate
native enemies and their own sinfulness.

Thus, when native

threats on the frontier continued and, more significantly,
when worldliness and indiscipline appeared to increase in
the years after King Philip's War, conservative Puritans
reacted with exhortations for further repentance.

The
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struggle against the opponents of the errand did not end
with the defeat of the Massachusetts tribes.

Rather, the

legacies of the conflict induced an intellectual shift among
many colonists, as they became more sensitive to the various
forces working against them in the region.

An intellectual

battle persisted, and the campaign of attitudes was applied
to New England's native enemies as well as to its domestic
doctrinal challengers.
In fact, although the natives' physical assaults were
very real, in the long run the Indians made their deepest
marks on the New England psyche.
just military or cultural enemies;

They were always more than
the region's native

inhabitants represented everything alien to English
civilization and to Puritan spirituality.

The colonists'

prejudices appeared in the images they painted of their
counterparts.

William Hubbard disliked the way native

tribes supported each other against the English, "all
hanging together, like Serpent's Eggs," the serpent, of
course, being the symbol of the devil and the tempter of
Eve.

Likewise, Deacon Philip Walker poetically portrayed

Indians as "Incarnat divels sent from the infernall Lake,
[who] Like helish monsters make our harts to ake."7 Such
literary characterizations abounded in late
seventeenth-century New England, and by and large they
reflected the attitudes of the vast majority of colonists.
During King Philip's War the colonists projected all of the
ills affecting them on the natives, and many Englishmen
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adopted an immutable intellectual enmity against Indians in
general, including, to some extent, the Praying Indians.

As

long as any hostile bands "remain unconquered," lamented
Increase Mather, "we cannot enjoy such perfect peace as in
the years which are past."8 Massachusetts residents
naturally feared renewed hostilities, but more
significantly, the persistence of any unconverted native
groups in their midst prevented the colonists from enjoying
true peace of mind.
Of course, the threat or actual continuation of
belligerent activities contributed to this mental agitation.
Even with Metacom dead, the colonists still saw apparently
unfriendly natives lurking at their frontiers, and so
naturally their elevated sense of fear and animosity
continued unabated.

In the words of Thomas Hobbes, "as the '

nature of foul weather lies not in the shower or two of
rain, but in an inclination of many days together, so the
nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the
known disposition during all the time that there is no
assurance to the contrary."9 Even with Metacom gone and
his warriors scattered, New Englanders had no assurance
against further assaults from the natives, much less from
the demonic forces they supposedly represented.

Leach

mistakenly called the attack on Deerfield and Hatfield in
September 1677 "a final afterclap of King Philip's War" and
claimed that the colonists themselves saw it as "an isolated
episode" which did not significantly hamper the resettlement
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of the frontier.10 Although frontier inhabitants returned
to their outlying towns shortly thereafter, they did so in
most cases with caution, and the general atmosphere in the
colony reflected nowhere near the level of confidence
asserted by Leach.

As late as May 1679, for instance,

Edward Taylor in Westfield still referred to the Hatfield
incident in relating the anxiety felt by frontier
residents.11 Such lingering fears reflected more a
long-term "inclination" than "an isolated episode."
Understandably, New Englanders reacted to this tension
with increasingly belligerent rhetoric.

In his Magnalia

Christi Americana (1702), Cotton Mather argued that as the
natives continued their hostile behavior, "the most
scrupulous persons in the world must own, that it must be
the most unexceptionable piece of justice in the world for
to extinguish them."12 All over the colony during the
1680s, Massachusetts authorities, both local and provincial,
took measures to protect the inhabitants from proximate
natives, thus attesting to the long-term effects of King
Philip's War on New Englanders' perceptions of their own
security and the potential threats which still lurked in
their midst.

In 1681, the General Court reminded

Massachusetts citizens that selling guns, powder, or
ammunition to any Indian was illegal.

Reacting to the

difficulty of distinguishing friendly natives from enemies,
the court in early 1690 issued the order confining "all the
Indians . . .

in amity with us" to their assigned towns.
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Likewise, John Pynchon received authorization to "dispose"
all the native residents of Hampshire County in appropriate
places "with such limitations & directions as may be least
disquiet to the English."13 Actually, in the aftermath of
King Philip's War, the presence of any Indians near the
colonists proved disquieting.
So deep was the effect on New England attitudes that
some colonists entirely abandoned the cherished values of
civilized behavior which they had previously held up in
contrast to the natives' supposed barbarity.

During King

Philip's War, for instance, a Massachusetts writer decried
native women for their "delight in Cruelties" inflicted upon
captives and for abandoning "the two proper Virtues of
Womanhood, Pity and Modesty."

Over the next two decades,

with the continuation of anxiety over persistent Indian
threats and finally renewed warfare, animosity progressed to
such heights that colonists openly applauded acts of
violence and cruelty inflicted upon Indians.

The most

poignant example occurred in April 1697, when Hannah Dustin
of Haverhill, who had earlier lost a child in the
hostilities, murdered and mutilated ten of her captors while
they slept, including two women and six Indian children.
Rather than any sort of censure for her actions, Dustin
received a reward of £50 from the Assembly and a great deal
of public acclaim.14 The experience not only of King
Philip's War but more importantly of the persistent
uneasiness which followed, caused New Englanders to react in
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ways which seemed completely alien to the principles for
which they had fought the natives in the first place.

By

applauding Dustin's actions, the colonists were becoming
more like the image of the savage Indians they hoped to
destroy than they would ever admit.

At the very least,

approval of such behavior revealed a clear decline in
popular optimism about the errand into the wilderness.
In its attempt to eliminate the existence of any
hostile threat, the colonial government attempted to
manipulate relations between contesting native groups, a
practice not entirely without precedent in New England, of
course.

Even during the war, various English officials,

including Governor Andros, had attempted to control native
activities to their own advantage.

The New England colonies

hoped to gain an alliance with the powerful Mohawks by
encouraging them to attack the renegades from the
Massachusetts frontier, who were also the Mohawk's
longstanding enemies.

On October 5, 1677, John Pynchon,

acting on instructions from the Council, wrote to Captain
Sylvester Salisbury at Fort Albany advising him to employ
"Maqua" warriors to track down the Indians who had attacked
Deerfield and other Connecticut Valley towns the previous
month.

"Let them know it will be a great demonstration of

their fidelity and friendship to us," he told Salisbury,
"and it is a very likely opportunity for them to kill and
catch Indians whom they so much hunt after."
Some New Englanders were openly uneasy at the plan,
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questioning the legality and morality of employing "Heathen"
warriors, "but the General Court and the most considerate of
the Country," according to Hubbard, "apprehended it lawful
to make use of any Advantage Providence put into their
Hands, whereby to weaken or abate the Force and Power of
their Enemies."15 Any weapons or allies which hastened the
demise of the native menace and thus helped to solve the
instability threatening New England security were seen as
justifiable.
The Mohawk alliance did not achieve the desired
results.

From the start, Massachusetts officials accused

their native mercenaries of preying on English cattle and
friendly, converted Indians, especially around the town of
Natick.

Connecticut Valley residents were particularly

disturbed by the free movement afforded the Iroquois
warriors, the colonists "not being able to distinguish
between . . . ennemy Indians & Macquas."

Finally, in March

1679 the Commissioners of the United Colonies decided to
inform the Mohawks that "wee have no present need for them
to pursue any Indians in these parts or at the
Eastward."16 The colonists apparently believed that they
could ignite or extinguish hostilities between native groups
at a moment's notice or solely according to their own
desires;

they failed to realize that the Indians of the

region were anything more than instruments of God's
providence or tools for their use.
Throughout the 1680s, the colonies, primarily through
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John Pynchon, attempted to enforce peace between the Mohawks
and the native groups effectively under English control, as
well as to bar the fierce warriors from undertaking
campaigns against the eastern Indians still in enmity with
the colonies.

The authorities realized what a dangerous

weapon their allies could be.

By 1689, however, Pynchon was

again suggesting to the Council in Boston that the colony
encourage "the Maguas and Senecas . . .

to effect some

destruction on the Eastern Indians."17 In again
considering a dangerous policy which clearly had not worked
the previous decade, New Englanders seemed slow to learn
their lessons.

After King Philip's War, however, they were

prepared to use any means at their disposal to eliminate the
native threat which continued to occupy their minds and
estates.
In addition to the presence of known hostile tribes and
invited warriors, Massachusetts residents from time to time
also became further unsettled by the appearance of wandering
groups of unidentified Indians on the frontier.

For

example, in late 1691 approximately 150 native men, women,
and children on a hunting expedition from the Albany area
settled, without warning, about a mile from Deerfield.
Residents of that town as well as neighboring communities on
the Connecticut River frontier immediately agreed that
although the newcomers appeared peaceful, their mere
presence represented a potential threat.

The local militia

committees in the region stepped up defensive preparations
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to give the natives notice, in Pynchon's words, that "we are
in a warlike Posture."18
Most town officials apparently favored sending the band
back to Albany immediately, but the General Court issued a
proclamation through Pynchon granting the refugee natives
temporary, conditional permission to remain in the area for
the winter of 1692.

Although the major chastised them for

not seeking advance leave to set up camp within
Massachusetts's jurisdiction, he promised the natives that
the colonists would "for the present overlook their seeming
intruding upon us" and would let them stay until spring if
they behaved themselves, abstained from liquor, and abided
by certain restrictions on their movement.19 The natives
agreed to the requirements and left the area without
incident in May 1692.

The importance of the incident rested

in the colonists' initial response to a potentially new
threat, particularly exemplified by Pynchon's advice that
colonial forces maintain "a warlike Posture."

Even though

they let the strange band remain in 1692, the colonists
exhibited an acute sense of tension and mental agitation at
the appearance of the natives.

One effect of King Philip's

War and related challenges was that, psychologically,
Massachusetts residents never really lost their "warlike
Posture";

in their lingering uneasiness they seemed

mentally ready to fight at the appearance of any perceived
challenge, whether Indians, crown officials, or evil forces
within their communities.
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During the late 1680s and into the 1690s, alarm after
alarm sounded from the Massachusetts frontier, and English
reactions turned toward eliminating any natives whose
behavior could not be controlled.

In October 1691 Nathaniel

Saltonstall advised that a military force be dispatched to
pursue the Indians on the Maine frontier, "and so not to
give it over while an Indian can be heard of in the
Country."

Similarly, Capt. Samuel Partridge of Deerfield

suggested in 1696 that "the pretended friendly Indians" who,
"proving enemies, being worse than open enemies," should be
rounded up and transported into slavery or exiled on
isolated islands near the colony.

The General Court

apparently agreed, for the previous year it declared "all
Indians who shall be found within 5 miles of the Connecticut
River on the easterly side or within 20 miles on the
westerly side thereof, shall be deemed and accounted enemies
and treated as such."20 This mentality of regarding all
Indians as enemies until proven innocent— and in some cases
even after— persisted long after King Philip's War, as the
siege of New England continued.
By the last decade of the century, King William's War
added a new dimension to the threats facing the English
colonies, as the French in Canada became factors in the
hostilities on the Massachusetts frontier.

The new enemies

furnished the same sources of tension as did the Indians;
New Englanders feared French opposition not only because of
military attacks but also because of far-reaching
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ideological differences.

To orthodox Puritans, Catholic

Frenchmen represented as serious a threat as did heathen
Indians;

the union of the two in a campaign against New

England therefore presented a paramount danger.

Cotton

Mather, for one, took every opportunity to point out the
evils of Massachusetts's "Declared Enemies,
Pagan and Popish Neighbors."

. . . those

He characterized the alliance

as an unholy marriage between the "Half Indianized French,
and the Half Frenchified Indians."21
Mather was not alone in this antipathy toward French
Catholics.

John Gyles was taken captive in Maine in 1689

and delivered to a Jesuit priest.

When the Jesuit gave him

a biscuit to eat, the boy instead disposed of it "fearing he
had put something into it to make me love him."
certainly took his mother's words to heart.

He

"Oh my dear

child," she told him during their captivity, "if it were
God's will, I had rather follow you to your grave, or never
see you more in this world, than you should be sold to a
Jesuit;

for a Jesuit will ruin you, body and soul!"22

Englishmen attributed supernatural evil powers to Catholic
priests, just as they did to Indian shamans, and therefore
viewed both as spiritual enemies bent on subverting the
Protestant mission in America.
of fears appear outlandish;

In retrospect, these types

to seventeenth-century

Puritans, they represented sharp prongs in the devil's
attack on New England.
The colonists had plenty of evidence to support their
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fear of French military malice.

In the summer of 1688 a

band of "North Indians" terrorized the Connecticut Valley,
killing five friendly natives near Springfield and six
settlers at Northfield.

Later testimony by other Indians in

the region revealed that the hostile group came "by ordre of
the Governor of Canida" with instructions to kill Englishmen
and Christianized Indians and to "bring noe prisoners, but
their Scalps."23 Massachusetts residents also found reason
to tie another of their archenemies into the plot;
following his overthrow in 1689, accusers levelled charges
at Governor Andros that he had plotted with both Indians and
Canadians to turn the New England colonies over to
24
France.
Not surprisingly, New Englanders cited Canada, along
with "Frenchified pagans" dispatched from there, as a major
source of their "Miseries."

"There was the main strength of

the French;

there the Indians were mostly supplied with

ammunition;

thence issued parties of men, who, uniting with

the salvages, barbarously murdered many innocent New
Englanders,

..."

wrote Cotton Mather.

Therefore, the

general conclusion among colonists concerned with the safety
of the colony was that "'Canada must be reduced.1" Pynchon
reflected the same sentiment when he warned, "we shal never
be quiet as long as we have those II Neighbors the French at
Canida & at the Eastward."25 Again, the quiet which the
colonists desired but found so elusive during the postwar
years was as much a respite from the mental agitation of the
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period as it was a relief from military attack.

Peace meant

nothing without peace of mind.
New England's enemies did not manifest themselves only
in the alien forms of Indian warriors or French soldiers.
In addition to these foes, Cotton Mather cited "the fatal
Enemies of this people, that shall go to Debauch and infect
the Rising Generation among us, and corrupt them with evil
manners;

and learn them to Drink and Drab, and Game, and

profane the Sabbath, and Sin against the Hope of their
Fathers."26 After King Philip's War, pious Puritans became
increasingly sensitive to signs of degeneracy with their
communities and interpreted the apparent growth of
sinfulness as an indication of the devil's attack on the
very heart of the New England mission.
Reflections of worldliness in personal behavior were a
major concern of Massachusetts authorities after 1675.
Warnings against excesses in apparel— the most widespread
and commonplace "evil" present in the colony— were not new
after the war;

concern over such symbols of personal pride

existed from the earliest days of the colony's history.
Judging by the attention spent on the problem during the
postwar years, however, worldliness— or at least sensitivity
to it— reached epidemic proportions.
In 1675 the General Court created the position of
tithingman to maintain a watch in Massachusetts communities
against such abuses as extravagant dress, abuse of liquor,
gambling, idleness, and sabbath-breaking.

The court later
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elaborated on the order to include inspections over "the
manners of all disorderly persons," residents suspected of
"debauchery, irreligion, prophaness, & atheisme," parents
neglecting their duties of proper "family government," and
any "idlenes, profligat, uncivill, or rude practices of any
sort."

The Hampshire County Court took these instructions

to heart, directing the tithingmen in the towns under its
jurisdiction "faithfully to act in their Inspecting of their
Neighbors, so as that Sin & Disorder may be prevented &
27
suppressed."
Communal watchfulness was an established
tradition in Massachusetts, of course, justified by the
belief that the good of the whole took priority over the
rights of the individual.

The creation of tithingmen added

one more weapon to the effort by civil authorities to
enforce Puritan morals on all Massachusetts residents.
Throughout the 1670s, both before and after King
Philip's War, county court dockets across the colony were
burdened with numerous cases of excessive worldliness.

The

Hampshire court proclaimed such behavior as "not Becomeing a
Wilderness State" and alien to "the Proffession of
Christianity & Religion."

Whether or not the problem of

"wearing silk Extravegently Contrary to Law" and generally
dressing "in a fflanteing [flaunting] manner" increased
significantly as a result of the war, local authorities took
a sterner stance against the continuing abuses, "Considering
of how unseemly a nature such things are in this Day of
Calamity, Wasting & Desolation."

Men and women alike were
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charged with taking excessive pride in their personal
appearance, but other instances indicating an apparent
decline in public morality also flooded the court books.
Hampshire County magistrates dealt with more cases involving
"Heineous swearing,

. . . lacivious & Wanton Carriages" in

public, fornication, and illegitimacy.28 None of these
crimes were new during the 1670s, but the stern reaction to
them by public officials reflected the continuing anxiety
over the future of Massachusetts.
In March 1685, in response to the number of "evills as
are found amongst us," the Massachusetts General Court
required "selectmen, grand jury men, constables, &
tithingmen of all townes within this jurisdiction . . .

to

doe their utmost to be faithfull in the discharge of their
respective duties as to Saboath breaking, typling, &
drincking, & towne dwellers mispending their time in publick
houses of entertainment."29 The sense of urgency expressed
by the legislators reflected the fervent messages delivered
from pulpits throughout the colony.

Both Increase and

Cotton Mather spoke out against breaches of the Seventh
Commandment, loosely defined as "Light Behaviour"
occasioning "Provacations to Uncleanness," which were
allegedly rampant among the colonists.

The elder Mather

warned his followers to abandon their "Revelling" and
"Rioting" in favor of a more appropriate "Gravity and
Sobriety."

Such behavior, he stated, "at a Time when God

calls to mourn, is most certainly a provocation."

In fact,
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he declared many of the "profane practices" to be "utterly
unlawful," and not to "be tollerated in such a place as
New-England, without great Sin."30
Countless ministers responded to the signs of
degeneracy with exhortations to their flocks.

Samuel Nowell

predicted shortly after Metacom’s death that "we shall not
live quiet long, or at least we have no Reason to promise
ourselves that we shall," because the "sins of New-England
increase, iniquity doth abound, and the Love of many doth
wax cold."

He preached that the repentance necessary to

completely defeat the Indians had not been forthcoming and
that, in fact, it seemed to be declining.

Nowell set the

scenario which he found all too common in the colony,
reflecting the evils of progress and worldly complacency.
Regrettably, "every Farmers Son, when he goes to
Market-Town, must have money in his purse;

and when he

meets with his Companions," the cleric warned, "they goe to
the Tavern or Ale-house, and seldome away before Drunk, or
well-tipled."

"This makes Youth effeminate and wanton,"

maintained Nowell, and "doth make men not so bold;
Righteous are bold as a Lion."

The

With sin undermining the

future generations of Massachusetts and thus jeopardizing
the future of the errand, he "encourage[d] Rulers,
Governours and Parents to train & bring up their Children in
such manner that they may endure Hardness."31 Discipline
and discipline alone represented the path to true repentance
and ultimately to a cleansing of New England's collective
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conscience.
Cotton Mather was also outspoken on the issue, not only
of the continuing "Spiritual Plagues" which afflicted the
colony but the consequences thereof.
it is truly a most Bewitching thing;"

"The World, The World,
he warned, "and the

Love of it, will be a Root of all Evil to us. . . . "

No New

Englander had any excuse for missing the gravity of his
admonition, he maintained, but unfortunatley many colonists
had not learned any spiritual lessons from the experiences
of King Philips's War.

Mather found that the passage of

time only made many men and women in the colony all too "apt
to forget the fears and sorrows which have been upon us."
Neglecting reformation in the years after the conflict
represented "the ready way to great Calamity.1,32 Such
pointed exhortations reflected a feeling that Massachusetts'
worst enemies were not the Indians or the French but rather
the cold hearts of the colonists themselves.

Human enemies,

even if they acted as agents of the devil, could be defeated
militarily;

purging New Englanders' own souls of Satan's

influence represented to fire-and-brimstone ministers like
Mather a much more serious and difficult struggle.
Increase Mather shared his son's antipathy toward "The
World," and he pinpointed the colonists' long-standing
appetite for real estate as a sign of the growth of
worldliness in New England.

The record of expansion and

community development from the earliest days of the colony
attested to the desire for the acquisition of land.

By
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1676, however, Increase Mather considered that this singular
attraction had reached unhealthy levels.

"Land!

land!"

he

harangued, "hath been the Idol of many in New England."33
He and other clergymen feared that the victory over the
natives might prove counterproductive in a way;

the

potential removal of the Indians as an effective barrier on
the frontier could have encouraged colonists to disperse
from central locations of provincial or even local
authority.

Of course, as events transpired, unfriendly

Indians did not disappear from the frontiers of
Massachusetts, nor did hordes of colonists rush headlong to
scattered farmsteads out of the reach of civil or religious
authorities.

Still, concerned clergymen saw a need to stem

the spread of worldly behavior, of which the attraction to
real estate was a blatant example.
Other clerics employed gentler means to influence their
followers.

Versifying minister Benjamin Tompson harkened

back to better days in New England, "When honest sisters met
to pray not prate/About their own and not their neighbor's
state."

Reacting to the problem of extravagant dress, he

reminded the colonists that "Deep-skirted doublets,
puritanic capes/Which now would render men like upright
apes/Was cornelier wear our wiser fathers thought/Than the
cast fashions from all Europe brought."

34

Tompson appealed

to a sense of nostalgia and a longing for quieter, more
secure times, when New Englanders behaved in a more uniform
manner and had more confidence in their errand into the
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wilderness.
Even lay persons publicly urged their fellow colonists
to learn from their recent experiences and to seek
repentance.

Mary Rowlandson warned that worldly goods and

amusements were only "a bait the devil lays to make men lose
their precious time."

She took the opportunity of her

period of enforced exile among the natives for reflection
and self-evaluation.

She found that "my conscience did not

accuse me of unrighteousness toward one or other:

yet I saw

how in my walk with God I had been a careless creature."
Rowlandson's sins were obviously sins of omission and
unwitting neglect, a point driven home particularly when
during the first Sunday of her captivity she "remembered how
careless I had been of God's holy time, how many Sabbaths I
had lost or misspent, and how evilly I had walked in God's
s i g h t . H e r complacent adherence to the requirements of
the Puritan religion became most apparent to her when the
Indians tore her away from the practice completely;

she

therefore wrote her narrative as a warning to other
colonists who were tearing themselves away from a spiritual
connection with the church by their inward apathy and
outward behavior.
Whether the exhortations took the form of fiery
sermons, nostalgic verse, or earnest narratives, the message
was the same.

New England was still under attack;

the

forces of evil already represented by Indians, French
militia, and crown officials now infiltrated Massachusetts
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communities, seeking as their ultimate goal, as always, the
destruction of the New England mission.

The war itself

represented both a warning and a punishment from God,
revealing His displeasure with New England's sins.

Rather

than defeating their enemies and repenting in order to avoid
retribution, the colonists faced new enemies in human form
while sin— the root of the problem— seemingly proliferated
in the communities of the Massachusetts Bay colony after the
war.

King Philip's War provided the initial shock;

the

continuing attacks and the manifestations of worldliness
around theii led the orthodox clergy and other pious
colonists to question just what the future held for
them.36 In their reflections on New England's experiences
and in their calls for reform, clergy as well as laymen
expresed decline in morale, approaching in some instances
despair.
The jeremiad was a dominant literary genre of
seventeenth-century New England.

By definition, jeremiads

were sermons presented on official occasions, such as
election days or fast days.

The clergy who delivered these

homilies concentrated on contemporary evils and
transgressions which prevented the colonists from fulfilling
their mission.

Although the genre was not new in 1675 nor

unique to colonial New England, King Philip's War and the
uneasy decades which followed presented clergymen with ample
ammunition for their sermons.

The jeremiads traditionally

played on a theme of crisis to spur the colonists toward
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reformation and rededication to the holy cause.37 The
experiences of the last quarter of the seventeenth century
inspired ample concern over New England's impending doom and
attention to the need for regeneration.
Increase Mather blamed the inconstancy of younger
colonists for the troubles, claiming that God had no reason
to punish New England with "so dreadfull a judgment, untill
the Body of the first Generation was removed, and another
Generation risen up which hath not so pursued, as ought to
have been, the blessed design of their Fathers, in following
the Lord into this Wilderness, whilst it was a land not
sown."38 Whoever was at fault, "the humbling, trying [and]
distressing providences" were a collective test, stated John
Higginson, to determine "whether, according to our
profession and [God's] expectation, we would keep his
commandments, or not."

More and more the answer seemed to

be "no" during the period, leading the Reverend Solomon
Stoddard later to deliver a somber prophecy.

In their

sinfulness, "men are wont to make many pretences and
excuses, and by them they mitigate the terror of their
consciences," he preached,
displeasure of God:

"but this does not prevent the

and if God be angry with his people, it

will before it be long, break out upon them."

39

Stoddard's

1703 admonition succinctly summarized the messages of the
jeremiads during the uneasy decades of the late seventeenth
century.

Mather delivered a blast in 1690, warning his

fellow colonists that if they persisted in their sinfulness
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and "if a Reformation be not Endeavoured, the Righteous God
will Punish us yet seven Times for our Iniquities."40 As
the epidemic of iniquity spread, chances of its cure seemed
to be slipping away.

The jeremiads continued, but the

preachers wondered if anyone was listening.
Since the major theme among pious Puritans during the
last quarter of the seventeenth century revolved around the
unceasing battle between the forces of good and evil in New
England, the appearance of witchcraft represented a focal
cause for alarm.

Accusations and trials of supposed witches

predated King Philip's War, but the intellectual intolerance
which accompanied the tense postwar period increased
suspicion.

New Englanders, feeling besieged by their

enemies and wary of any deviant behavior in their midst,
were more than ready to find and punish Satan's bedfellows,
even within settled communities.

By doing so, fearful

colonists could take heart in at least continuing the
battle, if not entirely eradicating the forces of the devil
which threatened them.41 The witchcraft proceedings became
just another defensive action in the ongoing battle against
Indians, French Canadians, royal officials, and backsliding
colonists;

English witches represented an additional branch

of the same familiar enemy.
In his Magnalia, Cotton Mather surmised that due to New
England's falling from its position as "a country devoted
unto the worship and service of the Lord JESUS CHRIST above
the rest of the world," God unleashed upon the degenerate
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colonists a series of unparalleled punishments.

Trying to

make sense out of the sharp judgments, he reasoned that when
God's people refused to repent in the past, He had
"suffer[ed] Devils sometimes" to visit the sinners with
perplexing and grave punishments.

Earlier, the Lord had

"permitt[ed] Satan and his Instruments [the Indians] to
molest His children . . .

in their Estates;"

as New

England's sins persisted, He allowed the devil to assault
"their Persons and their Posterity too."

"Devils and

Witches" infiltrated "not only the wigwams of Indians, where
the pagan powaws often raise their masters, in the shapes of
bears and snakes and fires," he warned, "but also in the
homes of white English men and women."

42

The clergy cited

biblical precedents of God employing the forces of Satan to
achieve His ends.

John Hale reminded his readers that when

the Egyptians angered God with their worldly sins, in many
ways the same worldly sins prevalent in New England, He
expressed His displeasure "by sending Evil Angels among
them."43 The only means of salvation open to the
colonists, therefore, was to expel existing "Evil Angels"
from their presence and to eliminate the sins which invited
them.
Understandably, New Englanders associated witchcraft
with Indians, their most common, most persistent, and
perhaps most frightening opponent.

The colonists certainly

feared their native enemies, and Europeans traditionally
characterized Indians as devil worshippers anyway.

Increase
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Mather reminded the colonists, as if it were necessary to do
so, that "it is known from their own Confessions that
amongst the Indians . . . oftentimes at their Dances the
Devil appears in bodily shape."

44

No doubt existed that

Satan and the natives worked hand-in-hand in plotting the
destruction of the New England mission.
not new in 1676;

This perception was

in 1652 Thomas Mayhew, Jr.

wrote to John

Eliot, stating, "The Devil also with his Angels had his
Kingdom among them."45 The popular association between
Indians and witches, however, was enhanced in the years
following King Philip's War.
Many deponents in witchcraft proceedings who claimed to
have experienced contact with the devil noted the
connection.

Mercy Short, herself a former captive whose

whole family perished in an Indian attack, in 1692 described
a specter which she claimed appeared to her as "a Short and
a Black Man; . . .

he was not of a Negro," she said, "but of

a Tawney, or an Indian colour."

Cotton Mather found that

this characteristic "tawny colour," exhibiting an
unmistakable resemblance to the natives, recurred frequently
in depositions.46
The association between witchcraft and the current
enemies afflicting New England did not stop with the
Indians.

"One who was Executed at Salem for Witchcraft had

confessed That at their Cheef Witch-meetings, there had been
present some French Canadians," according to Mather, along
with "some Indian Sagamores, to concert the methods of
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ruining New England."47 Such testimony revealed how deeply
the experiences of the recent decades had affected the
psyche of the colonists.

King Philip's War kindled popular

suspicion of the natives on a vast and unprecedented scale,
and the tensions which followed confirmed the perception, in
Englishmen's minds, that the Indians were in league with the
devil.

Colonists came to believe and fear that their

military enemies were indeed pawns of the devil in plotting
the "ruining" of New England, and conceiving that Indians
and Canadians could transmit evil to supposedly pious
Englishmen became a part of the colonial mentality at the
time.
Few Massachusetts residents seemed to question that the
accumulated troubles heaped on the colony were the designs
of the devil to destroy the errand into the wilderness or
that the natives played an integral role in the campaign.
When in August 1676 a violent storm struck the colony,
"doing much Hurt to very many" and spoiling much property,
many colonists undoubtedly believed a boast shortly
thereafter by some Indians "that they had caused it by their
Pawwaw,

(i.e.

worshipping the Devil)."

As a further boast,

the natives predicted "that as many Englishmen shall die, as
the Trees have by this Wind been blown down in the
Woods."48
In another incident, this time in 1692, colonists
around Gloucester were plagued by strange and elusive
figures who resembled Indians and Frenchmen lurking about
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the area, and by strange occurrences such as the
inexplicable misfiring of their guns.

Rev. John Emerson

wrote that he trusted that "all Rational Persons" would
realize "that Glocester was not Alarumed . . .

by real

French and Indians, but that the Devil and his Agents were
the cause of all the Molestation, which at this Time befel
the Town."

With every confidence that Satan had it within

his power and his design to set ambushes for New England
"with Daemons, in the Shape of Armed Indians and Frenchmen,"
even "the most Considerate Gentlemen in that
Neighbourhood . . . Believe[d] this whole matter to have
been a Prodigious piece of the Strange Descent from the
Invisible World, then made upon other parts of the Country"
as well.49 The Indians received a double indictment in the
whole affair.

John Hale concluded that "the Devil could not

assume the shape of an innocent person in doing mischief
unto mankind."50 Therefore, the natives were not only
guilty of hostile activities, but by their very nature
invited the forces of evil to assist them.
The clergy of the colony undertook a program to stem
the spread of sin during the late seventeenth century.

On

May 28, 1679 some of the elders suggested a synod, "for the
revisall of the platforme of discipline agreed upon by the
schismes, haeresies, prophaness, & the establishment of the
churches in one faith & order of the gospell."

The avowed

purpose of the conclave was "to enquire into the causes of
Gods displeasure against New England and scripture
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expedients for Reformation."51 The elders met the
following September, and while they enumerated a lengthy
list of specific affronts, the most serious sin affecting
New England at the time appeared to be an overall decline in
godliness and religious zeal.

This flaw was a coverall

which naturally opened the way for particular wrongs such as
drinking, swearing, and excessive dress.52 Identifying the
colonists' sins, of course, was the easy part;

finding

effective "expedients for Reformation" was the more pressing
and difficult task.
The decline in godliness appeared most clearly in an
apparently growing failure "to sanctifie the Sabbath day,"
especially among the youth.

In Springfield, as in other

communities across the colony, the selectmen heard
complaints of "great disorder in our assembly by many young
persons stealing out of the meeting house before the
blessing be pronounced."

Cotton Mather warned "that more

care should be taken respecting the Rising Generation, then
formerly hath been, that they might be brought under the
discipline of Christ."

53

Clearly, he looked to the future

of the mission with a sense of trepidation as long as the
"Rising Generation" was allowed to become complacent or even
scornful of religious discipline.

This potentially

dangerous decline in spiritual zeal represented a major part
of what the General Court cited as "a wofull breach of the
fifth commandment," composed of a widespread "contempt of
authority, civil, ecclesiasticall, and domesticall."

The
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court declared "that [particular] sin is highly provoking to
the Lord" and ordered "all persons under this government to
reforme so great an evil" before its progress became
irreversible.54 A decline in self discipline and in proper
respect for the symbols of authority at all levels meant
inevitable social disorder.
Already in the years immediately after King Philip's
War, when they were more sensitive than ever to such abuses,
Massachusetts leaders saw disturbing manifestations of
public disrespect.

The Hampshire County Court dealt with

many cases of "high Contempt of authority."

The justices

called Plaxy Holton to answer for "her ungodlie speeches
agst the Reverend Mr. Solomon Stoddard."

In September 1676,

John Lee of Westfield was presented for "willfully
resist[ing] the Constable" with "many Reviling & Curssing
speaches & Language;"

likewise, Samuel Smith of Northampton

faced charges for his "most Heineous, wecked, Revileing
speeches" against town

authorities. The most serious case

involved "an unlawfull

and Rioteous Assembly" at Hadley in

February 1676, during which several persons "Resisted the
Constable . . .

in the Execution of his office," thereby

"Stirring up and anemateing Sedition, Breakeing the Peace,
Contemning and affronteing Authority.

..."

The offenders

were whipped or fined and forced to post bond for their
future good behavior.

The court judged such disorder "not

becomeing of the gospell Especially
Affliction & Callamity

at such a time of sore

by Reason of the warr with the
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Indians."

Even more disturbing, the presiding justices
55
noted "how much such Evils grow amongst us."
They
believed that the problem was getting worse during the
postwar period.
The problem rested, however, not only in degenerate
colonists who slighted authories but also in civil officials
and clergymen who failed to demand or earn their followers'
respect.

The younger Mather warned against ministers who

neglected to encourage or enforce religious piety and
conformity, teachers who did not insist on proper
discipline, and heads of households who ignored their duty
to educate their charges in proper respect for
ecclesiastical and civil authority.

He entreated ministers

to take the lead in the crusade for reform and "to witness
against the more Spiritual Sins," which he collectively
described as "the Roots of Bitterness in the midst of
us."56
Complacency and lack of spiritual vigilance led to
worldly behavior, which stood as the outward sign of New
England's growing degeneracy.

Increase Mather cited sins

resulting from religious indiscipline as things "pleasing to
the Devil, but highly provoking to the Holy God."

He noted

that the spread of such behavior "hinder[ed] Religious
Exercises" and led the revellers to put "impudent
contempt . . . upon the Gospel."

"The Devil thereby

catcheth away the good seed of the Word," he warned, "and
the former Religious Exercise is rendered ineffectual."57
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The prevalence of excesses of the flesh, therefore,
represented both signs of the declining spiritual zeal and
causes of further degeneracy to late seventeenth-century
Puritan clergymen.
During King Philip's War, colonial authorities
prescribed special days of public humiliation, as well as
days of thanksgiving, when the situation merited them, to
bring about the desired reformation.

Even after the war and

Metacom's defeat, officials continued to order fast days to
exorcise evil.

On such occasions, the General Court

proclaimed "all servile labour prohibited on that day, and
the Churches ministers and people enjoined to keep it
solemnly and seriously."

The purpose of these days of

humiliation was to encourage colonists to "humble themselves
before the Lord and seek his face," in hopes that "he will
still please to dwell in the midst of, and not forsake us."
Officials of the United Colonies often coordinated these
holy days in an effort to present an image of unity and
universality in the reformation effort.

Of special concern

was that the ritual and the graces gained might result in
"the powring out of his Spirit upon the rising generation,"
and thereby encourage a renewal of spiritual vigor among the
future heirs of New England leadership.58
The mere ritual, however, was only an outward sign and
a beginning of the true process of reformation.
without Reforming," Cotton Mather warned,

"Praying

"will not do."

Figuratively, the colonists had to "Ly mourning and weeping
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and wailing in Sackcloth and Ashes, before the Lord," in
order to humble themselves sufficiently to lay their worldly
pride aside and open their hearts to the proper methods of
correction.59 At the base of the process, Mather advised
"a due execution of wholsome Laws which are founded upon the
Word of God" and a "Solemn Renewal of [the] Covenant with
God in Jesus Christ."

Puritan congregational identity was

embodied in individual church covenants, whereby members
both distinguished themselves as a select group and pledged
their dedication to the spiritual mission.

Therefore,

although individuals had to make restitution in their own
hearts, the renewal had to take place on a communal level,
with whole communities and congregations reaffirming their
covenants with the Lord.
There was no need to point fingers at the towns which
had suffered most from New England's accumulated enemies.
No one, in the Puritan view, was innocent and "none .
so good but we may be better, we may (and should) grow in
Grace and make progress in the work of Mortification."60
Deacon Philip Walker reminded his readers that everyone was
guilty of sin and advised that to root out the ungodliness
the colonists should "serch owr selves Each man his Secrit
hart, And Search the temple in Each privat partt."61
Reformation had to begin inside each colonist and spread to
encompass the whole in order to bring about a complete cure
of the evils threatening New England during the last quarter
of the seventeenth century.
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The general message of the clergy in their jeremiads
was that New England was declining in spiritual worth and
that self-discipline was the necessary formula for turning
the tide.

In reaction to the belief that colonists were

increasingly giving in to temptation, Increase Mather
demanded that "They ought to swim against the stream, and to
keep themselves pure from the sins of the Times."

He

further commanded the churches of the colony to oversee
individual repentance and "to exercise the Discipline of
Christ towards such of their Members as shall offend in this
matter."62 Mather and others called their brethren to be
steadfast in the effort.
Samuel Nowell admonished the colonists to brace
themselves and remain ever-ready to defend themselves
against their attackers, both human and supernatural.
on your spiritual Armour," he advised;
Breast-plate of Righteousness."

"Put

"look to that

Nowell, an outspoken

proponent of military discipline and preparedness, quite
clearly drew the link between the struggles faced by the
colonists in the wilderness of the frontier and that within
their own souls.

He likened the physical rigor necessary

for a soldier in the ranks to the spiritual vigor required
of New England’s Puritans.

He noted an "agreement between

the Spiritual and temporal Warfare" and claimed that every
attribute "belonging to a Souldier, is made use of to
resemble some Grace or Duty of a Christian."

Nowell

complained of "a strange piece of dotage befallen this
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crazy-headed age, that men should not use the sword."63 Of
course the colonists had to fight, he maintained, both
physically and spiritually, to defeat their challengers.
Anything less than a total commitment to the struggle
represented to the orthodox clergy a sign of resignation and
apathy in the face of the mission's impending doom.
In advocating total commitment against New England's
enemies, Massachusetts leaders emphasized the necessity of
solidarity, which had to which extend from the family to the
province.

Those who turned their backs on their duty to

foster unity and conformity were, according to Cotton
Mather, no better than heathens.

"How many that although

they are Christians in name," he asked, "are no better than
Heathens in heart, and in Conversation?"

He claimed that

"whole Plantations . . . have lived from year to year,
without any publick Invocation of the Name of God, and
without his Word.

And in most places," Mather lamented,

"Instituted Worship (whereby Christians are distinguished
from Heathens) hath been too much neglected."

Hubbard

observed in "many of these scattering Plantations in our
Borders, that many were contented to live without, yea,
desirous to shake off all Yoake of Government, both sacred
and civil, and so transforming themselves as much as well
they could into the Manners of the Indians they lived
amongst."64
These conditions represented certain paths to doom,
according to the clergy, and the danger could only be
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alleviated through a return to strict discipline, within
both families and congregations.

New England's natural

enemies, the Indians, were pictured as living without
restraint, in the wilderness, without the towns and other
communal organizations which colonial authorities portrayed
as the outward signs of civilization and Christian order.
Any trend towards breaking the ties of these valuable
agencies signalled to pious colonists a reversal of what the
founders of the mission came to America to accomplish.

"The

men of a Private Spirit are loosers," Mather stated, and
insisted that "Private Spirit tenders men Obnoxious to the
terrible Displeasure of an Holy and an Angry God."

He cited

a scriptural example in which disunity appeared among "some
of the Provinces of Israel."

"The man of God" warned the

Israelites, "Behold, yee have Sinned against the Lord;

and

be sure your Sin will find you out."65
Numerous writers pointed to the example of one
Mr. Wakely who was killed in 1675 at Casco Bay, in Maine.
Mather claimed that Wakely "would sometimes say with tears,
that he believed God was angry with him, because although he
came into New-England for the Gospels sake, yet he had left
another place in this Country, where there was a Church of
Christ, which he once was in Communion with, and had lived
many years in a Plantation where was no Church, nor
Instituted Worship."

Nathaniel Saltonstall cited another

"Man of a singular and sordid Humour;

of Great Knowledge in

the Scripture, but of no particular professed Sect or
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Perswasion," who perished at Providence in March 1676.

This

man reportedly denied the necessity of communal cooperation,
instead maintaining "a strange Confidence, or rather
Conceit, that whilst he held his Bible in his Hand, he
looked upon himself as secure from all kinde of Violence."
The natives evidently proved him wrong;

they "ripped him

open," according to Saltonstall, "and put his Bible in his
Belly."66 These extreme examples were obviously employed
by Massachusetts authorities as lessons against solitary
existence and removal from the webs of community and
congregation.

Isolation could only bring trouble.

Saltonstall's message was particularly poignant.

Even

supreme faith proved worthless in the absence of a communal
existence.

New Englanders had to band together and nurture

a firm commitment to fight their enemies as one body if they
were to have any hopes of winning the ultimate victory.
An important component of the necessary solidarity was
the removal of dissenters, such as Anglicans, Baptists, and
Quakers, from Massachusetts communities.

The controversy

over the elevation of the Anglican church in Boston under
Andros reflected the Puritan opposition to the English
institution.

Even more troublesome were Quakers, since the

1650s a perennial thorn in the side of pious New Englanders.
Mather considered the presence of Quakers a punishment from
God, "smiting them with Spiritual Plagues for their
Unfruitfulness and Unthankfulness."

Still, he thanked the

Lord that the number of Friends in the region was no
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greater, "for if they should multiply, not only would
Christianity be utterly Extinguished, but Humanity it self
Exterminated.1,67 The elimination of dissenters from the
colony, therefore, was a task of unquestionable importance
to the orthodox clergy in the effort to present a unified
front against New England's enemies.
Dissenters came in different forms, however, and not
all challengers of the orthodox conformity appeared so
blatantly evil as did the members of strange sects.

Even

within Massachusetts congregations, challenges to church
unity became serious matters of discussion during the last
quarter of the seventeenth century, and the most serious and
long-lasting controversy occurred in the Connecticut Valley.
Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton caused a stir among the
orthodox hierarchy during the 1670s when he began openly
relaxing the traditional requirements for full church
membership.
In July 1677, he listed 222 persons as church members,
of whom at least 40 probably could not fulfill the
requirements of the Half-Way Covenant.

After 1677, the

Northampton minister stopped making distinctions between
"half-way" members and those admitted to full communion.

In

his "five Harvests" (1679, 1683, 1696, 1712, and 1718),
Stoddard shocked many fellow clergymen by espousing the
belief that individual conversion experiences were not a
necessary prerequisite for acceptance to full communion.68
The frontier minister did not come up with his theory
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suddenly or without serious thought;

he reportedly even

publicized his developing views to members of his
congregation, causing some controversy within the
Northampton body.

In any case, Stoddard felt by the end of

the decade that the matter deserved discussion at the
Reforming Synod of 1679, where his comparatively liberal
beliefs naturally met with stiff opposition.69
The controversy revolved around Stoddard's insistence
that communion should be opened to "All Such as do make a
Solemn Profession of Faith, & Repentance, & are of Godly
Conversation, having Knowledge to Examine themselves, &
discern the Lords Body."

Persons of faith and moral

behavior deserved full membership, he stated, "without any
examination concerning a work of grace upon their souls."
The Northampton minister claimed that the church elders
imposed an artificial and erroneous dichotomy by making
communion only a sign of regeneration rather than a means to
that end.

"The Lords Supper is appointed by Jesus Christ,"

said Stoddard, "for the begetting of Grace as Well as for
the Strengthening of Grace."70 He felt that excluding
pious Christians from full church membership represented a
frustration and an impediment to the spread of God's word
across the frontier.
More conservative clergymen like Edward Taylor,
Increase Mather, and Cotton Mather could not bring
themselves to support Stoddard's innovations.

Each of these

eminent ministers argued that especially in a time of
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confusion and spiritual decline, the churches had to
maintain strict standards and thus guard against
complacency.

Stoddard and his opponents both sought the

same ends— the rejuvenation of religious vigor in New
England— but they obviously differed on the best means.

In

a 1677 election sermon, Increase Mather warned against
teachers in the region "that have espoused loose, large
Principles here, designing to bring all persons to the Lords
Supper, who have an Historical Faith, and are not scandalous
in life, although they never had Experience of a work of
71

Regeneration on their Souls."

Taylor, the minister of the Westfield congregation,
addressed Stoddard both publicly and privately on the
matter.

In 1688 he wrote to Northampton that he felt

justified in "medling," "considering as well our
familiarity, as proximity."

He chastised Stoddard for

taking it upon himself to institute such a radical extension
of the already controversial Half-Way Covenant.
his stand, Taylor cited the Bible:
that hath an Eare to heare hear.

To support

"Christ saith, let him
But he saith not, let him

that hath a mouth, to eatt, etc., eat & drink here."

Taylor

denied Stoddard's assertion that communion was a valid means
to regeneracy, claiming that the "Word" but not "the Lords
Supper" was "ordained for the Conversion of Sinners."

He

warned Stoddard that relaxing the requirements represented
"the ready way to trample underfoot all Church Discipline, &
to fill the Churches with all sorts of Sinners & to destroy
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the Purity of Churches, & so lock Church Holiness out of
Doores."72 Aside from the theological arguments, Taylor
pointed out that the innovation threatened the unity of the
colony's churches in the critical period.

He knew that the

controversy would not remain confined to the Northampton
congregation but would affect churches throughout the
colony, especially on the frontier.
Sensing that frontier congregations occupied a special
place in the errand into the wilderness, Taylor worried that
as a result of Stoddard's actions "a reflection unavoidably
is Cast upon our Churches."

He feared the controversy would

cause discord in neighboring congregations and encourage
"malevolent persons" to take advantage of the unsettled
situation.

Just as the frontier had to hold firm against

Indian attacks, frontier congregations had to maintain a
united front against spiritual decay.

Relaxing standards

for church membership would pollute the existing
congregations, he argued, rather than renew and propagate
fervor, as Stoddard hoped.

"And how grievous this may

prove," despaired Taylor, "who knows?"

Still, he was

confident, as of the turn of the century anyway, that public
opinion ran "100 or 1000 against One" in opposition to the
reform.73
Taylor's warning that the matter would tear at the
unity of Stoddard's congregation and adversely affect other
communities in the long run seemed to be accurate during the
late seventeenth century.

As for the immediate effects in
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Northampton, however, dissension existed among the
churchmembers even before the progressive minister's
arrival.

The question of restrictive versus expanded

standards for full membership surfaced during the 1660s, and
as the discussion continued, Northampton became a center of
reform against traditional clerical authority, in favor of
lay initiative.

Residents of the town were no strangers to

controversy when Stoddard began to announce his beliefs
during the 1670s, though it took nearly two decades for the
church to officially adopt his reforms.

By the 1690s, with

the maturation of a new generation, the Northampton
congregation finally resolved the question by voting to
accept Stoddard's definition of church membership.74
Stoddard's brand of presbyterianism— a term applied to those
moderate views which advocated the loosened
standards— definitely caught on more in the frontier region
than it did in the more established eastern areas of the
colony.

Congregations up and down the Connecticut Valley

opted for "Mr. Stoddard's Way" during the period, the
notable exception being Westfield, where the church under
Taylor's leadership maintained the traditional requirements
well into the eighteenth century.75
Much has been made of the fact that the liberalized
views first appeared and took root on the frontier;
in some cases, too much has been made of it.

perhaps

Still, a

parallel must be drawn between the social and demographic
nature of frontier communities and the desire for more lay
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control over church matters, including membership decisions.
Life on the Connecticut River, particularly during the
unsettled period of the late seventeenth century, required
an assertiveness on the part of the residents in defending
themselves and ordering their community affairs.

This

outlook naturally would have carried over into
congregational matters as well.

In addition, the growing

sense of worldliness, combined with the evident decline in
spiritual vigor among members of the second generation,
understandably produced an attitudinal change concerning
criteria for church participation.

Whether this

transformation represented degeneracy or merely evolution,
conditions in such frontier areas as the Connecticut Valley
fostered demand for reform during the postwar decades.
In this and other ways, Massachusetts colonists were
affected by the experience of King Philip's War and its
legacies, as settlement continued to spread out onto the
frontier.

While orthodox ministers continued to preach the

spiritual causes and lessons attributed to New England's
misfortunes at the time, a definite trend toward secular
interest and worldliness grew among the residents of the
region.

They were not all necessarily the degenerate

backsliders of whom ministers complained, but King Philip's
War did make colonists more aware of the assorted forces
working against them and more willing to take action to
protect their interests.

Of course, this assertiveness

disturbed the orthodox clergy who clung to the traditional
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norms of communal and congregational discipline, but even
while delivering jeremiads against internal evils which
threatened the mission, they continued to hold hope for
ultimate salvation, through "the undeserved favours of God"
whose "mercy endureth for ever."76
Numerous New England writers cited scriptural
precedents to draw some positive encouragement from God's
"fatherly chastisements," during the last quarter of the
seventeenth century.

Quoting Psalm 118, Mary Rowlandson

pondered how "the Lord hast chastened me sore, yet he hath
not given me over to death."

Increase Mather even found

reason to rejoice in God's punishment of the colonists.

"As

many as I love," he found the Lord proclaiming in the Book
of Revelation, "I rebuke and chasten."77 As long as they
continued to feel the effects of providential correction,
therefore, New Englanders could be confident of God's love.
Humans could never attain perfection, so divine rebukes were
good signs to Puritans who looked to the future, as long as
their fellow colonists reacted to the trials with the proper
spirit of humility and repentence.
John Higginson encouraged the effort by quoting the
Book of Chronicles, wherein the Lord promised, "If my
people, who are called by my name, shall humble themselves,
and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways,
then will I hear their prayers, forgive their sins, and heal
their land;

and mine eyes, and mine heart, shall be upon

them perpetually for good!"

Mather concurred;

"when a
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Sinful People Humble themselves before the Almighty God, it
is an Hopeful And an Happy Sympton, that He will not utterly
Destroy such a People."78 On the other hand, he cited the
example of Sodom, where the people disregarded the Lord's
warnings and refused to reform, and therefore "God sent a
fire upon the town that made it an eternal desolation."

The

Almighty did not want to destroy New England because, as
Mather pointed out, "The Great God is greatly Glorify'd by
the prosperity of His People."

79

Still, sincere

reformation was necessary in order to regain redemption and
a return to favor.
In spite of the monumental task of spreading
reformation throughout the colony, Higginson had faith that
"there are as yet many signs of his gracious presence with
us," most significantly "in and with the hearts and souls of
a considerable number of his people in New-England."

Samuel

Nowell, speaking in his usual militaristic tone, expressed
confidence that the colonists had "Spirit and Courage
enough" to meet the challenges and described them as "a
People bred up in this Country, that have the heart of
Lions."

The major concern, of course, revolved around the

fortitude of the younger generation, an age-old theme.
While pointing out that "the body of the second Generation
be wofully degenerate," Cotton Mather admitted,
"nevertheless there are some of them (and through Grace
many) that are eminently faithfull to the Lord Jesus and his
interest, being of the same Principles & Spirit, that their
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blessed Fathers were of before them.”80 Hope was not lost.
Despite all the trials and hardships, not the least of which
was the slow progress toward true repentance, a glimmer of
optimism remained that the Lord still had work for the
colonists to accomplish in New England and that enough of
them would remain worthy to warrant His favor.
Realistically, even the clerical jeremiahs had to hold out
some promise of success;

anything less would have

represented an acknowledgment of failure.
The postwar period was part of a learning process for
Puritan New Englanders.

They had to learn many

lessons— some good, some bad;

some willingly, others

reluctantly— about themselves and both the physical and
supernatural world around them.

Like it or not, even

devout, orthodox Puritans had to realize that the nature of
their mission had to change, inevitably, in response to
forces affecting New England from within as well as from
outside.

An important lesson appeared in the optimistic

outlook for God's continued favor;

the errand could

persist, even if in an altered form.

King Philip's War and

the troubled years that followed accentuated the changes
occurring in the region, and of course, this illumination
startled and disturbed conservatives.

Still, they predicted

that enough of the original spirit, if not all of the
original conventions, remained by the end of the century to
keep the errand into the wilderness alive, if only the
colonists would learn their lessons from the trials of the
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period.

According to Thomas Wheeler, the most significant

and long-lasting message which emerged for New Englanders
was the need "to trust and Rely upon [God] in the sorest
straits, and . . .

to wait patiently for Deliverance in the

greatest danger that may befall them."

They must never

forget the mercy and goodness of their Creator.

The "Lord

hath made his wonderful works to be remembered," wrote
Wheeler, "and he would have his People to tell them to their
Children, that they might also declare them to their
Children."81 If New Englanders could extract this simple
lesson from their deliverances of the period, then hope
remained for the future.
In a symbolic conclusion to his narrative of King
Philip's War, Benjamin Church unwittingly summed up the
intellectual legacies of the post-war period.

One of the

last bands of Indians captured by Church's company
supposedly included an old native man named "Conscience."
"Conscience said the Captain (smiling)," when he heard the
captive's name, "then the War is over, for that was what
they were searching for, it being much wanting.

. . .»82

Church, not known for his strict piety, may have intended
the allegory as a slap at the more insistent orthodox
leaders, but he was more insightful than he intended.
Throughout the last quarter of the seventeenth century,
Massachusetts colonists were undergoing an examination of
conscience.

Not all of them, of course, intended the

process as a cleansing or renewing endeavor in the spiritual
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sense, as clergymen like the Mathers insisted.

In a more

general way, New Englanders at the time were taking a new
look at themselves and how they fit into the world around
them.

King Philip's War did not cause all of the changes

underway in the colonies during the period, but it made the
colonists more sensitive to them and thus influenced the
ways in which the settlers of the New England frontier
viewed the changing situation.
traumatic period.

They lived through a

The search for conscience did not end in

1676, as Church suggested.

Rather, the whole postwar period

involved a process of trying to define or redefine the
collective conscience of the New England mission to cope
with present trials and to carry the experiment into the
future.
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CONCLUSION

In 1676, Increase Mather saw "good reason to hope that
this Day of Trouble is near to an end."

Samuel Nowell

agreed two years later, stating, "Our own greatest tryals
seem to me to be behind."1 Such optimistic predictions
followed closely Metacom's death and the defeat of his
scattered bands.

At the time, neither these clergymen nor

any other New Englanders could have foreseen that the recent
adversity would extend any farther than the immediate
aftermath of the conflict.

But, the challenges to the

errand into the wilderness did not die with the native
warriors;

rather, the legacies of King Philip's War

lingered throughout the ensuing decades, and new attacks
appeared on several fronts.

King Philip's War was not the

sole or direct cause of all of New England's accumulated
trials during the last quarter of the seventeenth century,
It was, however, the first in a series of crises, and it was
the event to which contemporary Massachusetts colonists
continually referred.

Some of the direct legacies of the

war persisted throughout the period, but more significantly,
the struggle against Metacom initiated an era of general
tension.

As a result, New England underwent a number of

changes during the decades following King Philip's War.
319
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Ethnically, the period witnessed the virtual
elimination from the area of colonial settlement of any
Indian bands not under the direct control of the provincial
government.

Nearly all of the tribes residing on the

Massachusetts frontiers, including the Nipmucks of the
interior, joined with Metacom's Wampanoags in open enmity
against the colonies, and the English undertook to erase any
hostile elements from the region.

In the end, the depletion

of the native population attested to the success of the
colonists' campaigns.

2

Even the Praying Indians who lived

within the province's jurisdiction suffered the effects of
the conflict.

During the war they experienced distrust,

confinement, and violence from their white neighbors;

after

1676, the Praying Indians still faced prejudice and physical
restrictions.

Even the Apostle, John Eliot, expressed

concern by 1690 that "There is a cloud, a dark cloud upon
the work of the gospel among the poor Indians."3 Although
the missionary effort did go on, King Philip's War and the
continuing anxiety adversely affected the atmosphere of
cultural relations in the colonies.
Economically, New Englanders paid for King Philip's War
throughout the period, and in fact, the lingering deficits
still existed when King William's War erupted in 1689.
Actually, the solution to the problem proved as disruptive
as the expenditures themselves.

The Massachusetts

government had to resort to unprecedented levels of taxation
to replenish the treasury, but towns as well as individuals
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did their best to avoid the multiple rates.

Some colonists

attempted to gain formal abatements or deferments from
Boston, while others simply refused to pay their levies.
Therefore, recovering from the deficits of King Philip's War
represented an ongoing source of contention, on both the
local and the provincial level.
Demographically, the scars of King Philip's War did not
soon disappear from the Massachusetts frontier.

Over 600

soldiers plus countless noncombatants lost their lives in
the conflict.4 Even more disruptive, in the long run, were
the effects of the war on the frontier settlements.

The

more exposed plantations, such as Deerfield, Northfield,
Groton, and Lancaster experienced periods of complete
abandonment, while other frontier communities such as
Springfield, Westfield, and Northampton suffered from direct
native attacks and persistent fears thereof.

In any case, a

major emphasis throughout Massachusetts after the war
involved government orders and clergymen's admonitions for
compact settlement.

The effort was an ongoing struggle, and

with continued threats on the frontiers, the search for
stable, permanent community order was never accomplished in
some places before the outbreak of King William's War.

The

physical wounds of King Philip's War did not heal quickly
because of the lingering uneasiness, and when the new
conflict erupted in 1689, some of the damaged areas
collapsed again.

Although not completely stymied by the

initial conflict, the face of the Massachusetts frontier was
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definitely altered by the experiences of King Philip's War.
Political concerns further compounded the recovery
effort in New England.

On the provincial level, the crown

revoked the cherished Massachusetts charter in 1684 and in
its place instituted the Dominion of New England.

The

colonists viewed this development not only as an
infringement upon their civil privileges but also as a
spiritual challenge, just as serious as the Indian war,
since the charter represented the basis of the errand into
the wilderness.

Massachusetts residents overcame this trial

with the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and throughout the
period, the colonists expressed a preference for familiar
trusted leaders.

They displayed this same preference on the

local level, but the upheaval which occurred in Boston never
appeared in the scattered towns because residents
consistently reelected thier established selectmen without
interruption.

This vote of confidence, however, was

accompanied by a new spirit of assertive’* ss by townspeople
all over the colony, as countless towns enacted restrictions
on the traditional powers of their local leaders.

Only in

isolated militia affairs did notable local disruptions
occur.

If the trials of the period, beginning with King

Philip's War, reminded colonists of their preference for the
old order, the accumulated challenges also taught them to
become more active in protecting their own interests.
The collective New England mind naturally underwent
changes in response to the unprecedented level of upheaval
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in the colonies during the last quarter of the seventeenth
century.

The colonists faced new challenges, both

physically and intellectually, and coping with the tensions
left its mark on the colonial psyche.

As noted, New

Englanders became ever watchful of potential, in any form,
and throughout the period they maintained 11a warlike
Posture," ready to respond to the slightest threat.5
Ministers and laymen alike warned their brethren to stay
prepared against the forces of evil that attacked the
mission.

The Reverend Samuel Nowell, in particular, advised

the colonists to "Put on your spiritual Armour" and "look to
that Breast-plate of Righteousness.1,6 The jeremiads of the
period blasted the apparent spiritual decline in the
colonies and warned of impending doom if the colonists
failed to dedicate themselves to reformation.

But the

sermons also included the optimistic messages that God still
had work for the Englishmen to do in America and that enough
worthy colonists remained to merit His continued
approbation.

New England had changed in the half-century

since John Winthrop and his followers inaugurated the
errand, and even the jeremiahs had to recognize that fact.
But the experiences of the last quarter of the seventeenth
century had provided the lesson that the mission could
survive through periods of turmoil and adversity.
colonies had survived King Philip's War;

The

they could

persevere through any challenge, according to the orthodox
clergy, if only the residents would place their ultimate
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faith in God.
King Philip's War proved to be the focal point of a
period of trial for the New England colonies.

The conflict

was the first crisis in a quarter-century of almost constant
tension.

Even after Metacom's defeat, the lingering

legacies and the appearance of new challenges kept the
colonists from truly recovering any sense of physical or
mental tranquility before the next wave of warfare broke out
in 1689.

But the troubled times also provided valuable

lessons for the future of the errand into the wilderness.
The colonists learned that despite facing overwhelming
obstacles— including the destruction of frontier towns, the
loss of their charter, huge economic deficits, and the
alarming spread of worldliness— the New England colonies
would survive.

Further, the crucial decades represented a

period of maturation and helped to redefine the mission.
The colonists were confronted with both worldly and
spiritual problems on an unprecedented scale, and the
experiences had to be incorporated into the New England way.
The errand was originally founded on idealistic visions;
King Philip's War and the related legacies forced New
Englanders to adapt and respond with greater flexibility and
practicality to assure the future of the mission.
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Mather, "Brief History,"142;
Arms," 286.

Nowell, "Abraham in

2. See, Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population
Decline," 1-24; Cook, "Disease and the Extinction of the
New England Indians," 485-508.
3. Cited in, Mather, Magnalia. I, 577.
4. Jennings, Invasion of America, 324; Leach,
Flintlock and Tomahawk, 243-244; Melvoin, "New England
Outpost," 159.
5. John Pynchon to the Governor and Council, January
18, 1691/2.
Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 242; MA,
37:214.
6. Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 278, 285, 293.

325

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.

Primary Sources

The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province
of the Massachusetts Bay.
21 vols.
Boston: Wright
and Potter, 1869-1922.
Baldwin, Thomas E., comp. Vital Records of Deerfield,
Massachusetts to the Year 1850. Boston: Wright and
Potter, 1920.
Bridenbaugh, Carl, ed. The Pynchon Papers, Letters of
John Pynchon, 1654-1700.
Boston:
Colonial Society
of Massachusetts, 1982.
Burt, Henry M . , ed. The First Century of the History of
Springfield;
The Official Records from 1636 to 1736.
2 vols.
Springfield: Henry M. Burt, 1898.
"Case of John Gould, Charged with Treason, (May 1686)."
Massachusetts Historical Society Collections.
27
(1858).
C[hurch], T[homas].
"Entertaining Passages Relating to
Philip's War which began in the Year 1675." in Slotkin
and Folsom, eds. So Dreadfull a Judgment. See,
Slotkin and Folsom, (secondary listing).
Drake, Samuel G. , ed. New From New-England.
Boston: Coolidge and Wiley, 1850.

1676.

Reprint.

Easton, John.
"A Relacion of the Indyan Warre, 1675." in
Lincoln, ed. Narratives of the Indian Wars. See,
Lincoln, (secondary listing).
Eliot, John.
"An Account of Indian Churches in New England
(1673)." Massachusetts Historical Society Collections
10 (1809).
________ . "A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel
Among the Indians in New England, in the Year 1670."
in Charles W. Eliot, ed. American Historical
Documents, 1000-1904. New York: P. F. Collier
and Son, Corp., 1938.
326

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

327
Force, Peter. Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally
to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress of the
Colonies xn North America From the Discovery of the
Country to the Year 1776. 4 vols.
1847. Reprint.
Gloucester:
Peter Smith, 1963.
Further Letters on King Philip's W a r . Providence:
Society of Colonial Wars, 1923.
Gookin, Daniel.
"Historical Collections of the Indians in
New England (1674)." Massachusetts Historical Society
Collections. 1 (1792).
________ . An Historical Account of the Doings and
Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England
in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677. 1836. Reprint.
New York: Arno Press, 1972.
Green, Samuel A., ed. The Early Records of Groton,
Massachusetts, 1662-1707- Groton:
Privately
Printed, 1880.
________ . The Town Records of Groton, Massachusetts, 16621678. Cambridge: University ? r e & , 1879.
Gyles, John.
"Memoirs of Odd Adventures, Strange
Deliverances, etc., in the Captivity of John Gyles,
Esq." in Drake, ed, Indian Captivities. See, Drake,
(secondary listing).
Hale, John.
"A Modest Inquiry into the Nature of Witchcraft
(1702)." in Burr, ed. Narratives of the Witchcraft
Cases. See, Burr, (secondary listing).
Hall, Michael G., Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael G. Kammen,
eds. The Glorious Revolution in America:
Documents
on the Colonial Crisis of 1689., Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
Hampshire County Massachusetts Court Records, 1677-1728.
Deerfield. Henry Flynt Library. Microfilm.
Hampshire County Massachusetts Probate Court Records, 16601690. Mormon Genealogical Library. Microfilm.
Hubbard, William.
The History of the Indian Wars in New
England from the First Settlement to the Termination
of the War with King Philip, in 1677, from the
Original Work by the Rev.~ William Hubbard (1677) .
Edited by Samuel G. Drake.
2 vols.
1865. Reprint.
New York: Burt Franklin, 1971.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

328
H[utchinson], R[ichard].
"The Wars in New-England Visibly
Ended, 1677." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives of the
Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary listing).
Hutchinson, Thomas. The History of the Colony and Province
of Massachusetts Bay. Lawrence S. Mays, ed.
Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1936.
"Indian Children put to Service, 1676," New England
Historical and Genealogical Register. 8 (1854).
Massachusetts Archives. State of Massachuetts.
the Secretary of State.

Office of

Massachusetts Court Records.
State of Massachusetts.
of the Secretary of State.

Office

Mather, Cotton. Bonifacius: An Essay Upon the Good.
Edited by David Levin.
1710. Reprint.
Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1966.
________ . "Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning." in Burr, ed.
Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases. See, Burr,
(secondary listing).
________ . "A Cloud of Witnesses." in Marks, ed. Mathers
on Dancing. See, Marks, (secondary listing).
________ . "Decennium Luctuosum." in Lincoln, ed.
Narratives of the Indian Wars. See, Lincoln,
(secondary listing).
________ . Humiliations Follow'd With Deliverances. 1697.
Reprint. Vol. 1 of Narratives of Indian Captivities.
Wilcomb Washburn, ed. Ill vols. New York: Garland
Publishing Co., 1977.
________ . Magnalia Christi Americana.
Silas Andrus and Son, 1855.

2 vols.

Hartford:

________ . "Memorable Providences Relating to Witchcrafts and
Possessions." in Burr, ed. Narratives of the
Witchcraft Cases. See, Burr, (secondary listing).
________ . The Present State of New England.
Samuel Green, 1690.

Boston:

________ . "The Wonders of the Invisible World." in Burr, ed.
Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases. See, Burr,
(secondary listing).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

329
Mather, Increase.
"An Arrow Against Profane and Promiscuous
Dancing Drawn out of the Quiver of the Scriptures
(1685)." in Marks, ed. Mathers on Dancing. See,
Marks, (secondary listing).
________ . "The Autobiography of Increase Mather."
by M. G. Hall.
Proceedings of the American
Antiquarian Society. 71 (1961).

Edited

________ . "A Brief Account Concerning Several Agents of New
England." in Charles M. Andrews, ed. Narratives of
the Insurrections, 1675-1690. New York:
Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1915.
________ . "A Brief History of the War with the Indians in
New England." in Slotking and Folsom, eds. So
Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and Folsom,
(secondary listing).
________ . "Diary of Increase Mather, 1675-1676."
Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings.
ser.
13 (1899/1900).

2nd

________ . "An Earnest Exhortation to the Inhabitants of
New England." in Slotkin and Folsom, eds. So
Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and Folsom,
(secondary listing).
Melvoin, Richard I., ed. Deerfield Town Book, 1670-1729.
Deerfield: Unpublished transcript from original
records, 1981-1983.
Moody, Robert E., ed. The Saltonstall Papers, 1607-1815.
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1972.
Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages, 1654-1853.
Northampton:
Forbes Library Microfilm, #16.
Northampton Town Records.
Microfilm, #56.

Northampton:

Forbes Library

Nourse, Henry S., ed. The Birth, Marriage, and Death
Register, Church Records and Epitaphs of Lancaster
Massachusetts, 1643-1850. Lancaster: w. J.
Coulter, 1890.
The Early Records of Lancaster, Massachusetts,
1643-1725. Lancaster: W. J. Coulter, 1884.
Nowell, Samuel.
"Abraham in Arms." in Slotkin and Folsom,
eds.
So Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and
Folsom, (secondary listing).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

330
Powell, Walter L. "Edward Taylor's Westfield: An Edition
of the Westfield 'Town Records.'" PhD Dissertation:
Kent State University.
(Includes Miscellaneous
Records, 1675-1694; Westfield Town Records, 16961765; Grants of Land at Worronoco, 1658-1725;
Westfield Land Records.)
Pulsifer, David, ed. Records of the Colony of New
Plymouth.
vols.
Boston: William White,
1859.
Rawson, Grindel.
"Account of an Indian Visitation (1698)."
Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. 10
(1809).
Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of
Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692. 3 vols.
Boston:
County of Suffolk, 1901.
Records of Salem Witchcraft, Copied from the Original
Documents. 2 vols.
1864-1865. Reprint.
New
York: Da Capa Press, 1969.
Rice, Franklin P., ed. Records of the Proprietors of
Worcester, Massachusetts. Worcester:
Worcester
Society of Antiquity, 1881.
Rowlandson, Mary.
"Narrative of the Captivity and
Restauration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson."
in Slotkin
and Folsom, eds, So Dreadfull a Judgment. See,
Slotkin and Folsom, (secondary listing).
Sainsbury, W. N . , ed. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial
Series. 40 vols.
1860-1939.
Reprint.
Vaduz:
Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1964.
S[altonstall], N[athaniel].
"A Continuation of the State
of New-England, 1676." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives
of the Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary
listing).
________ . "A New and Further Narrative of the State of NewEngland, 1676." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives of the
Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary listing).
________ . "The Present State of New-England with Respect to
the Indian War, 1675." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives
of the Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary
listing).
[Sewall, Samuel].

"Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729."

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

331
vols. Massachusetts Historical Society Collections.
45-46 (1878-1879).
Sheldon, George, ed.
"Three Letters Written by Gov.
Leverett in 1675— Newly Brought to Light," New
England Historical and Genealogical Register.
48 (1894).
Shurtleff, Nathaniel B., ed. Records of the Governor and
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England.
5 vols.
Boston: William White, 1854.
Smith, Joseph H . , ed.
Colonial Justice in Western
Massachusetts (1639-1702); The Pynchon Court
Record. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1961.
Stockwell, Quinton.
"The Captivity of Quinton Stockwell."
in Drake, ed. Indian Captivities. See, Drake,
(secondary listing).
Tompson, Benjamin.
"New England Crisis, or a Brief
Narrative of New England's Lamentable Estate at
Present." in Slotkin and Folsom, eds. So
Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and Folsom,
(secondary listing).
"A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences that
have Hapned in the Warre between the English and the
Indians in New-England (1676)." in King Philip's
War Narratives. Ann Arbor: University Micro
films, Inc., 1966.
Vital Records of Groton, Massachusetts to . . . 1849.
2 vols.
Salem: Essex Institute, 1926.
Warren, Thomas B. Births, Marriages and Deaths in
Springfield, 1639-1843. MSS.
1897. Mormon
Genealogical Library. Microfilm.
Wheeler, Thomas.
"A Thankefull Remembrance of God's Mercy
to Several Persons at Quabaug or Brookfield." in
Slotkin and Folsom, ed. So Dreadfull a Judgment.
See, Slotkin and Folsom, (secondary listing).
Whitmore, William H . , ed. The Colonial Laws of
Massachusetts, 1672-1686. Boston:
1887.
________ . The Massachusetts Civil List for the Colonial
and Provincial Periods, 1630-1774. 1870. Reprint.
Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1969.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

332
"Winthrop Papers.11 Massachusetts Historical Society
Collections. 41 (1871).

II.

Secondary Sources

Allen, David Grayson. In English Ways. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
Axtell, James. The European and the Indian: Essays in
the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
________ .The Invasion Within:
The Contest of Cultures
in Colonial North America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
________ . "The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness."
William and Mary Quarterly.
3rd ser. 29 (1972):
335-366.
________ . "The Vengeful Women of Marblehead: Robert
Roules's Deposition of 1677." William and Mary
Quarterly. 3rd ser. 31 (1974):647-652.
________ . "The White Indians of Colonial America."
William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser.
32 (1975):
55-88.
Andrews, Charles M . , ed. Narratives of the Insurrections.
1675-1690. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1915.
Barnes, Viola F. The Dominion of New England; A Study in
British Colonial Policy. New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Co., 1960.
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad.
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.

Madison:

Biglow, William. History of the Town of Natick,
Massachusetts. Boston: Marsh, Capen & Lyon, 1830.
Bodge, George M. Soldiers in King Philip's War.
Leominster:
Privately Printed, 1896.
Booth, Sally Smith. The Witches of Early America.
York: Hastings House Publishers, 1975.
Bowen, Richard L.

Early Rehoboth:

New

Documented Historical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

333
Studies of Families and Events in This Plymouth
Colony Townshship. Rehoboth:
Privately Printed,
1945.
________ . Massachusetts Records, A Handbook for
Genealogists, Historians, Lawyers and Other
Researchers. Rehoboth:
Privately Printed, 1957.
Boyer, Paul and Stephen Nissenbaum.
Salem Possessed:
The Social Origins of Witchcraft. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1974.
Bramson, Leon and George Goethals, eds. War:
Studies
from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology. New
York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1964.
Brayton, Abbott A. and Stephana Landwehr.
The Politics of
War and Peace: A Survey of Thought. Washington:
University Press of America, Inc., 1981.
Breen, Timothy H.
"The Character of the Good Ruler:
A
Study of Puritan Political Ideas in New England,
1630-1730." PhD Dissertation: Yale University, 1968.
________ . "Persistent Localism:
English Social Change and
the Shaping of New England Institutions." William
and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser.
32 (1975):3-28.
________ . Puritans and Adventurers:
in Early America. New York:
Press, 1980.

Change and Persistence
Oxford University

Burr, George L . , ed. Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases,
1648-1706. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons,
1914.
Carroll, Peter N. Puritanism and the Wilderness:
The
Intellectual Significance of the New England Frontier,
1629-1700. New York:
Columbia University Press,
1969.
Celebration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the
Settlement of Hadley, Massachusetts. Northampton:
Bridgman and Childs, 1859.
Coblentz, Stanton A. From Arrow to Atom Bomb.
A. S. Barnes and Co., 1967.

New York:

Cook, Frederic W. Historical Data Relating to Counties,
Cities and Towns in Massachusetts. Boston:
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1948.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

334
Cook, Sherburne F.
"Interracial Warfare and Population
Decline Among the New England Indians."
Ethnohistory. 20 (1973):l-24.
________ . "The Significance of Disease in the Extinction
of the New England Indians." Human Biology. 45
(1973):485-508.
Crandall, Ruth. Tax and Valuation Lists of Massachusetts
Towns Before 1776, Finding List for the Microfilm
Edition. Cambridge: Charles Warren Center for
Studies in American History, 1971.
Davis, Thomas M. and Virginia L. Davis. Edward Taylor
versus Solomon Stoddard:
The Nature of the Lord1s
Supper. Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1981.
Demos, John.
Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the
Culture of Early New England. New York:
Oxford
University Press, 1982.
Drake, Samuel G., ed.
Indian Captivities or Life in the
Wigwam. Auburn:
Derby and Miller, 1852.
Dunn, Richard S. Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop
Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962.
Ellis, George W. and John E. Morris. King Philip's W a r .
New York: Grafton Press, 1906.
Flagg, Charles A. A Guide to Massachusetts Local History.
Salem:
Salem Press, 1907.
Grant, Frank, ed. The History of the Celebration of the
250th. Anniversary of the Incorporation of the Town
of Westfield, Massachusetts. Concord:
Rumford
Press, 1919.
Green, Samuel A. Two Chapters in the Early History of
Groton, Massachusetts. Boston: David Clapp and
Son, 1882.
________ . An Historical Sketch of Groton, Massachusetts,
1655-1890. Groton:
Privately Printed, 1894.
________ . Groton in the Witchcraft Times.
Privately Printed, 1883.

Groton:

Greven, Philip J . , Jr.
Four Generations:
Population,
Land and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

335
Hall, Michael G. Edward Randolph and the American
Colonies, 1676-1703. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1960.
Hart, Albert Bushnell.
Commonwealth History of
Massachusetts. New York:
States History Co., 1927.
Hurd, Duane H., ed. History of Worcester County,
Massachusetts. 2 vols.
Boston:
C. F. Jewett and
Co., 1879.
Innes, Stephen.
Labor in a New Land: Economy and Society
in Seventeenth-Century Springfield. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983.
Jennings, Francis.
The Invasion of America:
Indians,
Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
Johnson, Clifton. Hampden County, 1636-1936. 2 vols.
New York: American Historical Society, Inc., 1936.
Johnson, Richard R.
"The Search for a Usable Indian: An
Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England."
Journal of American History. 64 (1977/78):
623-651.
Judd, Sylvester.
History of Hadley.
H. R. Hutting and Co., 1905.

Springfield:

Kawashima, Yasu.
"Jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts Over
the Indians in Massachusetts, 1689-1763." New
England Quarterly. 42 (1969):532-550.
Kellaway, William.
The New England Company, 1649-1776.
New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1961.
Kences, James E.
"Some Unexplored Relationships of Essex
County Witchcraft to the Indian Wars of 1675 and 1676."
Essex Institute Historical Collections. 120
(1984):179-212.
Koehler, Lyle.
"Red-White Power Relationships and Justice in
the Courts of Seventeenth-Century New England."
American Indian Cultural and Research Journal.
3:4 (1979):1-32.
Lauber, Almon W. Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within
the Present Limits of the United States. New
York:
Columbia University Press, 1913.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336
Leach, Douglas. Arms For Empire; A Military History of
the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763.
New York: MacMillan Company, 1973.
________ . Flintlock and Tomahawk.
Company, 1958.

New York:

MacMillan

________ . The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763.
New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1966.
Lewis, Theodore B. "Land Speculation and the Dudley Council
of 1686." William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser.
31 (1973):255-272.
________ . "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution, 16601692." PhD Dissertation: University of Wisconsin,
1967.
Lincoln, Charles H., ed. Narratives of the Indian Wars,
1675-1699. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1913.
Lincoln, William.
Worcester:

History of Worcester, Massachusetts.
Charles Hersey, 1862.

Lockridge, Kenneth A. A New England Town, The First
Hundred Years. Expanded Edition.
New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1985.
________ and Alan Kreider.
"The Evolution of Massachusetts
Town Government, 1640 to 1740." William and Mary
Quarterly. 3rd ser.
23 (1966):549-574.
Lovejoy, David S. The Glorious Revolution in America.
New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
Lucas, Paul R. Valley of Discord:
Church and Society
Along the Connecticut River, 1635-1725. Hanover:
University Press of New England, 1976.
McManis, Douglas R. Colonial New England: A Historical
Geography. New York: Oxford University Press,
1975.
Mank, Russell W . , Jr.
"Family Structure in Northampton,
Massachusetts, 1654-1729." PhD Dissertation:
University of Denver, 1975.
Marks, Joseph E., Ill, ed. The Mathers on Dancing.
Brooklyn: Dance Horizons, 1975.
Marvin, Abijah P.

History of the Town of Lancaster,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

337
Massachusetts.

Lancaster:

Solon Wilder, 1879.

Melvoin, Richard I. "New England Outpost: War and Society
in Colonial Frontier Deerfield, Massachusetts." PhD
Dissertation: University of Michigan, 1983.
Miller, Perry. Errand into the Wilderness.
Belknap Press, 1956.
________ . Nature*s Nation.
1967.

Cambridge:

Cambridge:

Belknap Press,

________ . The New England Mind, From Colony to Province.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Millis, Walter. Military History. Washington:
American Historical Association, Service Center for
Teachers of History.
Publ. #39, 1961.
Morgan, Edmund S., ed. Puritan Political Ideas, 15581794. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,
1965.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. Builders of the Bay Colony.
Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981.
Murdock, Kenneth B. , ed.
by Cotton Mather.

Maqnalia Christi Americana.
Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1977.

Nash, Gary B. Red, White and Black.
Prentice-Hall, 1974.

Englewood Cliffs:

Parsons, Herbert C. Puritan Outpost: A History of the
Town and People of Northfield, Massachusetts.
New York: MacMillan Company, 1937.
Pope, Robert G. The Half-Way Covenant;
Church Membership
in Puritan New England. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969.
Powell, Samuel Chilton. Puritan Village: The Formation
of a New England Town. Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press, 1963.
Powell, Walter L. "Edward Taylor's Westfield: An Edition
of the Westfield 'Town Records.'" PhD Dissertation:
Kent State University, 1982.
Proceedings and Addresses at the Dedication of the Town
Hall, in Swansea, Massachusetts. Fall River:
Alney and Milne, 1892.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

338
Proceedings of the Centennial Celebration at Groton,
Massachusetts. Groton, 1876.
Ray, Sister Mary Augustina, B.V.M. American Opinion of
Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century.
New York: Octagon Books, 1974.
Rutman, Darrett B. Winthrop1s Boston: A Portrait of a
Puritan Town, 1630-1649. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965.
Salisbury, Neal E.
"Conquest of the 'Savage1: Puritans,
Puritan Misisionaries, and Indians, 1620-1680."
PhD Dissertation: University of California at Los
Angeles, 1972.
________ . "Red Puritans:
The 'Praying Indians' of
Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot." William and
Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser.
31 (1974):27-54.
Segal, Charles M. and David C. Stineback.
Puritans,
Indians, and Manifest Destiny. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1977.
Sharp, Morrison.
"Leadership and Democracy in the Early
New England System of Defense." American
Historical Review. 50 (1944-45):244-260.
Sheldon, George. A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts.
2 vols.
Deerfield:
Pocumtuck Valley Memorial
Association, 1895.
Sibley, John L. Biographical Sketches of Graduates of
Harvard University. 17 vols.
Cambridge:
University Press, 1873.
Simmons, William S. "Cultural Bias in the New England
Puritans' Perception of Indians." William and
Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser.
(1981):56-72.
Slotkin, Richard. Regeneration Through Violence: The
Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860.
Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973.
________ and James K. Folsom, eds. So Dreadfull a
Judgment, Puritan Responses to King Philip's War,
1676-1677. Middletown: Wesleyan Univeristy
Press, 1978.
Temple, J. H. and George Sheldon. A History of the Town
of Northfield, Massachusetts. Albany: Joel
Munsell, 1875.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

339
Tichi, Cecelia, intro. The Present State of New-England,
Being a Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians,
by William Hubbard.
1677. Reprint. Bainbridge:
York Mail-Print, Inc., 1972.
Trumbull, Henry. History of the Indian Wars.
Phillips and Sampson, 1846.

Boston:

Trumbull, James Russell.
History of Northampton,
Massachusetts. Northampton:
Press of the
Gazette Printing Co., 1898.
Turney-High, Harry H. Primitive War: Its Practice and
Concepts. 2nd ed. Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1971.
Vaughan, Alden T. New England Frontier:
Puritans and
Indians, 1620-1675. Rev. ed. New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1979.
_________ and Daniel Richter.
"Crossing the Cultural Divide:
Indians and New Englanders, 1605-1763." Proceedings
of the American Antiguarian Society. 90 (1980):
23-99.
Walsh, Maurice N., ed. War and the Human Race.
York: Elsevies Publishing Co., 1971.

New

Wright, Carroll D. Report on the Custody and Condition
of the Public Records of Parishes, Towns and
Counties.
Boston, 1885.
Wright, Quincy. A Study of W a r . 2 vols.
University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Chicago:

________ . A Study of W ar. Abridged ed. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Young, Christine Alice.
From "Good Order" to Glorious
Revolution:
Salem, Massachusetts, 1628-1689.
Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VITA
Michael Joseph Puglisi
The author was born in Arlington, Virginia, October 2,
1958. He graduated from Bishop Denis J. O'Connell High
School in Arlington, in June 1977. The author next attended
James Madison Univeristy, graduating in May 1981, Summa Cum
Laude, with Distinction in History.
In August 1981 he
entered the graduate program at the College of William and
Mary, received the M.A.
degree in 1982, and attained the
A.B.D.
level in April 1984.
The author has served as a Teaching Fellow at the
College of William and Mary, and is currently employed in
the Department of Historical Research of the Colonial
Williamsburg Foundation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

